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Survey of Maryland
Court Of Appeals Decisions
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE PERMITS RETRIAL WHEN A FINDING
ON APPEAL OF TRIAL ERROR RESULTS IN THERE BEING INSUFFI-
CIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION -
STATE v. BOONE
In State v. Boone' the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed whether the
fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause2 precludes retrial of a convicted
criminal defendant after an appellate court finds that its discounting of evidence
that should have been excluded at trial results in there being insufficient
evidence to sustain the conviction. The court held that the United States
Constitution does not prohibit retrial when a conviction is reversed after an
appellate court's determination that evidence was admitted erroneously at trial,
even though without that evidence the trier of fact could not have convicted the
defendant.'
Marcus Angelo Boone was found guilty in the Circuit Court of Prince
George's County of two counts of receiving stolen goods,4 and he appealed. The
Court of Special Appeals reversed the conviction,5 holding that evidence of stolen
goods introduced at trial over Boone's objection was tainted by an unlawful
search and seizure and that its introduction violated Boone's fourth amendment
rights.6 There was no other significant evidence introduced against Boone at
1. 284 Md. 1, 393 A.2d 1361 (1978).
2. "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb .. " U.S. CONsT. amend. V. In Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), the
Supreme Court held that the double jeopardy clause was applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment.
3. 284 Md. at 17, 393 A.2d at 1370.
4. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 467(a)(1957) (repealed by ch. 849, § 4, 1978 Md. Laws
2478).
5. Boone v. State, 39 Md. App. 20, 383 A.2d 412, modified and affd, 284 Md. 1, 393
A.2d 1361 (1978).
6. When Boone failed to pay his apartment rent, his landlord instituted proceedings
to repossess the premises. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-401(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
Judgment was rendered in favor of the landlord, see id. § 8-401(c)(2), and the district court
issued a warrant of restitution commanding the sheriff to deliver possession of the
premises to the landlord. See id. § 8-401(c)(3). While executing the warrant a deputy
sheriff found the stolen goods in question. The deputy sheriff searched Boone's apartment
thoroughly for contraband, money, weapons, and other items that the sheriffs department
would not normally put on the street during an ejectment proceeding. The search included
going through closets, furniture drawers, clothing, and boxes. While searching a walk-in
closet in the bedroom, the deputy sheriff found four credit cards and a checkbook. They
were seized, and the rest of the apartment's contents were removed to the street. Upon
investigation, the deputy sheriff learned that the checkbook and credit cards were stolen.
284 Md. at 3-6, 393 A.2d at 1362-64.
The Court of Special Appeals held that the warrantless search of Boone's personal
effects was unreasonable and that the deputy sheriff did not have probable cause to seize
the credit cards or checkbook. Boone v. State, 39 Md. App. 20, 32-33, 383 A.2d 412, 420,
modified and affd, 284 Md. 1, 393 A.2d 1361 (1978). The Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that the search and seizure could not be justified under the theories of
abandonment, inventory search, or plain view. 284 Md. at 6-11, 393 A.2d at 1364-67.
(498)
DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE
trial. Following the test for permissibility of retrials established by the Court of
Appeals in Gray v. State,7 the court held that because the evidence at issue was
"the crucial evidence, without which [Boone] could not have been convicted, 8
there was no basis for a retrial after the reversal of Boone's conviction. 9
On certiorari, the Court of Appeals held that even though the evidence at
issue was tainted, leaving insufficient admissible evidence to support the
conviction, Boone could be retried without his retrial violating the double
jeopardy clause. The court concurred in the Court of Special Appeals' conclusion
that evidence admitted at Boone's trial had been obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment and therefore held that the trial court had erred in denying
Boone's motion to suppress the evidence so obtained.'" The Court of Appeals also
agreed with the intermediate court's conclusion that had the tainted evidence
been excluded at trial, there would have been insufficient evidence as a matter
of law to support Boone's conviction." The court reached the opposite conclusion
on the permissibility of retrial, however, rejecting Gray v. State,'" upon which
the Court of Special Appeals had relied, because it had been expressly overruled
in an earlier Court of Appeals decision. 3 The Court of Appeals turned to two
Supreme Court cases, Burks v. United States"s and Greene v. Massey,5 to
determine whether Boone's retrial after reversal of his conviction would violate
the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause.
In Burks, the defendant had moved at the close of the government's case for
a judgment of acquittal, and the district court had denied the motion. The case
was submitted to the jury, which found the defendant guilty of bank robbery.
After his motion for a new trial was denied, the defendant appealed his
7. Gray v. State, 254 Md. 385, 397, 255 A.2d 5, 11 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944
(1970); see notes 68 to 71 and accompanying text infra.
8. 39 Md. App. at 33, 383 A.2d at 420.
9. Id. The Court of Special Appeals relied on Gray v. State, 254 Md. 385, 255 A.2d 5
(1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970), for the rule that retrial is permissible after
reversal of a conviction due to insufficient evidence. However, the rule established in Gray
permitting retrial after reversal for insufficient evidence was expressly overruled in
Mackall v. State, 283 Md. 100, 113-14, 387 A.2d 762, 769-70 (1978). See notes 68 to 75
and accompanying text infra.
It is not clear from the Court of Special Appeals' opinion in Boone whether it
viewed the case as primarily one of trial error or of insufficiency of the evidence, for the
court devoted little discussion to either element. While most of the court's opinion focused
on the fourth amendment issues and the permissibility of the trial court's admission into
evidence of the stolen credit cards, the court summarily cited Gray as controlling the
retrial issue. 39 Md. App. at 33, 383 A.2d at 420. Because Gray was concerned only with
the permissibility of retrials when a reviewing court determines there is insufficient
evidence in the record to support a conviction, presumably the court regarded the
insufficiency claim as controlling the case.
10. 284 Md. at 12, 393 A.2d at 1367.
11. Id. at 15, 393 A.2d at 1368.
12. 254 Md. 385, 255 A.2d 5 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970).
13. Mackall v. State, 283 Md. 100, 113-14, 387 A.2d 762, 769-70 (1978).
14. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
15. 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
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conviction to the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Having
found that the evidence against the defendant was insufficient to support his
conviction, the appellate court remanded the case to the district court, ordering
it to determine whether a judgment of acquittal should be entered or a new trial
ordered." On certiorari, the Supreme Court ruled that the permissibility of
retrial is determined by the grounds for a conviction's reversal. If a criminal
conviction is reversed due to "trial error," such as incorrect jury instructions,
failure to appoint counsel, or prosecution under a faulty indictment, the Court
held, the double joepardy clause does not bar the defendant's retrial. 7 Because
reversal of a conviction due to trial error does not address the guilt or innocence
of a defendant, but means only that a defendant has been convicted through a
defective judicial process, the defendant's interest in obtaining a fair readjudica-
tion of his guilt free from trial error coincides with society's interest in insuring
that the guilty are punished. 8
When a criminal conviction is reversed because a reviewing court deter-
mines that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the conviction,
however, the Court held in Burks, the double jeopardy clause bars the
defendant's retrial.' In such a case, the reviewing court should direct a
judgment of acquittal. 20 Because the reversal of a conviction due to evidentiary
insufficiency necessarily constitutes a determination by the appellate court that
the prosecution's case was so lacking that it should not have been submitted to
the jury, and the appellate court's direction of a judgment of acquittal is entitled
to the same absolute finality as a jury's judgment of acquittal, the Court
indicated, the government should not have an opportunity for a second chance at
a conviction.2' In Greene v. Massey, 2 the Court extended the Burks rule to the
states through the fourteenth amendment.23
In Boone the Court of Appeals noted that the issue before it had not been
resolved by the Supreme Court in Burks and Greene." Finding "no clear
direction5 from those cases as to how it should resolve Boone, the Court of
Appeals held that the fifth amendment permits the retrial of a defendant when a
finding on appeal of trial error - the erroneous admission of tainted evidence -
results in there being insufficient evidence to support the conviction. 6 The court
16. United States v. Burks, 547 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
17. 437 U.S. at 15.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 18.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 16.
22. 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
23. Id. at 24.
24. 284 Md. at 15, 393 A.2d at 1369. The Court in Greene expressly reserved the
question presented in Boone: "We express no opinion as to the double jeopardy implications
of a retrial following . . . a holding [that when a reviewing court discounts inadmissible
evidence, insufficient evidence to support the conviction will resultl." 437 U.S. at 26 n.9.
25. 284 Md. at 15, 393 A.2d at 1369.
26. Id. at 17, 393 A.2d at 1370.
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found compelling certain policy reasons for permitting the defendant's retrial
even though his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. It reasoned
that in proving its case, the state is entitled to rely on the rulings of the trial
judge with respect to the admissibility of evidence." If the trial court rules that
the evidence is admissible, the state is not required to put on further evidence
anticipating that the trial court's ruling will be reversed on appeal; the state is
entitled to rest its case in reliance on the trial court's rulings and need not
marshall every shred of evidence it has against the defendant.' Finally, the
court noted that because it is impossible to know after the trial what additional
evidence the prosecutor would have included in the state's case had the trial
judge excluded the evidence in question, it would be unfair to the state for an
appellate court to grant the defendant immunity from further prosecution.29
In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Judge Cole argued that Boone
presented a case constituting "something more than mere trial error."30 He
concurred in the majority's ruling concerning the insufficiency of evidence, but
concluded that the reversal of the trial court's evidentiary ruling constituted an
appellate decision that the government had failed to put forth sufficient
evidence to convict the defendant and that under such circumstances retrial was
barred by the fifth amendment. Denouncing the majority's concern with
fairness to the prosecution, Judge Cole argued that the overriding concern of the
court should be fairness to the defendant under the Constitution.2 Moreover,
Judge Cole warned that the effect of the majority's decision in Boone would be to
encourage prosecutors to introduce tainted evidence in all criminal cases in
which the state's evidence would be otherwise weak. 3
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that retrial is permitted when the same
act at trial generates both trial error and evidentiary insufficiency3" ignores the
importance of the double jeopardy clause. Because the Supreme Court has
recognized that a fundamental tenet of the double jeopardy clause is that a
defendant whose conviction is unsupported by sufficient evidence may not be
27. Id. at 16, 393 A.2d at 1369.
28. Id. at 16-17, 393 A.2d at 1369.
29. Id. at 17, 393 A.2d at 1370.
30. Id. at 19, 393 A.2d at 1371 (Cole, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 21, 393 A.2d at 1372.
33. Id. at 20, 393 A.2d at 1371. Judge Cole appeared to suggest that the state would
be encouraged to proceed with, rather than discontinue, a criminal prosecution in which
most of the state's evidence was arguably tainted. Even if the defendant's conviction was
reversed on appeal, the state would have an opportunity to produce additional evidence
upon retrial. Id. Presumably, the state would find this alternative to dropping the case
attractive because of the additional time that it would have to collect incriminating
evidence.
34. It is unclear whether retrial would be permitted when evidentiary insufficiency is
found on appeal but the trial court erred in excluding admissible, incriminating evidence.
See note 80 infra.
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retried,35 an appellate court's finding of insufficient evidence to support a
conviction demands that the defendant's retrial be barred. 6 Competing consider-
ations of fairness to the prosecution and judicial economy, which the majority in
Boone found so persuasive, cannot compel an opposite result.
The prohibition against being placed twice in jeopardy is the oldest of the
protections incorporated into the Bill of Rights.3" Despite evidence to the
contrary,' one court has claimed that the prohibition on double jeopardy "seems
to have been always embedded in the common law of England, as well as in the
Roman law, and doubtless in every other system of jurisprudence, and, instead
of having a specific origin, it simply always existed."39 The double jeopardy
clause of the United States Constitution has been said to serve several purposes,
including preventing harrassment of criminal defendants, sparing defendants
the mental, physical, and emotional burdens of reprosecutions, and diminishing
the strain of reprosecution on the judicial system. 0 The Supreme Court has
stated that the heart of the double jeopardy clause is the concern that allowing
the sovereign freely to retry a citizen for the same offense would arm the
government with a potent instrument of oppression." The Court articulated the
purposes of the double jeopardy clause in Green v. United States,4 2 in which a
defendant who had been convicted only of second degree murder, after being
charged with both first and second degree murder, was retried on both charges
after reversal of his conviction. On retrial, he was convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to death. In striking down the second trial as violative of
the double jeopardy clause, the Court observed:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the
Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its
35. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11 (1978).
36. See id.
37. Slovenko, The Law on Double Jeopardy, 30 TUL. L. REV. 409, 409 (1956).
38. See, e.g., M. FRIEDLAND, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 5 (1969); Sigler, A History of Double
Jeopardy, 7 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 283, 309 (1963); Comment, Double Jeopardy: Its History,
Rationale and Future, 70 DICK. L. REV. 377, 380-81 (1966).
39. Stout v. State, 36 Okla. 744, 756, 130 P. 553, 558 (1913). Contra, Sigler, supra
note 38, at 284. Notions of a prohibition against double jeopardy can be found as early as
the Digest of Justinian, see Sigler, supra note 38, at 283, and were introduced into English
common law as a result of a controversy between Henry II and Thomas Becket, which
concerned further prosecution of clerics in the King's courts after conviction in the
ecclesiastical courts. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 152 n.5 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting); M. FRIEDLAND, supra note 38, at 5. Although Coke is the "fountainhead" of
modern double jeopardy law and was a leading exponent of its application to criminal
cases, Sigler, supra note 38, at 295, the prohibition against double jeopardy had not been
solidly established in English law by the time the United States Constitution was written,
id. at 298. Nevertheless, the double jeopardy clause was adopted by the First Congress
with little debate or indication of its intended meaning. Id. at 306.
40. Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1274
(1964).
41. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977).
42. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
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resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to
convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.3
The Supreme Court has held that the prohibition against double jeopardy
consists of three separate protections" designed to further the purposes of the
double jeopardy clause: protection against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal;"' protection against a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction;" and protection against multiple punishments for the
same offense.47 These protections are not absolute, however, and an examination
of the Court's interpretations of the double jeopardy clause in cases decided prior
to Burks reveals inconsistent holdings.
In United States v. Ball" the Supreme Court considered for the first time in
any detail the double jeopardy implications of appellate reversal of convictions. 9
Defendants' murder convictions had been overturned on appeal due to a fatally
defective indictment. On remand, the trial court dismissed the defective
indictment and then retried and convicted the defendants charged under a new
indictment. The defendants argued to the Supreme Court that their second trial
violated the double jeopardy clause. The Court held that the double jeopardy
clause did not bar the defendants' retrial: "[A] defendant, who procures a
judgment against him upon an indictment to be set aside, may be tried anew
upon the same indictment, or upon another indictment, for the same offense of
which he had been convicted."'5 Citing authority in which retrials had been
allowed to cure other errors committed at trial,5 the Court permitted retrial in
Ball to rectify prosecution under a defective indictment.
43. Id. at 187-88.
44. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75
YALE L.J. 262, 265-66 (1965).
45. E.g., Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957); United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662, 669 (1896).
46. E.g., In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
47. E.g., Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 635 (1915); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18
Wall.) 163, 168 (1873).
48. 163 U.S. 662 (1896).
49. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 13 (1978).
50. 163 U.S. at 672.
51. Id. The Court included in its list of citations four cases involving the same
defendant: Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887); Hopt v. Utah, 114 U.S. 488 (1885); Hopt v.
Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884); Hopt v. Utah, 104 U.S. 631 (1882). Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430
(1887), was the defendant's fourth appeal from a murder conviction. In each of the first
three appeals the defendant's conviction was reversed and a new trial ordered due to trial
error: 104 U.S. 631 (1882) (improper instructions); 110 U.S. 574 (1884) (defendant's
absence during part of the trial, hearsay evidence erroneously admitted, prejudicial
instructions); 114 U.S. 489 (1885) (inadequate record because jury instructions not
recorded). On the fourth appeal the defendant's conviction was affirmed, 120 U.S. at 442,
and the Court did not discuss the double jeopardy implications of the retrials.
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The Court established the "waiver rule" of double jeopardy law in Trono v.
United States,5 2 holding that regardless of the reason prompting reversal of a
conviction, a defendant who appeals his conviction waives his right to assert the
double jeopardy privilege upon retrial. In an apparent modification of this
waiver rule, however, the Court in Sapir v. United States5' reversed an appellate
court's decision to order a new trial after reversing a defendant's conviction. The
defendant in Sapir was convicted of conspiracy in a federal district court,
appealed the judgment, and obtained a reversal of his conviction. The appellate
court held that the trial court should have granted defendant's motion for
judgment of acquittal because the evidence against him was insufficient to
support the conviction. Later, however, the Court ordered a new trial upon the
government's motion to amend the judgment on the ground of newly discovered
evidence.55 Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Sapir discussed the permissi-
bility of retrials upon appellate reversal of convictions. Because a jury's verdict
of acquittal is entitled to absolute finality, he reasoned, it should make no
difference with respect to the double jeopardy clause that an appellate court
holds there is insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. A finding of
evidentiary insufficiency is equivalent to a ruling that the trial court should
have directed a judgment of acquittal. In such cases, the defendant may not be
retried because "an acquittal on the basis of lack of evidence concludes the
controversy . . . and puts it at rest under the protection of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. . . .", When, however, a defendant requests a new trial, he can be said
to have waived his double jeopardy objection, and retrial may be ordered.57 In
any case, Justice Douglas observed, retrial was permissible when trial error
caused the reversal of a conviction." Thus, the concurring opinion in Sapir
distinguished between reversals of convictions due to trial error, after which
retrials were permissible, and reversals caused by evidentiary insufficiency,
after which retrials were barred.
52. 199 U.S. 521 (1905). The Supreme Court implicitly overruled Trono in Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 197-98 (1957).
53. 199 U.S. at 533-34. Even though the defendants in Trono were acquitted at their
initial trial of murder and convicted of assault, the Court held that by appealing their
convictions they waived their double jeopardy objection entirely, and upheld their
subsequent murder convictions. The Court reasoned that "1wthen at his own request la
defendant] has obtained a new trial he must take the burden with the benefit, and go back
for a new trial of the whole case." Id. at 534. Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950),
perpetuated the waiver concept, and added that federal appellate courts had statutory
authority to order whatever relief was appropriate or equitable upon reversal of
convictions due to evidentiary insufficiency. Id.
54. 348 U.S. 373 (1955) (per curiam). The per curiam opinion consists of only a brief
statement of disposition.
55. Id. at 374.
56. Id.
57. Id. The defendant in Sapir had not requested a new trial.
58. Id.
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The distinction between permitting retrials when convictions were reversed
due to insufficient evidence and permitting retrials when convictions were
reversed due to trial error was not perpetuated by the Court. In Forman v.
United States,59 the Court upheld an appellate court's grant of a new trial to cure
improper jury instructions, and asserted sweepingly: "It is elementary in our
law that a person can be tried a second time for an offense when his prior
conviction for that same offense has been set aside by his appeal."' In Burks,
after reviewing the history of its decisions concerning the double jeopardy
clause, the Court remarked with candor that its prior holdings in cases
concerning the double jeopardy implications of the appellate reversal of
convictions could "hardly be characterized as models of consistency and
clarity."'"
The history of the double jeopardy protection afforded by Maryland law has
generally followed the inconsistent pattern established by the Supreme Court
under the Federal Constitution. The prohibition of double jeopardy in Maryland
exists not as a guarantee of the state constitution but as a matter of common
law"2 and the Federal Constitution, as applied to the states.' Maryland courts
were granted the power to review the sufficiency of evidence in 1949.1 After that
59. 361 U.S. 416 (1960).
60. Id. at 425. In interpreting Forman, the Court in Burks stated that the Forman
decision adopted the reasoning of Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). 437 U.S. at
8-9. The holding in Yates was susceptible of two readings. Construed narrowly, it held
that retrials are permissible to correct evidentiary insufficiency when defendants request
such relief, even if they request new trials only as an alternative to a judgment of
acquittal. 354 U.S. at 328. Construed broadly, it held that appellate courts may order new
trials to cure evidentiary insufficiency even if the defendant has moved only for A
judgment of acquittal. Id. It was the more expansive reading of Yates on which the Couri
apparently relied in Forman.
61. 437 U.S. at 9.
62. Neal v. State, 272 Md. 323, 327, 322 A.2d 887, 889 (1974); Pugh v. State, 271 Md.
701, 704, 319 A.2d 542, 544 (1974); State v. Barger, 242 Md. 616, 619, 220 A.2d 304, 306
(1966); Ford v. State, 237 Md. 266, 269, 205 A.2d 809, 811 (1965); Bennett v. State, 229
Md. 208, 212, 182 A.2d 815, 817 (1962); Robb v. State, 190 Md. 641, 650, 60 A.2d 211, 215
(1948).
63. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969); accord, Newton v. State, 280 Md.
260, 263, 373 A.2d 262, 264 (1977); Blondes v. State, 273 Md. 435, 442-43, 330 A.2d 169,
173 (1975); Cornish v. State, 272 Md. 312, 316, 322 A.2d 880, 883 (1974); Pugh v. State,
271 Md. 701, 704, 319 A.2d 542, 544 (1974).
64. Until 1950, the Maryland Court of Appeals had held that it was without power to
rule on the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases because the Maryland constitution
made the jury the triers of law and fact. Abbott v. State, 188 Md. 310, 313, 52 A.2d 489,
490 (1947). Therefore, the court would neither intrude upon the jury's province as judges of
fact and law, nor pass on the sufficiency of the evidence when the case was tried by the
court. A 1949 referendum amended the constitution to permit the appellate courts to rule
on the question of evidentiary insufficiency. Ch. 596, 1949 Md. Laws 1447 (current version
at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 593 (1976)). The Court of Appeals subsequently promulgated a
rule that permitted criminal defendants to make motions for judgment of acquittal, see
MD. R. P. 756, and appellate courts are currently allowed to review the sufficiency of the
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time, they took inconsistent courses of action when reversing convictions on
grounds of evidentiary insufficiency, sometimes remanding the case for a new
trial,65 and sometimes directing the entry of a judgment of acquittal.6 When
Maryland appellate courts reversed convictions due to errors committed at trial,
they held new trials permissible.
To resolve the inconsistency in the courses that appellate courts had taken
when ordering relief upon findings of insufficient evidence in the record to
support convictions, the Court of Appeals, in Gray v. State,6 devised a three-part
test for the permissibility of retrying defendants whose convictions were
reversed due to evidentiary insufficiency. The court held that if the record before
the appellate court showed that the state could put forward additional probative
evidence of the defendant's guilt at another trial, the court must reverse the
conviction and award a new trial if the interests of justice seemed to require it. 9
If the record before the appellate court showed that the state could not adduce
additional probative evidence of the defendant's guilt at a second trial, the
appellate court must direct the entry of a judgment of acquittal. 0 If the appellate
court could not determine from the record whether the state could adduce
additional probative evidence of the defendant's guilt and the interests of justice
seemed to require it, the appellate court was to vacate the judgment and remand
the case to the trial court, directing the trial court to hold a new trial if the state
could show within a given time that it could adduce additional probative
evidence of guilt, or enter a judgment of acquittal if the state could not make
such a showing." A 1970 Court of Appeals opinion admitted, however, that the
tripartite Gray test "disturbed our sense of logic .. *"72 And in 1977 the Court
of Special Appeals commented that the Gray rationale appeared to "fly in the
face of our double jeopardy concepts.7 3 Finally, in Mackall v. State, 4 the Court of
evidence in cases tried either with or without a jury when the defendant has preserved the
issue for appeal by making a motion for judgment of acquittal. See State v. Devers, 260
Md. 360, 369-71, 272 A.2d 794, 799-800, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 824 (1971); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 593 (1976).
65. See cases collected in Gray v. State, 254 Md. 385, 388 n.1, 255 A.2d 5, 7 n.1 (1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970).
66. See cases collected in id. at 388 n.2, 255 A.2d at 7 n.2.
67. Ruckle v. State, 230 Md. 580, 583, 187 A.2d 836, 838 (1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S.
816 (1963) (failure to rule on motion to quash indictment) (dictum); Willis v. Warden, 220
Md. 692, 694-95, 154 A.2d 916, 917 (1959) (failure to appoint counsel) (dictum).
Apparently no case had risen in Maryland presenting both trial error and insufficient
evidence on appeal prior to Boone.
68. 254 Md. 385, 255 A.2d 5 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1970).
69. Id. at 397, 255 A.2d at 11.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Couser v. State, 256 Md. 393, 396, 260 A.2d 334, 335 (1970). Apparently, the
logical flaw to which the court referred was the permissibility of retrials under Gray when
an appellate court found insufficient evidence to support a conviction. Id. (by implication).
73. DeLoso v. State, 37 Md. App. 101, 108, 376 A.2d 873, 878 (1977).
74. 283 Md. 100, 387 A.2d 762 (1978).
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Appeals reevaluated Gray in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burks, and
expressly overruled Gray's inconsistencies with that landmark decision.7
In Boone, the Court of Appeals initially looked to the Supreme Court's
decision in Burks to determine whether Boone's retrial was permissible under
the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause. Burks establishes a dichotomy
that apparently was intended to be dispositive of the issue of the permissibility
of retrial upon the appellate reversal of convictions. If an appellate court affixes
the label "trial error" to its reversal of a conviction, a retrial of the defendant
necessarily follows; but if an appellate court affixes the label "evidentiary
insufficiency" to its reversal of a conviction, a judgment of acquittal must be
ordered."6 When a dichotomy mandates mutually exclusive remedies, however,
the two cateogries of the dichotomy must also be mutually exclusive, for if they
are not, the dichotomy has little validity and practically no utility in the area in
which the two categories overlap.
There are two cases in which the distinction between reversal of a
conviction due to trial error and reversal due to insufficient evidence overlap. In
these cases, the same act both constitutes trial error and generates evidentiary
insufficiency." If at trial excludable incriminating evidence is admitted
erroneously and the defendant is convicted, the trial judge's erroneous ruling on
the motion to exclude the evidence constitutes trial error.8 If the wrongfully
admitted evidence comprises most or all of the state's case against the
defendant, then when the appellate court reviews the conviction and discounts
the tainted evidence there will be insufficient evidence to support the convic-
tion."
75. Id. at 113-14, 387 A.2d at 769-70. All that appears to be left of Gray after Burks
is the rule that the court must direct the entry of a judgment of acquittal when the record
indicates that the state cannot adduce additional probative evidence of guilt at a second
trial necessitated by evidentiary insufficiency. Burks makes it irrelevant whether the
record shows that the state could adduce additional probative evidence of guilt, however,
because all retrials are barred when convictions are reversed on appeal due to insufficient
evidence. See notes 19 to 23 and accompanying text supra.
76. See notes 17 to 23 and accompanying text supra.
77. The cases in which both trial error and evidentiary insufficiency occur without
being the product of the same act will not be discussed here. Cases can arise presenting
both trial error and evidentiary insufficiency without a connection between the two. For
example, improper jury instructions may be given (trial error) and defendant convicted
without sufficient evidentiary basis to sustain the conviction on appeal. It would seem that
in such cases the courts would deem the insufficiency of evidence to outweigh the
incidental trial error in the case, and would bar the defendant's retrial. The Supreme
Court in Burks faced precisely this type of problem. The trial court had denied Burks'
motion for a new trial, which was based in part on the ground of insufficient evidence, and
in so doing committed trial error. 437 U.S. at 3. The Court, however, chose the label
"insufficient evidence" rather than "trial error." See id. at 18.
78. In Burks, the Supreme Court listed the incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence as
an example of trial error. Id. at 15 (dictum).
79. This example presents the factual setting in Boone. See notes 10 & 11 and
accompanying text supra.
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The second case presenting both elements of the Burks "dichotomy" occurs
when the trial judge erroneously excludes admissible incriminating evidence
and the defendant is nevertheless convicted. If on appeal the reviewing court
determines that there is insufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, the case
presents both trial error (the trial judge's erroneous ruling on the motion to
suppress evidence) and evidentiary insufficiency."0 Thus, assuming for the
ou. Wnetner me Supreme Court intendedll U tle Dun'6N analytsis to apply ii Llll -a- i_
not clear, for in Burks the Court noted that it was not presented with the question whether
the trial court committed error by excluding prosecution evidence that would have
rebutted the appellant's claim of evidentiary insufficiency. 437 U.S. at 5 n.4. If the trial
court erroneously excludes admissible incriminating evidence and the defendant is
acquitted due to evidentiary insufficiency, Burks does not apply, for Burks presented the
tests for permissibility of retrials upon the appellate reversal of convictions. Id. at 15. If,
however, the trial court erroneously excludes admissible, incriminating evidence and the
defendant's conviction is reversed by an appellate court on the ground of evidentiary
insufficiency, it is unclear whether a Maryland appellate court would consider whether the
exclusion of the evidence constituted trial error. The state is not permitted to appeal
directly adverse pretrial evidentiary rulings, see Lohss v. State, 272 Md. 113, 117, 321
A.2d 534, 537 (1974), but there are dicta in several recent cases suggesting that in the
narrow area in which the state has the right to appeal in a criminal case, such as an
appeal from dismissal of an indictment, see MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 12-302(c)(1) (1980), pretrial suppression orders can be reviewed by the appellate court.
See Lohss v. State, 272 Md. 113, 118, 321 A.2d 534, 537 (1974) (dictum); State v. Ensor, 27
Md. App. 670, 681, 342 A.2d 1, 7 (1975) (dictum). The majority in Boone noted in dictum
that "when ... the trial court commits error by excluding prosecution evidence, which if
received, would have rebutted any claim of evidentiary insufficiency, we cannot conceive
that the rationale of Burks would apply to prohibit a retrial." 284 Md. at 16, 393 A.2d at
1369 (footnote omitted). This language suggests that the Court of Appeals would choose
the "trial error" label and permit retrial when incriminating evidence, which may have
rebutted the defendant's claim of evidentiary insufficiency, was erroneously excluded at
trial. Moreover, implicit in the court's statement is a recognition of the state's right to
raise by its own motion the question of trial error. In spite of the dictum in Boone, it does
not seem that the state should be permitted to raise by its own motion the issue of trial
error. Such a practice would, in effect, allow the state to appeal pretrial suppression
rulings, which is currently not permitted. See Lohss v. State, 272 Md. at 117, 321 A.2d at
537.
Practical considerations indicate that it is unlikely that an appellate court would
be faced with a situation in which a finding of evidentiary insufficiency could be rebutted
by correction of trial error. A jury's guilty verdict will be reversed on the ground of
evidentiary insufficiency if there was no legally sufficient evidence before the jury from
which it could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See note 100
and accompanying text infra. In cases tried without a jury, a trial court's judgment of
conviction will only be reversed if the verdict is determined to have been clearly erroneous.
See note 99 and accompanying text infra. Thus, an appellate court will reverse a
conviction on the ground of evidentiary insufficiency only in those cases in which the
prosecution's failure was clear. See note 101 and accompanying text infra. Two practical
considerations, therefore, suggest that a case presenting evidentiary insufficiency caused
by the erroneous exclusion of incriminating evidence would rarely, if ever, reach an
appellate court. First, if most of the state's evidence is excluded by a pretrial suppression
order, thereby justifying a finding of evidentiary insufficiency on appeal, the state would
probably discontinue its prosecution after weighing the cost of trial against the remote
chance for obtaining a conviction. Second, even if the state chose to go forward with its
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moment that the concepts of trial error and evidentiary insufficiency are
mutually exclusive, the dichotomy may be rendered invalid nevertheless
because the same act auring the course of a trial may give rise to both trial error
and evidentiary insufficiency. Because the remedies for the two branches of the
Burks dichotomy are polar opposites, the dichotomy alone provides little
guidance to appellate courts faced with cases in which a single act at trial
generates both evidentiary insufficiency and trial error.
Moreover, the concepts of trial error and evidentiary insufficiency may not
be completely independent of each other." As the Supreme Court has used the
term, "trial error" includes failure to dismiss a faulty indictment," improper
jury instructions,' absence of the defendant during part of his trial," incorrect
receipt or rejection of evidence at trial,' inadequacy of the trial record, 6 and
prosecutorial misconduct. 87 This list may not be exhaustive, however, as the
Court has not catalogued all of the conduct that is to be included under the
rubric "trial error." When an appellate'court reverses a conviction on the ground
that there is insufficient evidence in the record to support the conviction, it
makes an implicit finding that the trial court should have granted defendant's
motion for judgment of acquittal. In essence, the appellate court determines that
the trial court erred in not granting the motion.8 When an appellate court
case after an adverse pretrial evidentiary ruling, it is unlikely that a judge or jury would
find the remaining evidence sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Because
the state would not be permitted to appeal an acquittal, see State v. Adams, 196 Md. 341,
348-49, 76 A.2d 575, 578 (1950); MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-302(c)(1) (1980),
the case would reach an appellate court only in the event that the defendant was convicted
in spite of the paucity of the state's evidence.
It remains to be seen whether the state could test the evidentiary strength of its
case against a defendant without losing its ability to prosecute a defendant at a later date.
If the defendant moves to suppress evidence and the trial court hears the motion before the
trial begins, a procedure that must be followed for many kinds of evidence, see note 94
infra, presumably jeopardy has not "attached," because jeopardy has been held to attach
when a jury is empanelled and sworn, Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978), or when the
judge in a bench trial begins to hear evidence in the case, Serfass v. United States, 420
U.S. 377, 388 (1975). If the trial court holds the evidence inadmissible, thus weakening the
state's case, the state may set a stet against the defendant in some cases, thereby
temporarily suspending the charges and reserving the right to call the case at a later time.
See MD. DIST. R. 782(c).
81. See 10 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 184, 200-01 (1978).
82. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896).
83. See Hopt v. Utah, 104 U.S. 631, 634 (1882).
84. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 579 (1884).
85. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (dictum); Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574,
581-82 (1884).
86. Hopt v. Utah, 114 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1885).
87. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978) (dictum).
88. See id. at 16. If the defendant fails to make a motion for a judgment of acquittal at
trial, an appellate court would have no obligation to consider the issue of evidentiary
insufficiency. See MD. R.P. 1085. Appellate reversal on the ground of evidentiary
insufficiency, therefore, does not necessarily mean that the trial court erred.
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reverses a conviction due to evidentiary insufficiency, then, it rules by
implication that the case presented both elements of the Burks dichotomy:
insufficient evidence and trial error (the trial court's failure to grant a motion
for judgment of acquittal). The notions of trial error and evidentiary insufficien-
cy, therefore, may not be entirely separable, and that they are not may
contribute to the difficulties of applying the dichotomy established in Burks.
In Boone, the Court of Appeals was confronted not only with a case that
presented both elements of the Burks dichotomy, but also with a case in which
those two elements could not be effectively separated. The court directed the
retrial of a convicted criminal defendant when the appellate finding of wrongful
admission of tainted evidence resulted in there being insufficient evidence to
sustain the conviction." Although the policy reasons the court advanced to
justify its holding are cogent, they are less than compelling when considered in
light of the clear constitutional mandate that a defendant shall not be retried
when a court has found the evidence insufficient to support the conviction.
The court stated that a prosecutor is entitled to rely on a trial court's
evidentiary rulings, and need not introduce further evidence of the defendant's
guilt." This rule does promote the policy of economical use of judicial and
prosecutorial resources; by allowing the prosecutor to rely on the trial court's
rulings, the Court of Appeals may have discouraged the practice of "defensive
trials,'" in which prosecutors conduct trials by "overkilling" their cases in
anticipation of some or all of the trial court's rulings' being overturned on
appeal. In other words, to guard against losing their convictions on appeal,
prosecutors would seek out every possible piece of evidence against defendants,
delaying trials as much as possible until all the evidence was found, and
introducing all of it at the trial itself. If such "defensive trials" were conducted,
pretrial investigation would become perhaps needlessly lengthy and costly, as
would pretrial conferences and hearings on evidentiary motions. In a court
system already encumbered with a severe case backlog, the prospect of further
protraction of trials is hardly welcome."
The Court of Appeals also suggested that because on appellate review the
court cannot be certain of what the state's case against the defendant would
have consisted had the trial judge excluded the evidence in question, it would be
89. 284 Md. at 17, 393 A.2d at 1370.
90. Id. at 16-17, 393 A.2d at 1369.
91. The analogy is borrowed from the medical profession, in which doctors practice
"defensive medicine" in order to avoid malpractice suits.
92. The Court of Appeals recently promulgated a rule, however, that would force
prosecutors to bring defendants to trial within 180 days of the appearance of counsel or
waiver of counsel by the defendant. MD. R.P. 746(a), 6 Md. Reg. 1916 (1979). Thus,
prosecutors would be placed in the untenable position of attempting to lengthen the
pretrial period in order to conduct as much investigation as possible and, on the other
hand, attempting to bring defendants to trial quickly in order to comply with rule 746(a).
A prosecutor would have only a limited ability, therefore, to protect himself from
erroneous evidentiary rulings by conducting an extensive pretrial investigation, and
would ultimately be penalized by the court's error if retrial was not permitted.
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unfair to the state to immunize the defendant from further prosecutions.9" The
court held, in essence, that the prosecutor should not be penalized by being
denied a fair chance to prosecute a defendant when the wrongful act of the trial
judge caused the reversal of the defendant's conviction. There is much merit to
the argument that hindsight does not reveal of what the prosecutor's case would
have consisted had the evidence in question been excluded. Indeed, the
prosecutor may well have had at his disposal other persuasive incriminating
evidence against the defendant that he did not seek to introduce because it
would have been cumulative in the case. That evidence alone may have been
sufficient to convict the defendant, and the prosecutor may have introduced it at
trial had the primary evidence been ruled inadmissible. In other words, the trial
judge's erroneous evidentiary ruling could result in the prosecutor's losing a
conviction when he had but only partially revealed a solid case of admissible
evidence against the defendant.
On the other hand, to assert that a prosecutor should be entitled to rest on
the trial court's rulings is to ignore the reality of the prosecutor's role in
bringing the defendant to trial. The prosecutor certainly evaluates the strength
of his case before the trial begins, and this evaluation is facilitated by the
requirement that a large number of evidentiary challenges be raised by the
defendant in pretrial motions.' Even if the court rules at the pretrial stage that
93. 284 Md. at 17, 393 A.2d at 1370.
94. Maryland Rule 736, which concerns mandatory pretrial motions, provides:
a. Mandatory Motions.
A motion asserting one of the following matters shall be filed in conformity with
this Rule. Any such matter not raised in accordance with this Rule is waived, unless
the court, for good cause shown, orders otherwise:
1. A defect in the institution of the prosecution;
2. A defect in the charging document, other than its failure to show jurisdiction
in the court or to charge an offense which defenses can be noticed by the court at any
time;
3. An unlawful search, seizure, interception of wire or oral communication, or
pretrial identification;
4. An unlawfully obtained admission, statement or confession;
5. A motion for joint or separate trial of defendants or offenses.
b. Time for Filing Mandatory Motions.
A motion filed pursuant to section a of this Rule shall be filed within 30 days after
the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before
the court pursuant to Rule 723 (Appearance - Provision for or Waiver of Counsel),
except when discovery is furnished on an issue which is the subject of the motion, then
the motion may be filed within five days after the discovery is furnished.
c. Other Motions.
Any other defense, objection or request capable of determination before trial
without trial of the general issue shall be raised by motion filed at any time before
trial.
f. Determination.
A motion filed pursuant to this Rule, except a motion to dismiss for failure to
obtain a speedy trial, shall be determined before trial unless the court otherwise
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certain of the state's evidence is admissible, the defendant's challenges should
give the prosecutor some idea whether it nevertheless would be prudent to
produce at trial all the state's evidence against the defendant. It is reasonably
likely, therefore, that the prosecutor knows the potential weaknesses in the
state's case before trial, and there is little chance of unfair surprise. In Boone, as
noted in Judge Cole's opinion, the defendant made a motion to suppress evidence
in ample time to give the state notice that it should put forward all the evidence
it had against Boone. 5 Thus, a claim that the prosecutor detrimentally relied on
the trial court's ruling ignores the palpable reality that the prosecutor was
reasonably forewarned of the potential evidentiary weaknesses in the state's
case. When forewarned, a prosecutor should indeed be forearmed to marshall
every bit of relevant, competent evidence the state has to convict the defendant.
By adducing all of the admissible evidence against the defendant in a single
proceeding, the state would promote the policies of sparing the defendant the
trauma of repeated criminal prosecutions and sparing the courts the burden of
repeated trials. Fundamental constitutional policies" outweigh the fiscal and
temporal objectives advanced by the Court of Appeals in support of its assertions
that the prosecutor may rely on the trial court's rulings.
By emphasizing the role of the trial judge in causing the conviction's
reversal, the Court of Appeals characterized the case as one primarily of trial
error, the incidental impact of which was evidentiary insufficiency. Yet the case
can also be regarded as one of evidentiary insufficiency stemming from trial
error. Placing the emphasis on the evidentiary insufficiency aspect of the case,
rather than the trial error aspect, suggests that the appropriate remedy for cases
such as Boone is the preclusion of the defendant's retrial. It is more than an
exercise in semantics to so phrase the issue in the case, for given the Burks
directs in a motion involving subsection a 4 of this Rule. If factual issues are involved
in determining the motion, the court shall state its finding on the record.
g. Effect of Determination of Certain Motions.
1. Defect in Prosecution or Charging Document.
If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the prosecution
or in the charging document, it may order that the defendant be held in custody or
that the conditions of pretrial release continue for a specified time pending the filing
of a new charging document.
2. Suppression of Evidence.
If the court grants a motion to suppress evidence, the evidence shall be excluded
and shall not be offered by the State at trial, except that suppressed evidence may be
used in accordance with law for impeachment purposes. If the court denies a motion to
suppress evidence, the ruling is binding at the trial unless the court, in the exercise of
its discretion, grants a hearing de novo on a renewal of the motion. A pretrial ruling
denying the motion to suppress is reviewable on a motion for a new trial or on appeal
of a conviction.
MD. R.P. 736.
95. 284 Md. at 20, 393 A.2d at 1371 (Cole, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
96. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
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dichotomy with its mutually exclusive remedies, this characterization of the
issue is outcome-determinative."
Because Burks establishes a dichotomy from which mutually exclusive
results flow, appellate courts deciding cases that present questions of both
evidentiary insufficiency and trial error must decide which of the two elements
should predominate in order to dispose of the case. This dilemma can be resolved
in either of two ways: the courts could prescribe a standard rule or establish a
"balancing test" in which appellate courts would resolve the problem on a
case-by-case basis. Because a finding of evidentiary insufficiency can be reached
only rarely and only in clear cases," it appears that a standard rule dictating a
course of action in cases presenting evidentiary insufficiency and trial error is
warranted.
When a Maryland appellate court reviews the evidence in a non-jury
criminal case, it will reverse the trial court's judgment of conviction only if the
verdict is determined to be clearly erroneous; there must have been insufficient
evidence before the trial court from which it could have been fairly convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.' In reviewing a conviction
returned by a jury, a Maryland appellate court will reverse the jury's verdict on
the ground of evidentiary insufficiency only upon a determination that there
was no legally sufficient evidence before the jury from which it could have found
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."a As the Supreme Court noted
in Burks, "a decision [to overturn a conviction on the ground of evidentiary
insufficiency] will be confined to cases where the prosecution's failure is clear." ''
Because the standard for appellate reversal of convictions due to evidentiary
insufficiency is clear and well-established, although perhaps difficult to apply,
there is little reason for the courts to hesitate to formulate a firm rule for cases
presenting both evidentiary insufficiency and trial error. When choosing
between a rule that permits retrial and one that forbids such action, the courts
should consider carefully the relationship between the accused and the state. To
facilitate the granting of retrials is to provide the state with a tool to avoid
safeguards designed to prevent the mental and emotional harrassment of
defendants in our judicial system. The importance of the competing considera-
tion of fairness to the prosecutor, as promoted by allowing prosecutors to rely on
trial judges' evidentiary rulings, is minimized because of the relatively rare
97. See notes 17 to 23 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 99 to 101 and accompanying text infra.
99. E.g., Jones v. State, 242 Md. 323, 328, 219 A.2d 77, 79-80 (1966); Kucharczyk v.
State, 235 Md. 334, 337, 201 A.2d 683, 684 (1964); Graczyk v. State, 233 Md. 245, 246, 196
A.2d 469, 470 (1964) (per curiam); Ponder v. State, 227 Md. 570, 572, 177 A.2d 839, 840
(1962) (per curiam).
100. E.g., Veney v. State, 251 Md. 159, 174, 246 A.2d 608, 617 (1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 948 (1969); Pressley v. State, 244 Md. 664, 667, 224 A.2d 866, 868 (1966).
101. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978). The Court made this observation in
the context of its review of the federal standard for appellate reversal of convictions
challenged on the ground of evidentiary insufficiency.
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occurrence of appellate reversal due to evidentiary insufficiency."2 Moreover,
against the policies of judicial economy and fairness to the prosecutor stands a
clear constitutional mandate: a person acquitted of an offense may not be tried
again for the same offense.
The most fundamental guarantee of the double jeopardy clause is that when
the state has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to convict a defendant, retrial
of the defendant on the same charge is barred.' That guarantee should not be
vitiated when the cause of the evidentiary insufficiency is trial error. Opting for
the label "trial error" in cases presenting both trial error and evidentiary
insufficiency presents a danger to the continued vitality of the rule barring
retrials after an appellate reversal on the ground of evidentiary insufficency.
Because the scope of the notion of "trial error" is ill defined,"4 the exception to
the rule barring retrials on grounds of evidentiary insufficiency could easily
swallow that rule; courts could easily term as "trial error" almost anything
other than pure evidentiary insufficiency"5 that warrants the reversal of a
conviction, and thereby permit retrial in virtually every case."0 In cases
presenting both evidentiary insufficiency and trial error, the insufficient
evidence claim should prevail, and the retrial of the defendant be barred.
102. The prosecutor may be unfairly penalized when admissible, incriminating
evidence has been excluded erroneously and the defendant's conviction is reversed on
appeal because of evidentiary insufficiency. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
Although it would seem equitable for the court to consider the wrongfully excluded
evidence when deciding the question of evidentiary insufficiency, this would have the
effect of allowing the prosecutor to appeal an adverse evidentiary ruling, a practice
currently not permitted. See id. The infrequent occurrence of this precise question, see id.,
when weighed against the burden that retrial places on the defendant, see note 43 and
accompanying text supra, indicates that retrial should be barred in spite of the unfairness
to the prosecution.
103. This rule is subject, of course, to the exceptions that the trial court must have had
jurisdiction of the case, Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 130-32 (1904), and that an
appellate court may reinstate a guilty verdict when a jury convicted the defendant and the
trial judge granted defendant's post-verdict motion to dismiss, United States v. Wilson,
420 U.S. 332, 353 (1975).
104. See notes 81 to 88 and accompanying text supra.
105. See note 88 supra.
106. Because of the potential difficulty involved in analyzing the trial record on appeal
in order to decide the question of evidentiary insufficiency, an appellate court might be
tempted simply to reverse and remand a case once it has determined that trial error
occurred. Almost every case that involves evidentiary insufficiency also contains trial
error, however, and a predisposition by the court to search the record for trial error before
reaching the question of evidentiary insufficiency would lead to retrial in the vast majority
of cases. Appellate courts, therefore, should always consider the question of evidentiary
insufficiency when the issue is properly preserved for appeal. See Graef v. State, 1 Md.
App. 161, 165, 228 A.2d 480, 481 (1967).
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TO DEFEAT A CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE A PLAINTIFF IN A
DEFAMATION ACTION MUST PROVE "NEW YORK TIMES"
MALICE - MARCHESI v. FRANCHINO
In Marchesi v. Franchino' the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that in
order to establish the requisite malice to overcome a defendant's qualified or
conditional privilege to make defamatory statements, a plaintiff must prove that
the defendant acted with either knowledge of the statement's falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth. The court rejected its previous definition of the malice
required to defeat a conditional privilege, as stated in Stevenson v. Baltimore
Baseball Club, Inc.,' recognizing that the earlier standard gave rise to needless
confusion and required juries to draw lines of liability based on unclear
distinctions. The new standard was adopted, and Stevenson overruled, in an
effort to eliminate the confusion resulting from inherent contradictions in the
previous formulation and from the use of different standards of malice in
deciding whether presumed or punitive damages should be awarded and in
determining whether a conditional privilege was defeated.
Franchino and Marchesi were employed as probation officers at the
Baltimore office of the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services.' Marchesi
complained to her supervisor that Franchino had made sexual overtures and
harassed her to the point of causing her to fear for her personal safety.' She
further alleged that Franchino had admitted to an altercation, which resulted in
a criminal conviction, arising out of a homosexual relationship that Franchino
had had with a coworker at her previous place of employment.' The supervisor's
investigation of the allegations revealed that Franchino had been arrested and
convicted of a minor assault charge instituted by a coworker.6 The supervisor
submitted his findings to the State Medical Advisor along with a request that
Franchino be given a medical examination, including the possibility' of
"psychiatric consultation."7 At her request, Marchesi was transferred to andther
office.' Franchino, retaining her job at the Baltimore office and apparently
receiving a promotion, sued both Marchesi and her supervisor for defamation.9
1. 283 Md. 131, 387 A.2d 1129 (1978).
2. 250 Md. 482, 242 A.2d 533 (1968).
3. 283 Md. at 132, 387 A.2d at 1130.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 133, 387 A.2d at 1130.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. A defamatory communication is one that "tends to injure 'reputation' in the
popular sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the
plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions against
him." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 739 (4th ed. 1971). See generally Heath
v. Hughes, 233 Md. 458, 197 A.2d 104 (1964); Thomas v. Upton, 210 Md. 433, 146 A.2d 880
(1959).
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The trial judge determined as a matter of law that the defendants were
protected by a conditional privilege due to the employer-employee relationship."0
That privilege could be defeated only upon proof that defendants had acted with
malice. Therefore, the judge instructed the jury to decide whether the
defendants acted with malice," which she defined as not "hatred or spite but
rather a reckless disregard of truth, the use of unnecessarily abusive language
or other circumstances that would support a conclusion that either or both of the
defendants acted in an ill-tempered manner or were motivated by ill will."'" The
jury returned a verdict of $500 compensatory and $20,000 punitive damages
against the defendants. 3 The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Special
Appeals in an unreported opinion. 4 The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to
reexamine the definition of malice as that term is used in the determination
whether a conditional privilege is defeated in a defamation action against
private individuals." Although the trial court quoted the language of the Court
of Appeals in Stevenson v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc. 6 in instructing the jury
on malice, a definition that had been reaffirmed in numerous later decisions, 7
10. 283 Md. at 133, 387 A.2d at 1130. Statements that are made to warn a present or
prospective employer of the misconduct or bad character of an employee are conditionally
privileged. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 788. Although the most common example of such a
privilege occurs when a past employer warns a present employer about an employee, e.g.,
Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 87 (1890), the purpose behind the privilege is also served by
extending a privilege to statements made to a supervisor or employer about a coworker.
See Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co., 27 Md. App. 53, 68-69, 341 A.2d 856, 866, affd, 276 Md.
580, 350 A.2d 688 (1975) ("The basis for the privilege depends upon the particular
circumstances of the communication. [Persons other than former employers] may have a
bona fide belief that they owe a moral or social duty to inform a new or prospective
employer about an employee.").
11. If the trial judge determines that the publication was protected by a conditional
privilege, the jury is permitted to return a verdict for the plaintiff only if it finds that the
defendant acted with "malice." See text accompanying notes 49 & 50 infra.
12. 283 Md. at 134, 387 A.2d at 1130. The trial judge was employing the definition of
malice set out in Stevenson v. Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc., 250 Md. 482, 243 A.2d 533
(1968).
13. 283 Md. at 132, 387 A.2d at 1129.
14. Id. at 132, 387 A.2d at 1129-30. A verdict was also returned against the
supervisor, but it was reversed by the Court of Special Appeals for lack of sufficient
evidence. Id. at 132 n.1, 387 A.2d at 1129 n.1.
15. Id. at 132, 387 A.2d at 1129. The court's opinion was written by the late Judge
Irving A. Levine.
16. See id. at 134, 387 A.2d at 1130 (noting trial court's quotation of 250 Md. 482,
486-87, 243 A.2d 533, 536 (1968)).
17. IBEW Local 1805 v. Mayo, 281 Md. 475, 480-81, 379 A.2d 1223, 1226 (1977);
General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 172, 352 A.2d 810, 815 (1976); Jacron Sales
Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 599-600, 350 A.2d 688, 699 (1976); Orrison v. Vance, 262 Md.
285, 295, 277 A.2d 573, 578 (1971).
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the Court of Appeals unanimously reversed because it found it necessary to
refine the malice standard in order to avoid further confusion in its application. 8
The court was dissatisfied with the Stevenson definition of malice for three
reasons. First, to instruct the jury that malice did not involve hatred or spite,
but did involve manifestations of ill will, was to seek "to harmonize discordant
and irreconcilable conceptions of malice." 9 Although a jury should have little
difficulty understanding what "motivated by ill-will" means, cautioning the jury
in the same set of instructions that malice does not include hatred or spite, was
confusing. The distinction between ill will, on the one hand, and hatred or spite,
on the other, is unclear, often even to courts, yet it is a distinction the lay jury
was instructed to make under Stevenson. Further, the basis for the distinction
itself appeared somewhat tenuous to the court because earlier cases had
included hatred as an element of malice.'0
A second defect in the Stevenson definition of malice, according to the court,
was the fusion of the concepts of reckless disregard of the truth and ill will into
the definition of malice because that fusion brought incompatible standards
together into a single definition. That incompatibility stems from the focus of
the court's inquiry in determining liability: whereas the ill will element
concentrates on the defendant's subjective feelings toward the plaintiff, reckless
disregard for the truth focuses on the defendant's degree of awareness of the
truth of the statement.' Because the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that
ill will or bad motive are not elements of the reckless disregard standard,2 2 the
court found it unwise to fuse two incompatible legal standards into a single
definition.21
For the Court of Appeals, a third problem with the Stevenson formulation
lay in the necessity for the jury to understand and apply two different
definitions of malice in a single case in which punitive damages are sought.
Ordinarily punitive damages cannot be awarded unless compensatory damages
are awarded in the same case." The court had recently held that an award of
18. 283 Md. at 135, 387 A.2d at 1131. The court characterized its holding as a
refinement of, rather than a wholesale change in, the standard for malice because it
believed that it had expressed a dissatisfaction with Stevenson and a preference for the
standard it adopted in Marchesi in three prior cases, IBEW Local 1805 v. Mayo, 281 Md.
475, 479-81, 379 A.2d 1223, 1226 (1977); General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165,
172-73, 352 A.2d 810, 815 (1976); and Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 599-600,
350 A.2d 688, 699 (1976). 283 Md. at 134-35, 387 A.2d at 1131.
19. 283 Md. at 136, 387 A.2d at 1132.
20. Id. at 136-37, 387 A.2d at 1132. E.g., Evening News Co. v. Bowie, 154 Md. 604,
141 A. 416 (1928).
21. 283 Md. at 137, 387 A.2d at 1132. See Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 314-16, 413
A.2d 170, 176 (1980).
22. E.g., Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 280-82 (1974); Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (1971) (plurality opinion).
23. 283 Md. at 138, 387 A.2d at 1132-33.
24. See, e.g., Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Keulemans, 275 Md. 441, 446, 340 A.2d 705,
708 (1975); Shell Oil Co. v. Parker, 265 Md. 631, 644, 291 A.2d 64, 71 (1972); B & B
Refrigeration Co. v. Stander, 263 Md. 577, 582, 284 A.2d 244, 247 (1971); Kneas v. Hecht
Co., 257 Md. 121, 125, 262 A.2d 518, 521 (1970).
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punitive damages in defamation actions against either public or private
individuals could not be sustained absent proof of "constitutional" or "New York
Times"21 malice: knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.26 The court
had also held that compensatory damages cannot be awarded in a case involving
a conditional privilege absent a finding of malice as it defined that term in
Stevenson.27 The inherent difficulty in understanding the Stevenson definition of
malice, the court reasoned, would be exacerbated by requiring juries to apply
two different definitions of malice in the same case, the Stevenson standard in
testing the conditional privilege, and the New York Times standard in
determining the propriety of punitive damages.' Requiring juries to attempt to
apply two different legal standards in a single case ran counter to the court's
previously expressed recognition of the need for simplicity in the law of
defamation. 29
To end the confusion bred by dual definitions of malice, the court in
Marchesi therefore adopted as the standard - at least for the malice necessary
to defeat a conditional privilege to defame - the definition of malice enunciated
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,0 an approach that the court believed was
advocated by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3 The court perceived the New
York Times standard as easy to apply, requiring that juries find only one kind of
malice to award both compensatory and punitive damages.
In order to analyze the court's adoption of the New York Times definition of
malice as the standard required to defeat a conditional privilege to defame, the
history of that standard will be reviewed for the light that it casts upon the
standard's applicability to private defamation suits. It will be argued that the
Court of Appeals' application of a constitutional standard in a non-constitutional
setting has resulted in the court's approaching simplicity in the law of
defamation at the cost of applying standards that clash with the policies that
give rise to qualified privileges. Further, it will be questioned whether the
adoption of the new standard will in fact result in simplicity in defamation law.
In the early stages of the development of the common law of defamation, a
plaintiff had to prove that the defendant was motivated by malice in making the
defamatory statement, but by the early nineteenth century that "malice" was
implied from the fact of defamatory publication.32 That implication, which is an
irrebuttable presumption, led to a rule of strict liability in common law
defamation cases.33 A plaintiff needed to prove only the utterance or publication
25. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
26. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
27. Dennis v. Baltimore Transit Co., 189 Md. 610, 616, 56 A.2d 813, 817 (1948).
28. 283 Md. at 138, 387 A.2d at 1133.
29. See Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 593, 350 A.2d 688, 696 (1976).
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
31. 283 Md. at 138, 387 A.2d at 1133. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600
(1977).
32. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 771-72.
33. Id. at 772; e.g., Negley v. Farrow, 60 Md. 158, 177 (1883).
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of the defamatory statement and could then rest his case until a defense was
offered.-* A defendant could establish a defense by: (1) denying he had uttered or
published the statement; (2) refuting the legal presumption of falsehood by proof
that the statement was true; or (3) showing that the statement was privileged.3 5
The rationale for clothing some communication with a privilege is based on the
recognition "[tihat some words need saying."3" Some statements advance social
policies of greater importance than the vindication of a plaintiff's reputation; in
those instances, it is important that self-censorship not result from fear of a
defamation suit.37 When the policy to be advanced is especially important, the
privilege to defame is absolute, and its existence acts as a complete bar to
liability.3 When the policy is of lesser importance, this privilege is only qualified
or conditional, and therefore may be defeated by a showing that the defendant
abused, and thereby forfeited, the privilege.3 9
The situations in which publication enjoys a conditional privilege have not
been enumerated with precision or accuracy. 0 Until recently, Maryland cases
defined conditional privileges in broad, general terms, stating that the privilege
extended to situations in which the publication is designed to protect a
34. Domchick v. Greenbelt Consumer Servs., Inc., 200 Md. 36, 45, 87 A.2d 831,
835-36 (1952).
35. W. PROSSER, supra note 9, § 116. Some commentators added as a fourth defense
that the defendant could escape liability by establishing that the plaintiff consented to the
publication of the defamatory remark. E.g., Developments in the Law - Defamation, 69
HARv. L. REV. 875, 931-32 (1956). Consent has never been explicitly recognized as a
defense in Maryland, perhaps because it has never been litigated. There is some reason to
believe that it would be accepted as a defense because earlier cases had held that the
presumption of malice could be removed by showing a justifiable occasion or motive, a
defense that seems broader than the defense of privilege, and arguably would include
consent. See, e.g., Lewis v. Daily News Co., 81 Md. 466, 473, 32 A. 246, 246 (1895).
36. Orrison v. Vance, 262 Md. 285, 292, 277 A.2d 573, 576 (1971).
37. Marchesi v. Franchino, 283 Md. 131, 135-36, 387 A.2d 1129, 1131 (1978).
38. Developments in the Law - Defamation, supra note 35, at 917. In Maryland, an
absolute privilege is accorded statements made in judicial and legislative proceedings and
in the course of the activities of high executive officers. Walker v. D'Alesandro, 212 Md.
163, 169-70, 129 A.2d 148, 151 (1957) (dictum). In numerous cases the Court of Appeals
has held that statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding are absolutely
privileged. E.g., DiBlasio v. Kolodner, 233 Md. 512, 523, 197 A.2d 245, 251 (1964)
(allegations relevant to a judicial proceeding when included in a pleading); Bartlett v.
Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 227, 14 A. 518, 519-20 (1888) (petition to court by receiver alleging
that co-receiver had embezzled funds); Hunckel v. Voneiff, 69 Md. 179, 194-95, 14 A. 500,
504 (1888) (statement of witness in the course of his examination); Maulsby v. Reifsnider,
69 Md. 143, 164, 14 A. 505, 510 (1888) (statement of counsel made in reference to the
subject matter involved in the case then on trial). For a case involving a legislative
proceeding, see Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc., v. Pollitt, 220 Md. 132, 137, 151 A.2d 530,
533 (1959) (official participants in legislative proceedings enjoy an absolute privilege)
(dictum), and one involving a statement by a high executive officer, see Walker v.
D'Alesandro, 212 Md. 163, 169-70, 129 A.2d 148, 151-52 (1957) (Mayor of Baltimore
assumed to have an absolute privilege).
39. Developments in the Law - Defamation, supra note 35, at 917.
40. See Evans, Legal Immunity for Defamation, 24 MINN. L. REV. 607, 608 (1940).
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legitimate interest that the publisher has in the subject matter of the
publication,' to discharge a duty of the publisher,"2 or both. 3 In Simon v.
Robinson," the Court of Appeals began to emphasize the necessity that the
publisher and the recipient of the speech share a mutual interest or duty in the
subject matter. 5 In Marchesi, the court categorized conditional privileges as of
three types: those that protect statements in furtherance of the speaker's own
legitimate interests,' those that protect interests shared by the speaker and the
recipient or third parties,'7 and those that would be of interest to the general
public."'
41. Bavington v. Robinson, 127 Md. 46, 52, 95 A. 1067, 1070 (1915).
42. Domchick v. Greenbelt Consumer Servs., Inc., 200 Md. 36, 42, 87 A.2d 831, 834
(1952); Beeler v. Jackson, 64 Md. 589, 593, 2 A. 916, 917 (1886); Maurice v. Worden, 54
Md. 233, 254 (1880).
43. Deckleman v. Lake, 149 Md. 533, 536, 131 A. 762, 763-64 (1926); Bavington v.
Robinson, 124 Md. 85, 89, 91 A. 777, 778 (1914); Coffin v. Brown, 94 Md. 190, 195, 50 A.
567, 569 (1901); Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 87, 92, 20 A. 774, 775 (1890).
44. 221 Md. 200, 154 A.2d 911 (1959).
45. Id. at 206, 154 A.2d at 915. See Hanrahan v. Kelly, 269 Md. 21, 29, 305 A.2d 151,
156 (1973); Henthorn v. Western Md. R.R., 226 Md. 499, 507, 174 A.2d 175, 179 (1961).
Simon and Henthorn stated that there could be no privilege without a mutuality of
interests, but Hanrahan ruled that this was but one kind of privilege. Simon represented a
further refinement in that it held that there need not exist an actual mutuality of
interests, but that it was sufficient that the defendant reasonably believe that such a
relationship exists.
The court has increasingly relied on textual materials such as hornbooks and the
restatements to define the scope of the conditional privilege. E.g., Hanrahan v. Kelly, 269
Md. 21, 28, 305 A.2d 151, 156 (1973) (quoting W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTS
809 (3rd ed. 1964) and RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 596 (1938)); Orrison v. Vance, 262 Md.
285, 293, 277 A.2d 573, 577 (1971) (perhaps erroneously referring to W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 593 to 612 (3rd ed. 1964)); Stevenson v. Baltimore
Baseball Club, Inc., 250 Md. 482, 486, 243 A.2d 533, 536 (1968) (stating that the various
types of conditional privileges are categorized in PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
at 805 (3rd ed. 1964) and in RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 593 to 612 (1938)); Henthorn v.
Western Md. R.R., 226 Md. 499, 507-08, 174 A.2d 175, 179 (1961) (quoting RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 595(1)(b) (1938) for definition of a category of conditional privilege).
46. 283 Md. at 135-36, 387 A.2d at 1131. See e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277
Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810 (1976); Bavington v. Robinson, 124 Md. 85, 91 A. 777 (1914); Lewis
v. Daily News Co., 81 Md. 466, 32 A. 246 (1895).
47. 283 Md. at 135-36, 387 A.2d at 1131. See, e.g., Hanrahan v. Kelly, 269 Md. 21,
305 A.2d 151 (1973); Henthorn v. Western Md. R.R., 226 Md. 499, 174 A.2d 175 (1961);
Simon v. Robinson, 221 Md. 200, 154 A.2d 911 (1959); Domchick v. Greenbelt Consumer
Servs., Inc., 200 Md. 36, 87 A.2d 831 (1952); Deckleman v. Lake, 149 Md. 533, 131 A. 762
(1926).
48. 283 Md. at 135-36, 387 A.2d at 1131. See, e.g., Orrison v. Vance, 262 Md. 285, 277
A.2d 573 (1971); Brush-Moore Newspapers, Inc. v. Pollitt, 220 Md. 132, 151 A.2d 530
(1959); McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403 (1878). Although many Maryland cases have fallen
into one of these three categories, this categorization had not been drawn previously,
either by Maryland courts or by commentators. A conspicuous gap in the Marchesi
formulation is the absence of any treatment of situations in which the speaker
communicates information to protect the interest of another person, which the speaker
does not share and in which the general public is not interested. An example of this would
be when A's former employer, B, tells A's present employer, C, that A had stolen from B
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Proof of a conditional privilege removes the legal presumption of malice.49
Therefore, if the court determines that the defendant enjoyed a conditional
privilege,w the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant acted with
malice. Malice has been defined by Maryland courts in several ways. Most of the
early cases focused on the defendant's having a hateful or willfully abusive state
of mind."' Others spoke more generally of malice as constituting statements not
made in good faith. 2 Still other cases have defined malice in terms of
negligence.- The common denominator in most of these formulations is that the
publication said to be malicious is actuated by a motive inconsistent with the
policy that gives rise to the privilege.8 ' Privileges are created because it is
believed that the knowledge imparted to the recipient of the defamatory
statement, if the statement is true, is likely to advance interests of more
importance than the interests of the plaintiff in his reputation. Employing the
while in B's employ. B is motivated by a sense of duty to warn C, lest C suffer as B did. B's
interest is not furthered by the communication, B holds no interest in common with C or
anybody else, and the fact that A had stolen from B is not of general interest to the public.
Nevertheless, because a communication of this type has been held by Maryland courts to
be privileged, Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Fresh v.
Cutter, 73 Md. 87, 20 A. 774 (1890), the Marchesi dictum should not be considered
exhaustive of the different types of privileges that exist.
To some extent, any attempt to categorize these cases is artificial. It is rare that
the sole motive of the defendant is to protect only his own interest, an interest shared with
others, or a matter of general interest. It is far more common for his motivation to be
mixed, or unclear. For example, if a partner in a business believes an employee has stolen
from him and he tells this to the police, he may be motivated to do so by a desire to protect
his personal interest, by a desire to protect the common interest in the store that he shares
with his partner, by a sense of duty to the public to help bring criminals to justice, or by
any combination of these motivations. Consequently, while courts try to determine
whether a privilege exists, they seldom attempt to fit it neatly into a specific category. See,
e.g., Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co., 27 Md. App. 53, 69, 341 A.2d 856, 866, affd, 276 Md. 580,
350 A.2d 688 (1975) (communication privileged although not specified if it is because of a
duty owed to another or to a common interest).
49. Domchick v. Greenbelt Consumer Servs., Inc., 200 Md. 36, 45, 87 A.2d 831, 836
(1952).
50. The existence of a conditional privilege is a question of law to be decided by the
judge. Horning v. Hardy, 36 Md. App. 419, 430, 373 A.2d 1273, 1279 (1977).
51. Evening News Co. v. Bowie, 154 Md. 604, 611, 141 A. 416, 419 (1928) (malice as
hostility, hatred, or ill will); Fresh v. Cutter, 73 Md. 87, 92, 20 A. 774, 775 (1890) (malice
defined as conduct actuated by a malicious feeling); Beeler v. Jackson, 64 Md. 589, 594, 2
A. 916, 917 (1886) (malice evidenced by wreaking ill will on another and vilifying and
abusing another).
52. Jump v. Barnes, 139 Md. 101, 109, 114 A. 734, 738 (1920); Bavington v. Robinson,
127 Md. 46, 95 A. 1067 (1915); Snyder v. Fulton, 34 Md. 128, 137 (1871).
53. Wetherby v. Retail Credit Co., 235 Md. 237, 243, 201 A.2d 344, 348 (1964) (no
honest or reasonable grounds to believe in truth is evidence of malice); Simon v. Robinson,
221 Md. 200, 207, 154 A.2d 911, 915 (1959) (malice is lack of reasonable grounds for belief
in truth); Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233, 255-56 (1880) (malice as lack of reasonable or
probable cause for belief in truth of publication).
54. See Orrison v. Vance, 262 Md. 285, 294-95, 277 A.2d 573, 577-78 (1971).
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privilege for other purposes, such as to express spite or ill will, is an abuse of the
privilege." Thus, an otherwise protected publication will be actionable if, for
example, the defendant used the occasion not to protect a "legitimate interest,
but instead to vent his spleen. '
Recent Maryland cases have introduced and emphasized reckless disregard
for the truth as an element of malice. It was first mentioned in Stevenson v.
Baltimore Baseball Club, Inc.57 as an alternative means of establishing malice.'
Although the Stevenson formulation continued to be cited as the proper
definition of malice until Marchesi,5 the precise role of the reckless disregard
standard became muddled in Jacron Sales Co. v. SindorfM in which the Court of
Appeals held that this standard must be met before punitive damages could be
awarded. Some language in Jacron suggested that a showing of reckless
disregard for truth was an alternative means of proving malice," while other
language suggested that reckless disregard for truth had replaced the Stevenson
formulation , that a finding of reckless disregard for truth was a prerequisite for
55. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 603, Comment a (1977).
56. Blumhardt v. Rohr, 70 Md. 328, 341, 17 A. 266, 270 (1889).
57. 250 Md. 482, 243 A.2d 533 (1968).
58. Stevenson was employed by the defendant to work at Baltimore Oriole baseball
games. His duties included running tickets and change to the ticket sellers, and
occasionally counting tickets as they were delivered to other runners. When ticket
shortages were discovered after two of the games, the ticket manager held a meeting at
which Stevenson and four other runners were fired. At the meeting, the ticket manager
said that he believed that he could no longer trust Stevenson or his four coworkers, and
indicated in response to a question that he thought they were dishonest. The Court of
Appeals held that the publication was protected by a qualified privilege, and then stated
the test for defeasance of such a privilege:
The privilege may be lost, however, if the plaintiff in a defamation case can show
malice, which in this context means not hatred or spite but rather a reckless disregard
of truth, the use of unnecessarily abusive language, or other circumstances which
would support a conclusion that the defendant acted in an ill-tempered manner or was
motivated by ill-will.
Id. at 486-87, 243 A.2d at 536. The court found that there was no evidence of malice, and
affirmed the trial judge's granting of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
59. IBEW Local 1805 v. Mayo, 281 Md. 475, 480-81, 379 A.2d 1223, 1226 (1977);
General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 172, 352 A.2d 810, 815 (1976); Jacron Sales
Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 599-600, 350 A.2d 688, 699 (1976); Orrison v. Vance, 262 Md.
285, 295, 277 A.2d 573, 578 (1971).
60. 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
61. At one point in the opinion, the court quoted the Stevenson formulation of malice
and observed, "the reckless disregard standard now appears to be firmly established in
Maryland as a test, albeit not the exclusive test, for abuse of a conditional privilege." Id. at
600, 350 A.2d at 699 (emphasis added).
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recovery when the communication was privileged.2 Later cases perpetuated this
confusion.3
The reckless disregard standard has been defined by the Supreme Court. As
interpreted by the Court in cases involving public figures, in which the first
amendment requires that the plaintiff establish New York Times malice,
reckless disregard for truth focuses on 'the element of scienter. The plaintiff
must show that the defendant possessed "a high degree of awareness . . . of
probable . . . falsity,"' such that "he entertained serious doubts as to the truth
of his publication."6 More than negligence must be proved," as an honest belief
in the truth of a statement completely bars liability, no matter how unreason-
able that belief might be.67
The Supreme Court first defined malice as knowing falsity or reckless
disregard for truth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.' It held there that the
first amendment conferred upon defendants a qualified privilege to defame
public officials as long as the statements were not made with knowing falsity or
reckless disregard for truth.69 Moreover, the Court stated that the plaintiff must
establish the presence of this "constitutional malice" by clear and convincing
evidence,70 and that it would conduct an independent examination of the record
to review the jury's finding of malice.7 In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts"2 the
Court extended the qualified privilege to defame to statements about public
figures, and in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.73 the plurality extended it to "all
62. "It should be noted, however, that in a case where a common law conditional
privilege is found to exist, the negligence standard of Gertz is logically subsumed in the
higher standard for proving malice, reckless disregard as to truth or falsity, and therefore
becomes irrelevant to the trial of the case." Id. at 600, 350 A.2d at 699-700. In a,
subsequent case, the court stated: "[In Jacron] we held that reckless disregard as to trdth
or falsity is necessary to defeat a qualified privilege; proof of mere negligence will not
suffice." IBEW Local 1805 v. Mayo, 281 Md. 475, 479, 379 A.2d 1223, 1225 (1977).
63. See IBEW Local 1805 v. Mayo, 281 Md. 475, 379 A.2d 1223 (1977); General
Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810 (1977).
64. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
65. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
66. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 79 (1964).
67. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
68. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
69. Id. at 279-80.
70. Id. at 285-86. One commentator has stated that the clear and convincing evidence
requirement derives from a somewhat offhand statement in New York Times: " '[Wie
consider that the proof presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing clarity which
the constitutional standard demands.' The 'convincing clarity' language was officially
restated in terms of 'clear and convincing proof in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. [403
U.S. 29 (1971)]." Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. And Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349, 1374 (1975) (footnotes
omitted) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964)).
71. 376 U.S. at 285.
72. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
73. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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discussion and communication involving matters of public or general concern."7'
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.15 the Court retreated from the view of the
Rosenbloom plurality by holding that privileges extended only to those instances
in which the plaintiff was a public official or public figure. 6 At the same time,
however, Gertz also extended a degree of first amendment protection to
defamation suits brought by private persons - at least those against media
defendants. Gertz permits punitive damage awards against media defendants
only if the plaintiff can establish by clear and convincing proof that the
statement was made with knowing falsity or reckless disregard of the truth,"
allows compensatory damages from the media only if fault is established,"8 and
limits recovery against the media to actual damages unless constitutional
malice is shown by clear and convincing proof.7"
The Court of Appeals of Maryland responded to Gertz in Jacron Sales Co. v.
Sindorf.° Although the defendant was not a member of the media and the
subject of the defamatory publication not of public interest, the court applied
Gertz, of its own force and, by analogy, as a matter of state law. It held, as a
matter of federal constitutional law, that Gertz applied to defamations of private
individuals whether the subject matter of the defamation was of public or
private interest." Indicating its belief that the Supreme Court would in the
future extend the application of Gertz to non-media defendants, " the court held
74. Id. at 44 (plurality opinion).
75. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
76. Id. at 342-43. Gertz involved an action brought by an attorney against a
publisher whose magazine had labeled him a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter." Id. at
326.
77. Id. at 348-50.
78. Id. at 347-48.
79. Id. at 349-50.
80. 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976). After working as a construction tool salesman
for the Jacron Sales Company, Sindorf resigned and began working as a salesman for the
Tool Box Corporation. Sindorf refused to return equipment belonging to Jacron Sales until
the company paid commissions and other amounts that it owed him. Subsequently, a vice
president of a subsidiary of Jacron Sales telephoned the president of Tool Box and implied
that Sindorf had stolen tools from Jacron Sales while in its employ. Sindorf then sued
Jacron Sales, claiming that the conversation was defamatory. Id. at 582-83, 350 A.2d at
689-90.
81. Id. at 590, 350 A.2d at 64. Some courts have held, as a matter of constitutional
law, that Gertz applies only to media defendants who publish defamatory remarks of
general public interest. E.g., Calero v. Del Chemical Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d
737 (1975). For a more extensive treatment of Jacron Sales, see Murnaghan. Ave
Defamation, Atque Vale Libel and Slander, 6 U. BAI.T. L. Rzv. 27 (1976); Comment. The
Maryland Court of Appeals: State Defamation Law in the Wake of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 36 MD. L. REv. 622 (1977).
82. Noting that Gertz applied only to media defendants, 276 Md. at 590-91, 350 A.2d
at 694, the court posed the questions before it as whether the Supreme Court would in the
future extend the case to non-media defendants and, even if it would not, whether the
Court of Appeals should do so as a matter of state law, id. at 591, 350 A.2d at 694. The
court used the extension of New York Times to non-media defendants as an analogy, to
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that as a matter of state law I the Gertz rule was applicable to suits involving
non-media, as well as media, defendants." For cases not involving a privilege,
the court adopted a negligence standard to satisfy the Gertz requirement of
fault.85 Jacron, however, did not resolve the issue of the degree of fault necessary
to defeat a common law conditional privilege. By adopting the New York Times
standard of malice as that necessary to defeat a common law conditional
privilege, Marchesi answers the question left open by Jacron.
The court stated in Marchesi that its formulation of the definition of malice
found support in the adoption by the American Law Institute (ALI) of section
600 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.' Its holding, however, actually
represents a departure from the Restatement; it is the Stevenson test that is
consonant with the ALI position. Section 600 of the Restatement provides that
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth may defeat a conditional
privilege, 8 but another section states that one also abuses a privilege "if he does
not act for the purpose of protecting the interest for the protection of which the
privilege is given, ''" the functional equivalent of common law malice.
support its view that Gertz would be extended by the Supreme Court to non-media
defendants. Id. at 591-92, 350 A.2d at 694-95. It also noted that the rationale of the
media cases, that the defense of truth did not suffice to assure discussion of important
issues, could apply equally to non-media defendants. Id. at 592, 350 A.2d at 695.
83. Although it is not clear from Jacron Sales whether the court's discussion of the
constitutional issue should be viewed as dictum or an alternate holding, later cases seem
to make it clear that the extension of Gertz to all private defendants was made only as a
matter of state law. See Marchesi v. Franchino, 283 Md. at 138, 387 A.2d at 1133; General
Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 171, 352 A.2d 810, 815 (1976).
84. 276 Md. at 592, 350 A.2d at 696.
85. 276 Md. at 596-97, 350 A.2d at 697-98. The precise formulation that the court
chose was the one suggested in a tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
One who publishes a false and defamatory communication concerning a private
person, or concerning a public official or public figure in relation to a purely private
matter not affecting his conduct, fitness or role in his public capacity, is subject to
liability, if, but only if, he
(a) knows that the statement is false and that it defames the other,
(b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or
(c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TpRTS § 580B (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1975). This draft was adopted
by the American Law Institute for the official version of the Restatement only after several
changes were made. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977); Comment, The
Maryland Court of Appeals: State Defamation Law in the Wake of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., supra note 84, at 633.
86. 283 Md. at 139, 387 A.2d at 1133. The court cited § 600 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which provides:
Except as stated in § 602 [pertaining to an exception not relevant to Marchesi],
one who upon an occasion giving rise to a conditional privilege publishes false and
defamatory matter concerning another abuses the privilege if he
(a) knows the matter to be false, or
(b) acts in reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600 (1977).
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 600 (1977).
88. Id. § 603.
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Under Stevenson a plaintiff could defeat a conditional privilege by
establishing that the defendant acted with reckless disregard for the truth, the
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan9 test; or that he used unnecessarily abusive
language or otherwise acted in an ill-tempered manner or was motivated by ill
will, 90 alternatives derived from the common law malice requirement that the
motive for publication be consistent with the policy giving use to the privilege.9'
Unlike the ALI position or the Stevenson standard, both of which allow
conditional privileges to be defeated by constitutional or common law malice,
the rule in Marchesi establishes that a conditional privilege can be defeated only
upon a showing of New York Times malice.92
It remains to be seen whether Marchesi will bring to the law of defamation
the simplicity sought by the Court of Appeals. All that is constitutionally
required under Gertz to recover compensatory damages is some showing of fault.
The state courts have discretion to determine the degree of fault required to
permit recovery. 91 It would have been constitutionally permissible for Maryland
to have retained the common law definition of malice or to have required proof
of negligence to defeat a conditional privilege; each would have required the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant was at fault." Because the court did not
89. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
90. 250 Md. 482, 486-87, 243 A.2d 533, 536 (1968).
91. Orrison v. Vance, 262 Md. 285, 294-95, 277 A.2d 573, 577-78 (1971).
92. See 283 Md. at 139, 387 A.2d at 1133.
93. See 418 U.S. at 347-48.
94. Most states that have ruled on the issue since Gertz have retained the common
law definition of malice similar to the definition of malice that existed in Maryland before
Stevenson. See Willis v. Demopolis Nursing Home, Inc., 336 So. 2d 1117 (Ala. 1976);
Argawal v. Johnson, 81 Cal. 3d 513, 603 P.2d 58, 146 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1977); Axelrod v.
Califano, 357 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Knight v. Baker, 363 N.E.2d 1048
(Ind. App. 1977); Winn v. Cole, 68 Mich. App. 706, 243 N.W.2d 923 (1976); Ramacciotti v.
Zinn, 550 S.W. 2d 217 (Mo. 1977); Rogozinski v. Airstream by Angell, 152 N.J. Super. 133,
377 A.2d 807 (1977); Hahn v. Kotten, 43 Ohio St. 2d 237, 331 N.E.2d 713 (1975); British
Overseas Airways Corp. v. Tour and Travel of Houston, Inc., 568 S.W.2d 888 (Tex. 1978);
Direct Import Buyers v. KSL, Inc., 538 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1975). Several states define malice
in terms of negligence or lack of probable cause to believe the truth of the defamatory
statement. This also represents a retention of pre-Gertz defamation law rather than a
change to a negligence standard in response to Gertz. See Ward v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
339 So. 2d 1255 (La. App. 1976); Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc. v. Fundera, 58
App. Div. 2d 808, 396 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1977); Powers v. Carvalho, 117 R.I. 519, 368 A.2d
1242 (1977); Gem Trading Co. v. Cudahy Corp., 22 Wash. App. 278, 588 P.2d 1222 (1978).
Only two states have adopted knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth as the
malice necessary to defeat a conditional privilege, but, unlike Maryland, those states had
adopted the reckless disregard standard before Gertz. See Aspell v. American Contract
Bridge League, 122 Ariz. 399, 595 P.2d 191 (1979); Bradford v. Mahan, 219 Kan. 450, 548
P.2d 1223 (1976). Two states have adopted a reckless disregard standard for those cases in
which the speech affects a matter of public interest. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc.,
188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Commercial Programming
Unlimited v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 81 Misc. 2d 678, 367 N.Y.S.2d 986 (1975).
One commentator has suggested that the traditional common law definition of
malice is unconstitutional because it focuses on the defendant's motive without requiring
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adopt the New York Times standard under constitutional compulsion, but only
as a matter of state law, it is not bound by Supreme Court interpretations of the
meaning of reckless disregard for the truth. The court may choose to follow
Supreme Court rulings, but it is also free to make its own interpretation of what
the words "reckless disregard" mean, so long as the definition it chooses requires
some finding of fault. 5 This situation poses a dilemma for the court. To the
extent that the policy rationales for conditional privileges differ from the first
amendment considerations that give rise to the adoption and use of the New
York Times standard, the temptation will be strong to part company with
Supreme Court interpretations. To do so, however, would be to contravene the
court's avowed purpose of achieving simplicity and consistency in the law of
defamation.
It is very likely that the Court of Appeals will follow the Supreme Court's
interpretations of the reckless disregard standard. The court said that the
solution to the inconsistency of the malice standards for allowing punitive
damages and for defeating a conditional privilege was "the adoption of the New
York Times standard of malice to defeat the conditional privilege defense in
cases of private defamation."" Had the Marchesi court not intended to adopt the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the reckless disregard standard, it could have
simply declared that knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the truth was to
be the new standard, without referring to outside sources. Its repeated
references to New York Times may indicate a contrary intention. The Marchesi
court established a uniform standard of malice for allowing punitive damages
and for defeating a conditional privilege. The case with which conditional
privilege malice was now consistent, Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf,7 itself adopted
the New York Times standard for private plaintiffs for purposes of presumed or
punitive damages partly in recognition of the need for consistency with the law
of defamation for public plaintiffs,' in which constitutional malice principles
apply of their own force.
Further, the manner in which Maryland cases have treated the reckless
disregard standard in other contexts suggests that the Supreme Court interpre-
that the defendant be at fault, as that term was intended by the Gertz court. Barnes, The
Constitutional Fault Test of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., and the Continued Viability of the
Common Law Privileges in the Law of Defamation, 20 ARiz. L. REV. 799, 805-06 (1978).
The courts that have retained common law malice apparently have not found such
reasoning persuasive.
95. One court has adopted the reckless disregard standard as the malice necessary to
defeat a conditional privilege for speech of public interest, but it chose not to follow
Supreme Court precedent. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d
450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
96. 283 Md. at 138, 387 A.2d at 1133. Although a literal reading of "all purposes"
might include all private defamation actions, given Jacron Sales, the language must refer
only to cases not involving a conditional privilege in which presumed or punitive damages
are sought and to cases involving a conditional privilege.
97. 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
98. Id. at 593, 350 A.2d at 696.
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tation of that standard will be followed. Although the Court of Appeals did not
define "reckless disregard for truth" as that phrase was used in Stevenson and
its progeny, it has used the reckless disregard standard in other areas of the law,
most notably in civil cases in which fraud is alleged." As in the Supreme Court's
first amendment defamation cases, the court has required that scienter be
alleged and proved, that the defendant know that his statement was untrue, or
make it with reckless indifference to its truth."° Reckless indifference has been
defined as "[makingl a statement whether it he trie nr felqe., sn-d therefore
without any real belief in its truth , . . ."I" This definition is the substantial
equivalent of the Supreme Court's interpretation of reckless disregard for the
truth. 10 2
Even if the Court of Appeals chooses to follow the Supreme Court's
explications of the reckless disregard standard, questions about the applicability
of the burden of proof and the scope of judicial review mandated by that
standard will remain. Marchesi presents the question on two levels. The first is
whether Jacron Sales compels application of the stricter evidentiary and
appellate review tests to malice determinations for presumed and punitive
damages, since it is that case with which Marchesi is supposed to be in accord.
Because Gertz was applied to private defamation actions in Jacron Sales as a
matter of state law, it does not necessarily follow that all the incidents of the
constitutional doctrine need be or have been incorporated into state law. It
seems clear, however, that the Court of Appeals contemplated that these
incidents would be part of the state defamation law on proof of malice in private
defamation cases not involving conditional privileges.'" The question then
99. See Brashears v. Collison, 207 Md. 339, 115 A.2d 289 (1955); Piper v. Jenkins, 207
Md. 308, 113 A.2d 919 (1955); Appel v. Hupfield, 198 Md. 374, 84 A.2d 94 (1951); Brodsky
v. Hull, 196 Md. 509, 77 A.2d 156 (1951) (by implication); Reynolds v. Evans, 123 Md. 365,
91 A. 564 (1914) (by implication).
100. Brashears v. Collison, 207 Md. 339, 115 A.2d 289 (1955); Piper v. Jenkins, 207
Md. 308, 113 A.2d 919 (1955).
101. Brashears v. Collison, 207 Md. 339, 115 A.2d 289 (1955).
102. See text accompanying notes 64 to 67 supra. There may be some difference
between the two formulations. The Maryland standard of scienter seems to require only
that the speaker have no reason to believe in the truth of the statement, not that he must
be aware that the statement is probably false, as required by the Supreme Court's
definition.
103. The court clearly thought the extension should be made as a matter of federal
constitutional law, 276 Md. at 590-92, 350 A.2d at 694-95; had it so held, the stricter
burden of proof and appellate review standards would have been constitutionally
compelled. The fact that the court did view the extension as probably constitutionally
compelled, and its state law holding as an alternate means of adopting the Gertz rule,
lends support to the view that it intended to adopt all of the incidents of the constitutional
rule.
Some support may perhaps be found in IBEW Local 1805 v. Mayo, 281 Md. 475,
379 A.2d 1223 (1977), a libel action filed by a plant supervisor against a union. The court
noted that because the union had not contended on appeal that evidence was insufficient to
support the verdict, it need not "make an independent examination of the record to assure
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presented in Marchesi is whether the clear and convincing evidence test and the
greater scrutiny on appellate review must also be applied to proof of malice
necessary to defeat a conditional privilege.
Although under Maryland law a preponderance of the evidence has been the
degree of proof needed to show the requisite malice to defeat a conditional
privilege,'" the Supreme Court has stated that New York Times malice must be
proven by "clear and convincing evidence."'0 5 Clear and convincing evidence, as
that term has been defined by the Court of Appeals, is more than a mere
preponderance of evidence, but short of evidence that establishes proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.'0 The theoretical basis for requiring a degree of proof greater
than a mere preponderance is the belief that an erroneous verdict for one side
(in this case, the person whose reputation is at stake) would be more harmful
than an erroneous verdict for the other side (in this case, the person who
published the speech in question). 7 In cases in which the New York Times
standard is constitutionally mandated, an incorrect verdict for the plaintiff
would result in an abridgement of first amendment rights, and would lead to
self-censorship in precisely those areas in which the free exchange of ideas is
most vital.ln On the other hand, an erroneous verdict for the defendant would
result only in the plaintiffs injury to his reputation going unredressed and
uncompensated. Although an erroneous verdict for the defendant in that case
would be an injustice, it is deemed to be not as serious as an infringement of
constitutional rights. Although the clear and convincing standard sometimes is
used when constitutional rights are not involved, it is invoked only in those
areas in which the court is especially sensitive about making an erroneous
decision - such as when fraud or other acts of moral turpitude are alleged 10 -
[itselfl that the statement . . . was not insulated from a libel award by the first
amendment." Id. at 480 n.3, 379 A.2d at 1225-26 n.3. The case involved a labor dispute,
however, and the Supreme Court has held that the strict standard of judicial review is
applied in those cases to protect the national labor policy. See note 120 infra.
104. See General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810 (1976); A.S. Abell
Co. v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 265 A.2d 207 (1970); Kapiloff v. Dunn, 27 Md. App. 514,
530-31, 343 A.2d 251, 262 (1975) (dictum).
105. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion). The Court
has elsewhere characterized New York Times as requiring such proof. E.g., Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
106. Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 319-20, 413 A.2d 170, 178 (1980). See also
Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437, 442 (La. 1976); Jolley v. Jolley, 46
Ohio Misc. 40, 44, 347 N.E.2d 557, 560 (1975); Cromwell v. Hosbrook, 81 S.D. 324, 329,
134 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1965).
107. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971) (plurality opinion). The
argument is analogous to that put forth to justify requiring that a criminal conviction
must be supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. It is believed that a greater evil
results from the conviction of an innocent man than from the acquittal of a guilty man. See
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
108. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50 (1971) (plurality opinion).
109. Household Fin. Corp. v. Altenberg, 5 Ohio St. 2d 190, 192, 214 N.E.2d 667, 669
(1966); Merrick v. Ditzeler, 91 Ohio St. 256, 258, 110 N.E. 493, 494 (1915); Virginia Fire
and Marine Ins. Co. v. Hogue, 105 Va. 355, 361, 54 S.E. 8, 10 (1906).
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or in certain instances in which the power of equity is invoked - such as when a
court is asked to revoke a solemnly executed written document. 10 The social
disutility of falsely branding a person a fraud or erroneously dissolving a
properly executed contract is thought to outweigh the opposite mistake.
A purely private defamation suit is not an appropriate case for requiring
clear and convincing proof of malice. Although Gertz held that all speech was
constitutionally protected to some degree,"' it also held that any standard of
fault was constitutionally permissible,"2 and did not require that fault be proved
by clear and convincing evidence." 3 Had the Supreme Court thought that
private defamation was one of those instances in which an erroneous verdict for
the plaintiff presented a greater evil than a faulty verdict for the defendant, it
would have mandated that the clear and convincing evidence burden of proof be
applied in all defamation cases. The Court of Appeals has always allowed a
finding of malice to defeat a conditional privilege based on a preponderance of
evidence. It has thus agreed with the judgment implicit in Gertz that an
erroneous verdict for the plaintiff in a private defamation suit is no more
pernicious than one for the defendant. Further, Marchesi has made the danger of
socially undesirable verdicts for the plaintiff now more remote than before,
because the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted with reckless
disregard of the truth, a higher standard of malice than that previously
required. An additional -factor against adoption of the higher standard is that
the clear and convincing evidence standard is difficult to explain to juries,"4
which suggests that the courts should make use of that standard with a certain
amount of caution and restraint.
When appellate courts are presented with cases in which constitutional
considerations require that the New York Times standard of malice be applied,
they must make an independent examination of the record."' An independent
examination of the record differs from ordinary review in that the reviewing
court scrutinizes findings of fact without granting them their ordinary
110. Household Fin. Corp. v. Altenberg, 5 Ohio St. 2d 190, 192, 214 N.E.2d 667, 669
(1966).
111. 418 U.S. at 347-48.
112. Id. at 398.
113. See Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 597, 350 A.2d 688, 698 (1976). In
Jacron the Court of Appeals concluded that it was free to adopt a preponderance of
evidence standard as the quantum of proof by which a plaintiff must establish the
defendant's fault in a private defamation action in which the speech is not protected by a
conditional privilege. Id. At least one commentator has gone further, and suggested that a
court may presume fault and place the burden on the defendant to prove that he was not at
fault. Eaton, supra note 70, at 1429.
114. "We hold that proof of fault in cases of purely private defamation must meet the
standard of the preponderance of the evidence. This is the quantum of proof ordinarily
required in other types of actions for negligence and is apt to be more readily understood by
juries." Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 597, 350 A.2d 688, 698 (1976) (emphasis
added). See also Household Fin. Corp. v. Altenberg, 5 Ohio St. 2d 190, 193, 214 N.E.2d 667,
670 (1966).
115. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964); A.S. Abell Co. v.
Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 71-72, 265 A. 2d 207, 216 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 921 (1971).
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presumption of correctness."' A less stringent standard of review permits first
amendment rights to be violated by adverse findings of fact."' The Supreme
Court's concern has been that state courts not be allowed to vitiate constitution-
al rights through factual findings."' The requirement that there be an
independent examination of the record has also been applied to safeguard
federal rights,"9 even when there is no suggestion of a constitutional issue."2
The rationale of protecting federal rights against state infringement does not
apply to Marchesi, in which New York Times malice is applied as a matter of
state law. It would be anomalous to say that these state rights must be protected
by the state court against state court intrusion or distortion.'2'
116. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963); Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 659 (1944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 228-29 (1939); Norris
v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590 (1934).
117. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284-85 (1964); Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335 (1946); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590 (1935).
118. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S.
227 (1939); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1934).
119. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 659 (1945); Fiske v. Kansas, 274
U.S. 380, 385-86 (1927).
120. Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Ancient Order of Nobles of the
Mystic Shrine v. Michaux, 279 U.S. 737 (1929); Creswill v. Grand Lodge Knights of
Pythias, 225 U.S. 246 (1912); Kansas City So. Ry. v. C.H. Albers Comm. Co., 223 U.S. 573
(1912).
An example of a case in which an independent examination of the record is
required to protect federal, non-constitutional rights, is a defamation suit arising from
labor disputes. The Supreme Court has held that there can be no recovery in such a case
unless New York Times malice is proven. Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53
(1966). The Court in Linn did not adopt the New York Times standard under constitutional
compulsion but rather because it held that the national labor policy requires federal
intervention to protect some speech not covered by the first amendment. Id. at 65. In
Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974), the Court required that appellate courts
make an independent examination of the record to insure that the speech involved is not
protected under federal law. Id. at 282.
121. Indeed, a court's allowing an independent examination of the record might
constitute a deprivation of the individual's right to a trial by jury. Although the principles
of the seventh amendment are not incoporated into the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause and are not, therefore, applicable to proceedings in state courts, see Binge v.
Collins, 274 Md. 338, 335 A.2d 670 (1975), the Maryland state constitution contains a
provision similar to the federal seventh amendment: "The right to a trial by Jury of all
issues of fact in civil proceedings in the several Courts of Law in this State, where the
amount in controversy exceeds the sum of five hundred dollars, shall be inviolably
preserved." MD. CONST., Dec. of Rights art. 23.
It can be argued that permitting an appellate court to conduct an independent
examination of the record infringes on the individual's right to have questions of fact
determined by a jury. In Board of Shellfish Comm'rs v. Mansfield, 125 Md. 630, 94 A. 207
(1915), the Court of Appeals was faced with a statute that empowered it "to review all
questions of fact" in certain cases it heard on appeal. The appellant argued that vesting
the Court of Appeals with such power rendered the act unconstitutional because it did not
protect the parties' rights to trial by jury. Although the court refused to declare the act
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Despite the arguments against applying the clear and convincing evidence
test and a stricter appellate review of factual determinations, the Court of
Appeals will probably incorporate them into the New York Times definition for
the sake of simplicity and clarity. Although the clear and convincing evidence
test is difficult for a jury to understand, it would be far more confusing to
require a jury to apply two different burdens of proof in a single case -
preponderance of evidence for an award of compensatory damages, and clear and
convincing evidence for an award of punitive damages.1n By the same token,
because appellate courts must conduct an independent examination of the record
to review punitive damage awards,"u it is likely that they will conduct an
independent examination to review compensatory damage awards as well. It
seems doubtful that they would set aside a punitive damage award from their
review of the factual findings, only to close their eyes to those same findings and
uphold an award of compensatory damages based on an identical definition of
malice.
Even if the court fails to adopt the clear and convincing evidence test or the
stricter standards of appellate review, the application of New York Times malice
to cases involving conditional privileges will make it more difficult for a plaintiff
to bring a successful defamation suit. Whereas the plaintiff formerly had the
option of demonstrating constitutional malice or common law malice, now he
can recover only upon a showing of constitutional malice."' In addition, New
York Times malice is a more difficult standard to meet than the traditional
common law standard."n Proof of New York Times malice would probably satisfy
the common law test, because a jury could easily infer that if the defendant
published an injurious statement realizing that it was probably false, he must
have been motivated by a desire to injure the plaintiff. Proof sufficient to
establish common law malice, for example, that the defendant acted with an
improper motive, such as a desire to injure the plaintiff, 6 would not, however,
be sufficient to show constitutional malice.
unconstitutional on that ground, it eliminated the word "fact" from the act, implicitly
accepting the argument that an appellate court cannot review findings of fact. Id. at
633-34, 94 A. at 208. If the state constitution precludes an appellate court from reviewing
findings of fact when the legislature directs the court to do so, the court should also be
precluded from reviewing factual findings when its avowed purpose is to simplify the law
of defamation.
122. The clear and convincing test is probably applicable to malice determinations for
punitive damages. See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
123. The stricter standard of appellate review is probably applicable to malice
determinations for punitive damages in private defamation cases. See note 103 and
accompanying text supra.
124. See text accompanying notes 86 to 92.
125. Very few plaintiffs have successfully hurdled the constitutional malice barrier
since New York Times. See Eaton, supra note 70, at 1375.
126. See notes 51 to 56 and accompanying text supra.
127. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that ill will is not an element of
constitutional malice. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (1971)
(plurality opinion); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 9-11 (1970);
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965);
Garrison v. Louisana, 379 U.S. 64, 73-74, 77-79 (1964).
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Given the difficulties in proving New York Times malice, a plaintiff may
find it more likely that he can defeat a privilege by proving excessive
publication. Excessive publication occurs when speech goes beyond what is
necessary to protect the interest that gives rise to the privilege." Suppose, for
example, that an employer thinks an employee is stealing from him. If he tells
this to a policeman, the statement is privileged because it is reasonably
calculated to protect his legitimate interest in protecting his property. However,
if he also tells the policeman that the employee is lazy or unfaithful to his wife,
the statement is not privileged because it is not reasonably calculated to protect
a legitimate interest. For the same reason, he cannot tell his friends that the
employee is stealing from him, unless he can reasonably expect that his telling
them will help protect his interest in guarding his property. The Court of
Appeals has stated that excessive publication takes the speech outside the
privilege rather than defeating the privilege."2 In other words, statements that
constitute excessive publication are treated as evidence of unprivileged speech,
rather than as evidence of malice to defeat an existing privilege. As unpri-
vileged speech, excessive publication is subject to the rule established in Jacron
Sales that it is actionable upon a showing of negligence. Consequently, changing
the definition of malice necessary to defeat a conditional privilege leaves the
doctrine of excessive publication unchanged, and as malice becomes increasingly
difficult to establish, plaintiffs may find that proof of excessive publication is
their only means of bringing a successful defamation suit.
In some cases, a plaintiff may benefit from the new standard of malice. At
common law, damages were presumed from the fact of the defamatory
publication;130 actual injury need not be shown. Gertz held, however, that when
states allowed recovery under a lesser standard than the New York Times
standard, actual injury must be proven by the plaintiff in order to recover
damages. 3 ' Had the Court of Appeals retained the Stevenson definition of
malice, plaintiffs would have to prove actual injury as well as malice in private
defamation cases in which a conditional privilege is present. Since the Court of
Appeals has instead adopted New York Times malice, a plaintiff need not prove
actual injury. 3 2 When one litigates over a subject as intangible as reputation,
128. General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 172-73, 352 A.2d 810, 816 (1976);
Robinett v. Ruby, 13 Md. 95, 102 (1859).
129. General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 172-73, 352 A.2d 810, 816 (1976).
130. Foley v. Hoffman, 188 Md. 273, 52 A.2d 476 (1947); DeWitt v. Scarlett, 113 Md.
47, 77 A. 271 (1910).
131. 418 U.S. at 349-50.
132. Whether actual injury need be proven depends upon how the Maryland courts
interpret the new standard. If they interpret it as identical to New York Times malice,
with the same burden of proof or scope of review as constitutional malice, actual damages
need not be shown. If it is interpreted differently, however, then it might be held to be a
lesser standard, and actual damages would have to be shown. Indeed, constitutional malice
may be present, but if the jury is permitted to return a verdict for the plaintiff under a
lesser standard, actual injury must be proven.
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actual injury is often difficult to prove. Thus, in cases in which a plaintiff can
prove New York Times malice, but cannot prove that he suffered actual injury, a
plaintiff can recover under the Marchesi test, although he would have lost under
the Stevenson definition of malice.
As has been shown, the new standard of malice established in Marchesi will
bring several substantial changes to the law of defamation. Although the court's
aim to achieve greater simplicity and certainty is desirable, this goal could have
been met with less drastic measures than that adopted in Marchesi. The
Stevenson definition could have been made less confusing to juries by simply
deleting the phrase "malice does not mean hatred or spite" from the jury
instructions. Although the substance of the test would have been virtually
unchanged, the jury would have been relieved of the burden of having to draw
semantic distinctions between "hatred or spite" on the one hand, and "abusive
language" and "manifestation of ill will" on the other. Another means by which
confusion could have been diminished would have been by removing the word
"malice" from jury instructions altogether. Juries are accustomed to finding two
different kinds of conduct in one case in order to award compensatory and
punitive damages.13 The reason juries were confused in defamation cases is that
two different standards were given the same label, "malice." Removing the label
should have eased the difficulty in applying the two standards. A final way for
the court to have achieved simplicity would have been for it to adopt a
negligence standard rather than a reckless disregard standard. Since negligence
had already been adopted as the fault a plaintiff must show in the absence of a
privilege,'"' adopting the same standard when a privilege exists would eliminate
altogether any litigation concerning the existence and scope of the privilege.'35
The Marchesi opinion exalts convenience over substance. Absent from the
opinion is any policy justification other than convenience for adopting a new
standard of malice. In terms of policy, there is little justification for shielding
most privileged speech with as much protection as is provided by the New York
Times standard. The tort of defamation is based upon the recognition that an
individual has an interest in having injury to his reputation redressed. 3 '
Privileges are created to balance that interest against the various social
133. Regardless of the nature of a defendant's conduct, compensatory damages are
awarded when a plaintiff has established his cause of action and suffered an actual loss.
Punitive damages, however, are only appropriate when the defendant's conduct is deemed
to be such that he should be punished, when he has acted maliciously. See Wedeman v.
City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 366 A.2d 7 (1976). In cases in which both types of
damages are sought, therefore, juries must find first, that the defendant's conduct was
such that plaintiff has established his cause of action and second, that that conduct was
malicious in some way.
134. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 596-97, 350 A.2d 688, 697-98 (1976).
135. Perhaps the Marchesi court believed that it should not adopt a negligence
standard because it had expressly declined to do so two years earlier in Jacron Sales. Id. at
588-89, 350 A.2d at 699.
136. See Eaton, supra note 70, at 1351-52.
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interests that are advanced by the free and open discussion of ideas. When the
interest in free speech predominates, the law protects that speech by conferring
a privilege upon it. It follows that the stronger the societal interests served by a
privileged communication, the stronger the privilege should be.'37 When the
interest served by uninhibited communication is especially strong, the privilege
should be absolute, acting as a complete bar to recovery." When the interest
served is less compelling, the protection conferred by the privilege should be
weaker. If no interest is served by the publication or the interest advanced is de
minimis, the speech should not be protected by any privilege.'39 The interest
served by the open communication of ideas varies with the facts of each case.
Thus a strict adherence to the principle of weighing the free speech interest in
the case against the reputational interest, if taken to its logical extreme,
dictates that the privilege conferred on the speech at issue would also vary with
each case. Because such an ad hoc approach would be unmanageable, however,
speech is divided into categories under which all speech within each category is
given the same degree of protection. 0
The decision as to how strong a privilege should be conferred on speech
cannot be based solely on how important that speech is. Another factor that
should be considered, but is often ignored, is the extent to which protecting
speech with a privilege deters self-censorship. "' Privileges have their basis in
the concern that, in the absence of safeguards, "information that should be given
or received would not be communicated because of [the] fear of . . . persons
capable of giving it that they would be held liable in an action for defamation if
their statements were untrue."'42 If the failure to afford certain speech a
privilege will not deter communication of the idea that society has an interest in
having published, there is no need to clothe that speech in a privilege. Similarly,
if a weak privilege will discourage self-censorship to the same extent that a
strong privilege would, there is no reason to afford the stronger privilege. It is
not simply the value of the speech, but the value of the speech that will be lost,
that must be weighed against the reputational interest at stake. "'
137. It does not follow, however, that the degree of protection afforded the speech
should vary inversely with the reputational interest. Since damage awards are proportion-
al to the injury to reputation, the more devastating the impact of the publication on the
reputation of the potential plaintiff, the greater the risk of incurring substantial losses
should the publisher be found liable in an action for defamation. The threat of substantial
liability should act as a deterrent to ill-considered publication when the interest in
protecting reputation is great.
138. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
139. In other words, it should be protected by the minimum standard of fault that is
constitutionally permissible under Gertz.
140. Thus, for purposes of defamation law, all speech falls within one of three
categories: speech that is absolutely privileged, speech that is qualifiedly privileged, and
speech that enjoys no privilege.
141. Anderson, Libel and Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REv. 422, 423 (1975).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 593 (1977).
143. See generally Anderson, supra note 141.
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Under this analysis, there is little reason to extend special protection to
speech that falls into the Marchesi court's categories of "statements] in
furtherance of (the publisher's] own legitimate interests, or those shared in
common with the recipient or a third party . . ."'" When there is a strong
self-interest present there is little reason to fear self-censorship. Any self-
censorship that results indicates that the reputational interest of the potential
plaintiff, as measured by the risk of liability to the defendant from a defamation
suit, is stronger than whatever gain the publisher might achieve by speaking. If
so, it is better that he not speak, as his personal self-interest, as demonstrated in
his decision not to speak, coincides with the social interest. Speech advancing
interests of third parties or of the general public is in need of greater protection.
If an individual does not have a personal stake in the speech; the fear of being
sued would more likely be a deterrent to his speaking than it would to a person
who speaks in furtherance of his own interests. He does not have a personal
stake in the speech that motivates him to risk a lawsuit should his statement
turn out to be false.
From the standpoint of social utility of speech designed primarily to further
interests other than those of the speaker, the argument for awarding a
conditional privilege is stronger in the case of speech of interest to the general
public than in the case of speech intended to protect a few third parties because
its publication tends to advance the interests of a greater number of people. The
aggregate social interest in protecting the speech from self-censorship is apt to
be greater than the social interest in protecting an individual's reputation."5 If
the information is not of interest to the general public, it is more likely that the
risk of self-censorship will be outweighed by the interest in protecting
reputation and by the simplicity that will result from not having to determine
whether a privilege exists and whether it was forfeited by excessive publica-
tion. 4
Thus, the only case in which a conditional privilege requiring a standard of
proof higher than negligence is justified is that of publications that are of
interest to the general public. The practical effect of such an approach would be
to reinstitute the position of the plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.' 7 as
144. 283 Md. at 135-36, 387 A.2d at 1131.
145. Of course, there will be instances in which the injury to reputation will be more
serious than the interest in preventing self-censorship. As was discussed earlier, however,
weighing the two competing interests on a case-by-case basis is not practical. See text
accompanying note 140 supra.
146. Another advantage of extending a conditional privilege only to matters of interest
to the general public, rather than to publications designed to protect others as well, is that
it would relieve the trier of fact of delving into the motives of the publisher to ascertain
whether the publication was motivated by self-interest or by the interest of another. Such
determinations can be difficult, especially where motives are mixed.
147. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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a matter of state law - all speech of general public interest would be actionable
only on a showing of knowing falsity or reckless disregard for truth.'48 All other
speech would be actionable upon proof that the publisher was negligent, as that
term is defined in Jacron Sales.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals has attempted to simplify the law of defamation by
adopting the New York Times definition of malice as the standard necessary to
defeat a conditional privilege. By applying a constitutional standard in a
non-constitutional setting, the court has achieved simplicity at the cost of
applying standards that are inconsistent with the policies surrounding condi-
tional privileges. Further, by considering simplicity to the exclusion of all else,
the court missed an opportunity to reevaluate the policy considerations behind
conditional privileges and to choose the socially optimal standard.
148. Two states have limited the application of the standard of knowing falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth in private defamation cases to speech in the public
interest, see note 83 supra, but they have not followed the suggestion here that the
distinction between privileged and unprivileged speech in all other private defamation
cases should be abolished.
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A DEFENDANT FOUND GUILTY BUT INSANE MAY APPEAL
HIS CONVICTION - LANGWORTHY v. STATE
In Langworthy v. State,' the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a
defendant found guilty of a crime, but insane at the time of its commission, has
a right to appeal his conviction.' In an opinion interpreting the Maryland
statutory provisions concerning the insanity defense, the court held that a
criminal defendant is entitled to appeal a verdict against him, even though his
successful insanity plea prohibited sentencing, the usual final judgment from
which defendants may appeal.' The court thus extended the final judgment rule
in criminal cases. In doing so, it interpreted the statutory provisions for the
insanity defense to permit a finding of both guilty and insane,4 an interpretation
at odds with traditional notions of the nexus between the insanity verdict and
the mens rea requirement for guilt.
John Alan Langworthy was charged with rape and other offenses in October
1974. He entered in the Circuit Court of Prince George's County a general plea
of not guilty and an additional plea alleging insanity at the time of the
commission of the offense. The case was tried in July 1977 before a court sitting
without a jury.' The issues of guilt or innocence under the general plea and
insanity under the additional plea were argued and determined separately. The
court convicted the defendant of rape, but found him insane at the time of the
commission of the crime.' It ordered that the defendant be committed for
examination and evaluation by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
to determine whether he should be confined for treatment of his mental
disorder.7 In March 1978, the court ordered that Langworthy be confined in the
Clifton T. Perkins mental health facility,' based on the Department's report.
1. 284 Md. 588, 399 A.2d 578 (1979).
2. Id. at 589, 399 A.2d at 579.
3. Id. at 597, 399 A.2d at 583.
4. Id. at 598-99, 399 A.2d at 584.
5. For a discussion of the procedure to be followed in a trial when the defense of
insanity has been interposed, see Bremer v. State, 18 Md. App. 291, 313-18, 307 A.2d 503,
518-20, cert. denied, 269 Md. 755 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930 (1974); Strawderman v.
State, 4 Md. App. 689, 698, 244 A.2d 888, 894 (1968).
6. Such a two-part verdict was approved in Turner v. State, 5 Md. App. 584, 590, 248
A.2d 801, 804 (1968), cert. denied, 253 Md. 735 (1969). There the Court of Special Appeals
commented: "[W]e think it the better practice, even though the statute does not expressly
provide, that when the issue is before the court as the trier of fact, that the court render
a special verdict [of insanity]."
7. Commitment for evaluation was authorized under Act of April 29, 1971, ch. 261,
1971 Md. Laws 561 (repealed 1979, current version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, §§ 27-27C
(1979)).
8. See Act of April 29, 1971, ch. 261, 1971 Md. Laws 561 (repealed 1979, current
version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 27B(e) (1979)). For the current provisions for
submission of the evaluation report and for the court's determination whether to commit
the defendant, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, §§ 27-27B (1979).
9. 284 Md. at 591, 399 A.2d at 580.
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In August 1977, after he had been convicted but before he had been
committed to Perkins for treatment, Langworthy filed an appeal to the Court of
Special Appeals. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that because Langwor-
thy had been found "not guilty by reason of insanity," he had no right to appeal
that acquittal.1" The court reasoned that a consummated crime requires the
coming together of a guilty act - actus reus - and a guilty mind - mens rea.
While many verdicts of not guilty are the result of the state's failure to prove the
actus reus, the court noted, other not guilty verdicts, including not guilty by
reason of insanity, are the result of the state's failure to prove the requisite
mens rea. 11 The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the law demands the
same result whether a defendant wins an acquittal because of the state's failure
to prove the actus reus, or, as in Langworthy's case, its failure to prove mens
rea: the defendant has won an acquittal in the eyes of the law, and may not
appeal.
2
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari. After reviewing the Maryland
legislative scheme concerning the insanity defense, the court reversed, holding
that a defendant found guilty but insane at the time he committed a crime may
appeal his conviction. 3 Although Langworthy's ultimate disposition - commit-
ment to Clifton T. Perkins hospital upon a finding that he constituted a danger
to himself or others - had not been ordered by the court before he appealed to
the Court of Special Appeals, the court held that Langworthy's conviction, plus
the trial court's order to commit him for psychiatric evaluation, constituted a
"final judgment" from which he could appeal.' In reaching its conclusion, the
court rejected the Court of Special Appeals' position that the defendant had been
acquitted. The court found that Langworthy had, in fact, been found guilty of
10. 39 Md. App. 559, 560, 387 A.2d 634, 635 (1978), rev'd, 284 Md. 588, 399 A.2d 578
(1979).
11. Id. at 561, 387 A.2d at 635.
12. Id.
13. The court also pointed out that in the event of appellate reversal of the conviction
for reasons not precluding retrial, the issue of the defendant's insanity, as well as his guilt,
may be retried. 284 Md. at 597, 399 A.2d at 583. The reasons for reversal that do not
preclude retrial can be found in State v. Boone, 284 Md. 1, 393 A.2d 1361 (1978) (retrial
does not violate double jeopardy when trial error causes reversal). See Burks v. United
States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978). The holding that both the
defendant's guilt and his insanity must be considered at the second trial was necessary to
avoid what would in effect be a bifurcated trial, a separate trial for each issue, which has
been consistently denied to defendants in Maryland. See Tull v. State, 230 Md. 596, 188
A.2d 150 (1963); Williamson v. State, 36 Md. App. 405, 374 A.2d 909 (1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 282 Md. 100, 395 A.2d 496 (1978); Bremer v. State, 18 Md. App. 291, 307 A.2d
503, cert. denied, 269 Md. 755 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930 (1974); Morris v. State, 11
Md. App. 18, 272 A.2d 663, cert. denied, 261 Md. 727 (1971); Avey v. State, 9 Md. App. 227,
263 A.2d 609, cert. denied, 258 Md. 725 (1970); Sweeney v. State, 6 Md. App. 431, 252 A.2d
9 (1969).
14. 284 Md. at 597, 399 A.2d at 583. Although Langworthy appealed only the finding
that he committed rape, the court stated in dictum that a defendant in Langworthy's
position could also appeal his "disposition." Id. at 597, 399 A.2d at 583. "[TIhe disposition
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rape, and that the court's dismissal of his appeal had precluded appellate review
of that conviction."
The Court of Appeals determined that the purpose of the legislature in
providing for a special verdict of insanity was to prevent an insane criminal
from being punished."6 The statute provided that a person who successfully
pleads insanity may go free, or, under prescribed circumstances, be given treat-
ment for his mental disorder. 7 According to the court, it was not the intent of the
legislature that an insane criminal should be deemed not guilty of the crimi-
nal act of which he had been convicted. 8 The court reasoned that the existing
statutory scheme regarding the insanity plea contemplates that there first be
a determination of guilt or innocence under the general plea before a rendering
of the special verdict regarding a defendant's sanity at the time of the crime."
aspect may be reversed only upon an abuse of the judicial discretion exercised." Id.
Because at the time he appealed Langworthy had not been confined to Perkins, the
disposition referred to by the court must have been the initial decision to release him or
refer him for evaluation. It seems unlikely that as a practical matter a court could ever
have been found to have abused its discretion in referring a person adjudged insane for
evaluation.
The present provisions concerning the insanity defense render the point moot. The
provision construed by the Langworthy court provided that a person found not guilty by
reason of insanity "in the discretion of the court, may be committed" for evaluation. Act of
April 29, 1971, ch. 261, 1971 Md. Laws 561 (emphasis supplied). The statute now provides
that a court shall order an insane defendant committed for evaluation, with one exception.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 27(b) (1979). The court may order a defendant released, with or
without conditions, if both the defendant and the state's attorney agree to release and to
any conditions imposed and if the court has available an evaluation similar to that
required to be made by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene made within the
preceding 90 days. Id. § 27(e). As it pertains to a commitment order, the exception seems
designed only to relieve a recently evaluated defendant of the inconvenience of
commitment for reexamination.
15. 284 Md. at 598, 399 A.2d at 584.
16. The court observed that "[tihe legislative scheme contemplates that a person shall
not be punished for a crime he commits when, at the time of its commission, he was insane
as statutorily defined." Id. at 597, 399 A.2d at 583.
17. Id. at 598, 399 A.2d at 583. Act of April 29, 1971, ch. 261, 1971 Md. Laws 561. For
the current provisions, see MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, §§ 27 & 28 (1979).
18. 284 Md. at 598, 399 A.2d at 584.
19. Id. The court posited that this was the rationale of Morris v. State, 11 Md. App.
18, 272 A.2d 663, cert. denied, 261 Md. 727 (1971). In Morris, the Court of Special Appeals
held that a defendant who enters an uncontested plea of insanity does not thereby lose his
right to a trial on the merits. The court found that the willingness of the state to accept the
defendant's insanity plea, thus automatically granting him a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity, did not give the trial court the right to deny the accused's strenuous
request that he be given the opportunity to prove his innocence. The opinion implied that a
plea of insanity should not be interpreted as a defendant's confession of guilt, if not for the
insanity. But see Figinski, Commitment After Acquittal on Grounds of Insanity, 22 MD. L.
REV. 293, 296-97 (1962). Figinski expresses the view that "the plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity is seen in Maryland as an admission by the defendant that he committed the
act alleged. The question of insanity is placed in issue first and the verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity 'results. . . in the automatic supposition that the defendant was guilty
of the crime charged without a [determination] whether or not a crime was committed or if
the defendant was the one who committed it.'" Id. (quoting Hearings on the Constitutional
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The Maryland Code' and rules of procedure"' allow a defendant to file a
general plea of not guilty, guilty, or nolo contendere in addition to his plea of
insanity. At the trial of any case in which a plea of insanity has been properly
filed, the court is instructed by statute to direct the jury to render a special
verdict on the sanity of the defendant at the time of the alleged crime.2'
In interpreting the statutory provisions regarding the insanity plea, the
court described the three possible results when both insanity and not guilty are
pleaded to a criminal charge: (1) if the verdict on the general plea is not guilty,
the insanity plea is moot, and the defendant goes free; (2) if the verdict on the
general plea is guilty, and the defendant is found to have been sane at the time
of the offense, the court imposes sentence; (3) if, as in Langworthy, the verdict on
the general plea is guilty but the special verdict is that the accused was insane
at the time of the offense, the court may either "turn him loose" or commit him
for examination and evaluation." The court observed that the trial court's
disposition of the case "was in full compliance with the statutory scheme."'
Finding that the defendant had put before the Court of Special Appeals only
the propriety of the verdict that he was guilty of rape,' the court turned to the
issue whether, under the circumstances of the case, an appeal could lie from that
Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 638 (1961) (statement of Charles E. Goshen,
Director, Community Psychiatric Services, Maryland Department of Mental Hygiene)).
See text accompanying note 23 infra.
20. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 25(b) (1979).
21. MD. R.P. 731(a).
22. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 25(b) (1979). In addition, the Court of Appeals has
interpreted MD. R.P. 760 to require a rendering of the special verdict in non-jury cases as
well as jury trials. 284 Md. at 593, 399 A.2d at 581.
23. 284 Md. at 593-94, 399 A.2d at 581-82.
24. Id. at 594, 399 A.2d at 582.
25. Id. at 596, 399 A.2d at 583. The court concluded that Langworthy was not
contesting the finding of insanity. Id. It also noted that because Langworthy appealed
before the trial court ordered him committed to Perkins for treatment, he could not
question his commitment. Id. at 595, 399 A.2d at 583. The court reserved the question
whether a criminal defendant could appeal an order of commitment. Id. After Langworthy
was decided, the legislature provided a limited means for challenging the order. Act of
May 29, 1979, ch. 701, 1979 Md. Laws 1961. Section 27A requires that an administrative
hearing be held after examination and evaluation are completed; the hearing officer then
submits to the court, based on the evidence presented, a report of the hearing and
recommendations as to the defendant's commitment. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 27A (1979).
Section 27B specifies procedures for the court's determination, upon receipt of the report of
the hearing officer, whether to order commitment, including provisions for defendant's
challenge to the findings and a hearing on the record made by the hearing officer if
exceptions are filed or if the court does not intend to follow the recommendations. Id.
§ 27B. The right to appeal at least from this determination is contemplated, although not
specifically given, for a subsection provides that appeal of a district court order is to be to
the circuit court on the record and appeal of a circuit court order is to be by petition for
leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. Id. § 27B(j).
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verdict." The court concluded that the verdict of guilty and the order that
Langworthy be committed for psychiatric evaluation together constituted a final
judgment. 7 The judgment would be appealable whether a trial court set a
legally insane defendant free or ordered him committed for examination and
psychiatric evaluation. Langworthy was allowed to appeal his conviction despite
his not having received a sentence, the usual final judgment from which
criminal defendants appeal, because his sentencing had been legally prohibited
by the success of his insanity plea. The court reasoned that because punishment
is supplanted by statutory alternatives,2" the general rule that pronouncement of
sentence or the suspension of its imposition is required to comprise an
appealable judgment does not apply in the context of cases in which insanity is
pleaded successfully.' Although Langworthy's trial was not truly "final" at the
time he appealed because the court had not ordered his ultimate disposition, the
Court of Appeals determined that the trial of a defendant adjudged guilty and
insane reaches final judgment when the defendant is convicted and is either set
free or ordered committed for psychiatric evaluation. It is not necessary for
purposes of the final judgment rule that the court have ordered its ultimate
disposition of the convicted defendant at the time the defendant appeals.3"
Maryland law provides that an appeal may be granted only from a final
judgment2 The usual criminal case reaches final judgment when sentence has
been imposed2 or imposition of sentence has been suspended," and ordinarily an
appeal is premature until that time. 4 The Maryland statute prescribing the
final judgment rule makes no attempt to define an appealable final judgment or
order, leaving that determination to the courts for resolution on a case-by-case
basis." In deciding whether a particular judgment or order is "final," the courts
look to whether it settles and concludes the rights of the parties, and whether a
failure to appeal would deny to the parties the means of further prosecuting or
defending the action.3 6
26. 284 Md. at 595, 399 A.2d at 583.
27. Id. at 597, 399 A.2d at 583.
28. Id.
29. Id. See Act of April 29, 1971, ch. 261, 1971 Md. Laws 561 (repealed 1979, current
version at MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, §§27-27G (1979)).
30. 284 Md. at 597, 399 A.2d at 583.
31. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-301 (1980).
32. E.g., Buckner v. State, 11 Md. App. 55, 272 A.2d 828, cert. denied, 261 Md. 723
(1971).
33. "In a criminal case, the defendant may appeal even though imposition or
execution of sentence has been suspended." MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-301
(1980).
34. See Pearlman v. State, 226 Md. 67, 70, 172 A.2d 395, 397 (1961); 5 E. WHARTON,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2176 (1957) ("A criminal case is not complete
and the case is not disposed of until sentence has been pronounced.").
35. See Revisor's Note to MD. CTS. & JuD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-101(f) (1980).
36. Jolley v. State, 282 Md. 353, 355, 384 A.2d 91, 93 (1978); Warren v. State, 281 Md.
179, 183, 377 A.2d 1169, 1171-72 (1977); Jeffers v. State, 203 Md. 227, 229, 100 A.2d 10,
11(1953).
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It must be questioned whether Langworthy's rights were settled at the time
he appealed. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court's order to
commit Langworthy for psychiatric evaluation was "as final a judgment
following the conviction as if a sentence inflicting punishment had been
imposed."37 However, upon a close comparison of the stages of trial of an insane
defendant and those of a sane defendant the court's analogy seems less than apt.
When both the sane and the insane defendants are convicted, the trial court
must order their disposition. At the time Langworthy was decided the trial court
had two options with respect to the insane defendant: set the defendant free,38 or
order him committed for psychiatric evaluation pending an ultimate order for
his disposition.' With respect to the sane defendant, the court has three options:
impose sentence immediately, suspend sentence," or stay the imposition of
judgment. 1 When the trial court requires information beyond that which it has
obtained during the trial, in order to effect the optimum disposition of the sane
defendant, the court may stay the entry of judgment42 and order that the
Division of Parole and Probation conduct a pre-sentence investigation of the
defendant."
Both the psychiatric evaluation and the pre-sentence investigation fulfill
the function of providing information to the trial court about the defendant so
that the court can order the most appropriate disposition of the defendant under
the circumstances. When the psychiatric evaluation is received by the judge, he
may order the convicted insane defendant released without condition," released
conditionally, 5 or committed for treatment."0 When the pre-sentence investiga-
tion is received by the judge, he determines an appropriate sentence for the
convicted sane defendant. The defendants' cases conclude in the respective trial
courts when sentence is imposed (or suspended) with respect to the sane
defendant, and when the insane defendant is either released or committed for
treatment.
37. 284 Md. at 597, 399 A.2d at 583.
38. Id. at 594, 399 A.2d at 582.
39. Act of April 29, 1971, ch. 261, 1971 Md. Laws 561 (repealed 1979). The court is
now required to commit the defendant for evaluation unless it determines on the basis of a
recent "similar" evaluation and with the consent of the defendant and the state's attorney
that he should be released. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 27 (1979); see note 14 supra.
40. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641A (1979) provides in pertinent part: "Upon entering a
judgment of conviction, the court having jurisdiction, may suspend the imposition or
execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation upon such terms and
conditions as the courts deem proper."
41. Id. § 641(a).
42. Id.
43. Id. art. 41, § 124.
44. Id. art. 59, § 27B(h).
45. Id. § 27B(f). This alternative is provided for situations in which the court finds
that the defendant has a mental disorder, would not be a danger to himself or others if not
committed to an institution for in-patient care or treatment, but would be a danger if
released to the community without special conditions imposed by the court. Id.
46. Id. § 27B(e).
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The functional equivalent of criminal sentencing, then, is not the trial
court's order that the insane defendant be committed for evaluation. Rather, the
equivalent of criminal sentencing occurs when the trial court selects one of the
three available alternatives for the disposition of the insane defendant. Indeed,
courts and commentators have observed that indefinite confinement in a mental
institution is as much, if not more, of a deprivation of an individual's liberty as
is a sentence served in prison. 7 The trial court's order that an insane defendant
be committed for psychiatric evaluation, however, is the functional equivalent of
an order that a sane defendant be subject to a pre-sentence investigation.
Notwithstanding the court's flawed analogy between the trials of sane and
insane defendants, its application of the final judgment rule to Langworthy's
case is sound. A sane defendant undergoing pre-sentence investigation cannot
appeal his conviction; however, the bar to his appeal originates in the statutory
preclusion of appellate recourse inasmuch as judgment against him is stayed
pending the investigation.'8 An insane defendant undergoing psychiatric evalua-
tion, on the other hand, bears the stigma of an existing finding of guilt; his
rights have been concluded. Moreover, there are other distinctions. First, the
evaluation of an insane defendant frequently takes much longer than that of a
sane defendant. Second, the insane defendant's evaluation may occur while the
defendant is confined to a residential psychiatric facility,'9 the sane defendant's
evaluation frequently occurs while the defendant is released on bail. Third, even
if the trial court were to order the release of the insane defendant based upon
the results of his psychiatric evaluation, the defendant would retain a vital
interest in the appeal of his conviction. The social consequences flowing from a
person's having a record of conviction support permitting the appeal of that
conviction.
The purposes and policies underlying the final judgment rule support the
Court of Appeals' extension of the. rule in Langworthy. The rule is said to
prevent piecemeal disposition of litigation, to avoid the indefinite protraction of
litigation, to discourage unnecessary appellate interference with the trial court's
authority and, in general, to avoid "a multiplicity of appeals . . . creatl ing]
vexatious delay, and . . . ruinous accumulation of costs." None of these
considerations would be served by denying appellate review to insane defen-
47. Morris v. State, 11 Md. App. 18, 23, 272 A.2d 663, 665 (1971), cert. denied, 261
Md. 427 (1971); Figinski, supra note 19, at 298.
48. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 641(a)(2) (1979).
49. The current statute clearly contemplates that a defendant need not be residing in
the facility while he is examined: "The court shall state in its Icommitmentl order whether
the examination and evaluation are to be conducted on an in-patient or out-patient basis."
MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 27(b) (1979). The former provision stated that a defendant found
"not guilty by reason of insanity" could in the court's discretion be committed to the
Department of Mental Hygiene for confinement for evaluation. Act of April 29, 1971, ch.
261, 1971 Md. Laws 561. Apparently the court had discretion to commit or not commit for
evaluation, but all persons committed were confined in an institution during examination.
50. Waverly Mut. Bldg. Ass'n v. Buck, 64 Md. 238, 342, 1A. 561, 562 (1885).
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dants, as was done by the Court of Special Appeals in its decision in
Langworthy.
Langworthy seems to be in conflict with the conservative spirit of Warren v.
State,"' the most recent Maryland case interpreting the final judgment rule in
the criminal context. In Warren the Court of Appeals held that an order for
"probation without verdict" was not a final order, and thus not appealable.5 2 The
court was construing a statutory provision that provided that for certain
first-time offenders of the Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, a
court "may, with the consent of [the defendant] stay the entering of the
judgment of guilt, defer further proceedings, and place [the defendant] on
probation . . . ."'I The articulated ground for the decision was that the
legislature would not have expressly provided for the stay of the entry of
judgment of guilt if it had intended the probation order to fall within the ambit
of the final judgment rule, which permits appeal only from a judgment entered
in a lower court.' The underlying rationale for the decision, however, seems to
have been the Court of Appeals' reluctance to expand the scope of the final
judgment rule without explicit legislative direction." In Langworthy, on the
other hand, the Court of Appeals expanded the final judgment rule, despite
legislative silence on appellate review. Although it cited Warren,9 the Langwor-
thy court made no attempt to distinguish it.
There was support in Maryland law predating Warren for extension in
Langworthy of the final judgment rule. An earlier legislative enactment and a
Court of Appeals decision evidenced a flexible approach to the final judgment
rule by permitting appeals from non-traditional alternative judgments. In 1927
the legislature passed a law specifically allowing suspended sentences to be
appealed as final judgments,"7 overruling a judicial decision that had held to the
contrary.' In Pritchett v. State," the Court of Appeals held that a lower court
order that imposed a lesser alternative penalty in lieu of the usual punishment
51. 281 Md. 179, 377 A.2d 1169 (1977).
52. Id. at 180-81, 377 A.2d at 1174.
53. Act of May 5, 1972, ch. 278, 1972 Md. Laws 36 (current version at MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 292(b) (1979)). The current version specifically deals with the Warren problem; it
provides that a defendant's consent to a stay of proceedings before judgment constitutes a
waiver of his right to appeal the finding of guilt. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 292(b) (1979).
54. 281 Md. at 185, 377 A.2d at 1177.
55. As was true of the statute in Langworthy, the statute at issue in Warren was
silent on the issue of appeal.
56. 284 Md. at 597, 399 A.2d at 583 (citing Warren v. State, 281 Md. 179, 183, 377
A.2d 1169 [,1171] (1977)). The court apparently cited Warren for the general proposition
that an action that "settles some disputed right or interest of the parties" constitutes a
final judgment. See Warren v. State, 281 Md. 179, 183, 377 A.2d 1169, 1171 (1977) (citing
Harlan v. Lee, 177 Md. 437, 439, 9 A.2d 839 [,8411 (1939)).
57. Act of April 26, 1927, ch. 608, 1927 Md. Laws 1239 (presently codified at MD. CTS.
& JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-301 & -401(a) (1980)).
58. Symington v. State, 133 Md. 452, 105 A. 541 (1919).
59. 140 Md. 310, 117 A. 763 (1922).
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was a final judgment from which appeal could be taken.' The trial court's
disposition of the insane defendant in Langworthy was a statutorily mandated
alternative to sentencing, and thus was analogous to a suspended sentence or to
the alternative penalty in Pritchett.
Recent statutory changes raise questions of the extent to which the final
judgment holding in Langworthy survives. Although the Court of Appeals
expressly reserved the question whether insane defendants could appeal court
orders for their commitment,6 the legislature has provided a limited means by
which they may do so. Section 27B of article 59 provides that the defendant or
the state's attorney may file exceptions to the commitment recommendation of
the Department of Mental Hygiene hearing officer. If exceptions are filed, a
court hearing on the record in the administrative proceeding is held.2 The
statute gives a right of appeal on the record from district court orders to the
circuit court and a right to apply to the Court of Special Appeals for leave to
appeal from circuit court orders.' The dictum in Langworthy that a defendant
could appeal his disposition' as well as the finding of guilt is mooted, since
referral for commitment is no longer discretionary. 5 Whether the Langworthy
60. Id. at 316, 117 A. at 765. Pritchett involved a statute that permitted a court to
order a person convicted of desertion and nonsupport to pay his wife a certain sum of
money weekly for a year rather than impose the usual sentence of fine or imprisonment.
Once such an order was entered, only if the defendant failed to pay could the court impose
a fine or imprisonment. The Court of Appeals characterized the order as an "alternative
penalty or punishment." Id. It was from such an order that the defendant appealed.
61. 284 Md. at 595, 399 A.2d at 582.
62. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 27B (1979). See note 25 supra.
63. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 27B (1979). See note 25 supra. The subsection that
apparently contemplates appeal, MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 27(B)(j) (1979), refers to appeals
from a court order. It might arguably be said to apply not only to an order entered
following a hearing on exceptions to the administrative officler's report but also to one
made when exceptions are not filed. An earlier subsection provides that if no exceptions
are filed and if the court determines that the recommendation was supported by the
evidence and is otherwise appropriate, it shall enter an order in conformance with the
recommendations. Id. § 27B(b). Reading all the provisions together, however, the
reasonable conclusion is that if no exceptions to the recommendation are made, they are
waived, and the commitment order is not appealable. The alternate procedure provided by
§ 27(e), by which release of a defendant on whom an evaluation has been recently
performed can be granted, apparently is not affected by the appeal provision. Subsection
27(b) provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (e) . . .," immediately after a
defendant has been found not guilty by reason of insanity, he shall be committed to the
Department of Mental Health for examination. Id. § 27(b). Subsection (e) provides that the
release of a defendant, without commitment for evaluation, may be ordered if the
defendant and the state's attorney consent to such a procedure and if the court has
available an evaluation made within the past 90 days. Id. § 27(e). Apparently, judging by
the fact that immediate commitment for evaluation is made mandatory, subject to the
limited exception, if the court does not release the defendant under the exception, it must
commit him for examination. In that case, the statutory appeal procedure would be
available as if § 27(e) had not come into play.
64. See note 14 supra.
65. Although release under § 27(e) is discretionary, certain statutory conditions must
be met before it can be ordered. See note 63 supra.
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holding relating to the time of appeal survives the statutory changes is unclear.
It now seems to be possible for insane defendants to appeal their convictions in
one proceeding and the court's commitment order in another." The avoidance of
multiple appeals in the same proceeding is one of the reasons for the final
judgment rule, and the Court of Appeals might hold that the statutory changes
vitiate the Langworthy holding, that since review of the commitment order,
albeit limited, is now provided, it makes little sense to create a bifurcated appeal
by allowing appeal after the guilty determination. Given the limited nature of
the appeal from the commitment order and the limited scope of review, however,
such a result is not necessarily compelled.
In addition to its significance in extending the final judgment rule -
whatever the effect of the statutory changes - the Court of Appeals' decision in
Langworthy represents a significant departure from the law establishing that an
insane defendant cannot possess the requisite mens rea to be guilty of a crime.
The court's opinion rejected the traditional rules" about the relationship
between the insanity defense and mens rea, which had influenced the Court of
Special Appeals' decision. Moreover, the court's formulation of the three
eventualities that arise when there is a plea of insanity in addition to the
general plea of not guilty" has far-reaching consequences not involved in the
intermediate court's disposition of the issues."
The Court of Appeals turned to the existing Maryland statutory provisions
concerning the insanity defense in order to determine the intent of the
legislature with respect to the appealability of a judgment of not guilty by
reason of insanity."0 The provisions in effect at the time of Langworthy relating
66. Indeed, although as a practical matter defendants might choose to defer appeal of
the finding of guilt until the commitment decision is made and file a combined appeal,
until the effect of the new statute on Langworthy is determined, they will have to file
separate appeals because appeal from a conviction must be filed within 30 days of the
entry of final judgment, MD. R.P. 1012.
Langworthy may provide some guidance if guilty determinations and commitment
orders are appealable in separate proceedings. The Court of Appeals noted in dictum that
if the verdict on the general plea is not guilty, the defendant's insanity plea becomes moot.
384 Md. at 593, 399 A.2d at 581. Although not resolved by the court in Langworthy, it
appears that if an insane defendant's conviction is reversed on appeal, all commitment
proceedings against him should be dropped. If he is already committed, he should be
released.
67. See text accompanying notes 86 to 96 infra.
68. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
69. See text accompanying notes 124 to 126 infra.
70. In determining the legislative intent, the court apparently followed its own
established methodology for the exercise of statutory interpretation:
[T]he cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain and carry out the real legislative
intention. In determining that intention, we consider the language of an enactment in
its natural and ordinary signification; only when the statute in question is ambiguous
or of doubtful meaning need we look elsewhere to ascertain the legislative intention.
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 278 Md. 26, 31, 358 A.2d 241,
244 (1976). The Court of Appeals' methodology in determining legislative intent has been
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to the disposition of a person who successfully asserts an insanity defense
applied to a defendant found "not guilty of any crime by reason of insanity at the
time of the commission of the act."' Although the words seem clear upon first
reading, the phrase must be read to include the definition of "insanity" in this
context.72 Maryland law defines a person as legally insane when "at the time of
the commission [of the crime] as a result of a mental disorder, he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law."73 Read with this definition, the
phrase is ambiguous, and the words alone are insufficient to answer the
question whether the Court of Appeals' or the Court of Special Appeals'
interpretation of the statutory provisions for the insanity verdict is correct.
Further, the statute contains no explicit statement of purpose, and no legislative
history is available.74 In short, there are no obvious indications of the
legislature's clear intent in passing the criminal insanity provisions.
criticized in Reynolds, The Court of Appeals of Maryland: Roles, Work and Performance,
Part II: Craftsmanship and Decision-Making, 38 MD. L. REV. 148, 162-67 (1978).
Had the language of the statutes at issue in Langworthy been so clear as to permit
no ambiguity concerning legislative intent, the court would not have needed to resort to
statutory interpretation. Indeed, in that event the court's allusion to support from
precedent and considerations of public policy could have been deemed inappropriate. See
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). An objective examination of the
statute in effect, Act of April 29, 1971, ch. 261, 1971 Md. Laws 561, and rule of procedure,
MD. R.P. 731(a), however, fails to provide a clear guide for the resolution of legislative
intent, although both the court of Special Appeals and the Court of Appeals exposited that
intent in widely contrasting opinions.
Once the words of a statute admit of more than one meaning, a court interpreting
a statute faces the threshold issue of the determination of the intention of the legislature
in passing the law. See generally Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision
and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395,
401-06 (1950). If the statute itself contains a statement of purpose, or if legislative history
is available, the intention of the legislature is relatively clear. If these sources do not exist,
however, authorities generally agree with Blackstone that
the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is by
exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made by signs the most natural
and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter,
the effects and consequences, or the spirit and reason of the law.
1 W. BLACKS'ONE, COMMENTARIES 59-62 (8th ed. 1778).
71. Act of April 29, 1971, ch. 261, 1971 Md. Laws 561 (current amended version at
MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 27-27C (1979)). The statute, recently repealed and reenacted,
still refers to the finding as one of "not guilty by reason of insanity." MD. ANN. CODE art.
59, §§ 27(a), (b) & 28 (1979); see Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 701, 1979 Md. Laws 1961
(purpose of act to provide "procedures for confinement, commitment ... for persons found
not guilty by reason of insanity").
72. See 284 Md. at 599 n.12, 399 A.2d at 584 n.12.
73. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 25(a) (1979). The same provision was in effect at the
time of Langworthy.
74. The primary focus of the legislature in its revision of the insanity laws in 1967
was the modernization of the definition of legal insanity from the M'Naghten rule to a
modification of the American Law Institute test for criminal responsibility. See text
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The contradictory approaches of the two Langworthy opinions both repre-
sent valid interpretations of the insanity verdict and its consequences as it has
existed during different stages of its development in the common law.
Nevertheless, the Court of Special Appeals' opinion in Langworthy was more
technically correct in its handling of the insanity defense as it is generally
understood by the courts.75 To discover an historical precedent for the Court of
Appeals' interpretation in Langworthy, one must focus on the law as it existed
before the fourteenth century, when insanity was not a defense to a crime, and
the insane defendant was not acquitted by virtue of insanity. 6 At that time,
insanity was merely a ground for a special verdict finding that the accused had
committed the act when mad, and was thus entitled to a pardon from the
Crown." The insane were then described as those who did not know what they
were doing, who were lacking in mind and reason, and were not far removed
from brutes."
The current definition of insanity in Maryland is considerably broader than
that which existed in the early fourteenfh century. A legally insane defendant is
today defined as one who lacks the substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law.7" Notwithstanding this difference in definition, the Court of Appeals'
finding in Langworthy that the legislative intent behind the insanity verdict is
that the defendant should not be punished for a crime committed while insane'
is strongly reminiscent of the early common law belief that the insane should be
pardoned for their crimes.
From the reign of Edward III - 1327 to 1377 - until 1883, insanity was an
absolute defense to a crime in England." Madness, or insanity, was defined in
terms of cognitive processes such as the ability to count to twenty pence, to tell
one's age, and to recognize one's parents.2 An insane person was assumed to be
accompanying notes 95 & 96 infra. It is conceivable that the procedural issues revolving
around the special verdict of insanity were not considered by the legislature, and that the
ramifications given to the new provisions in Langworthy by the Court of Appeals were not
anticipated.
Nevertheless, the judiciary is not usually understood to be limited to the
expressed intentions of the legislature in its authority to interpret statutes. Courts are
subject generally only to the restriction that they may not give a statute meaning that the
words themselves will not bear. That is, the words of a statute are to limit the meanings
which can be attributed to a particular law. This proposition is designed to prevent
unwarranted expansion of the scope of statutes. See generally H. HART & A. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS 1218-26 (tent. ed. 1958).
75. See text accompanying notes 87 to 90 infra.
76. Figinski, supra note 19, at 321.
77. S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER & THE CRIMINAL LAW 125 (1925).
78. Id. at 126.
79. Mn. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 25(a) (1979).
80. See text accompanying notes 16 to 18 supra.
81. S. GLUECK, supra note 77, at 125. The rationale behind this complete defense may
be explained by the expression, furiosis furore solum punitur (a madman is punished by
his madness alone), 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 24 (9th ed. 1783).
82. S. GLUECK, supra note 77, at 128.
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mentally incapable of forming criminal intent.83 Insanity was thus viewed as an
affirmative defense that negated the state of mind - the mens rea - that was
universally held to be a necessary element of a criminal offense."4 Therefore, the
insane defendant was not punished, or even found guilty, because without mens
rea a crime could not exist.'
The Court of Special Appeals' assumption that Langworthy was found not
guilty by reason of insanity" reflects the recent common law view of insanity,
inasmuch as the court viewed the verdict of insanity as implying a failure by the
state to prove mens rea." Indeed, this theory regarding insanity as an
affirmative defense has been applied in many Court of Special Appeals
decisions.' The iCourt of Special Appeals' conclusion that Langworthy had been
found not guilty by reason of insanity by the trial court also finds support in
opinions of the Supreme Court89 and the Court of Appeals" holding that an
insane person is incapable of forming the requisite criminal intent (mens rea) to
commit a crime.
The conclusion that one adjudged insane is legally incapable of forming
criminal intent received support from the M'Naghten rule of insanity, a variant
of which had existed in Maryland9 before the legislature enacted the American
Law Institute (ALI) insanity test in 1967.92 Under the M'Naghten test, a
defendant was legally insane if he did not have the capacity and reason
sufficient to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong and to
understand the nature and consequences of his acts. 3 If the state was unable to
prove that the defendant was not insane under this standard of insanity, it
83. See id. at 131.
84. This view has received support by modern courts. See, e.g., Sweeney v. State, 6
Md. App. 431, 438-39, 252 A.2d 9, 14 (1969): "Insanity at the time of the commission of
the offense is such an alternative defense and is for the determination of the trier of fact at
the trial on the merits, for if the accused was insane at the time of the commission of the
crime he was not responsible for his criminal conduct and must be found not guilty. Such
affirmative defense puts in issue one of the essential elements of guilt - the defendant's
mental capacity."
85. See Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 484-86 (1895).
86. See 39 Md. App. 559, 560, 387 A.2d 634, 635; text accompanying notes 10 to 12
supra.
87. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
88. E.g., Riggleman v. State, 33 Md. App. 344, 361, 364 A.2d 1159, 1163 (1976); White
v. State, 17 Md. App. 58, 61, 299 A.2d 873, 875, cert. denied, 268 Md. 754 (1973). Although
the courts often term insanity an "affirmative defense," presumably they mean no more
than that a defendant has the burden of raising it.
89. E.g., Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 484-86 (1895).
90. E.g., Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 512-14, 200 A.2d 150, 153-55 (1960).
91. See Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 13 A. 809 (1888).
92. Act of April 26, 1967, ch. 709, § 1, 1967 Md. Laws 1541.
93. M'Naghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
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would be virtually impossible for it to prove that the defendant could have
formed criminal intent.'
However, because the legislature has adopted the ALI test for criminal
responsibility, the issue arises whether the broader definition of insanity
necessarily implies a parallel expansion in the doctrine of mens rea. Under the
ALI test, a defendant is legally insane if he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law.95 Some authorities assume without discussion that a
defendant found legally insane by the ALI test must also be found incapable of
forming mens rea.96 They ignore the possibility that the test used for finding
legal insanity might, or should, alter the traditional premise that insanity and
criminal mens rea can never coexist in an individual.
In Gardner v. State," the Court of Special Appeals questioned the validity of
the assumption that an insane person is incapable of formulating criminal
intent. The court interpreted the ALI test to allow a defendant to be found
legally insane if he could not conform his conduct to the requirements of the law,
despite the possibility that the defendant possessed mens rea.94 The court's
implicit assumption in Gardner is that one who fails to meet the first part of the
ALI test - that he appreciates the criminality of his conduct - has the mens
rea to be guilty. Thus Gardner laid the groundwork for the Court of Appeals'
decision in Langworthy by implying that if the actus reus and mens rea were
proven by the state, but the defendant was found to have lacked the substantial
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, the conceptually
appropriate verdict would be one of guilty but insane."
The Court of Appeals' analysis in Langworthy was in accord with Gardner's
discussion of the possibility that mens rea and legal insanity may coexist.
Indeed, only a finding that the defendant was both capable of forming the
94. As Justice Harlan observed: "How then upon principle or consistently with
humanity can a verdict of guilty be properly returned, if the jury entertain a reasonable
doubt as to the existence of a fact which is essential to guilt, namely, the capacity in law of
the accused to commit that crime?" Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895).
The problem of the relationship between mens rea and insanity existed under the
M'Naghten test. A woman who believed that God commanded her to strangle her husband,
for example, would be insane under M'Naghten and also possess the mens rea to commit
the crime of strangling her husband. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955).
95. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 25(a) (1979).
96. Comment, Insanity - Guilty But Mentally Ill - Diminished Capacity: An
Aggregate Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 351, 375 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Guilty But Mentally 1111; Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 53 J. URB. L. 471, 472 (1976).
97. 41 Md. App. 187, 396 A.2d 303, affd, 286 Md. 520, 408 A.2d 1817 (1979).
98. Id. at 194-95, 396 A.2d at 308.
99. However, even the Gardner court repeated, without questioning, the premise that
a defendant once found insane is "thus not guilty," ignoring the ramifications of its own
analysis. Id. at 195, 396 A.2d at 308.
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requisite mens rea despite his insanity, and that he did in fact do so, could
justify a verdict of guilty but insane. Yet, other than mentioning in a footnote
that the ALI test for legal insanity is not "necessarily at variance with a general
intent to commit a crime,"'" the Langworthy opinion avoided all discussion of its
implications for the issue of mens rea. °'
Another alternative approach to the traditional verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity can be found in the Michigan legislative provisions that
establish the verdict of"guilty but mentally ill."' 2 This verdict avoids the logical
entanglement of criminal intent and sanity by acting as an alternative to the
"not guilty by reason of insanity verdict" without replacing it. In 1975 the
Michigan legislature passed a series of amendments that enable the factfinder to
return the verdict of guilty but mentally ill, instead of guilty, not guilty, or not
guilty by reason of insanity."°
The Michigan statute changes trial procedure and testimony to separate the
issues of criminal agency and sanity more logically for the jury. The jury first
considers whether the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense.
Mental illness is defined under the statute as a "substantial disorder of thought
or mood which significantly impairs [a person's] judgment, behavior, capacity to
recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life."'" The
jury next decides whether the defendant was legally insane at the time of the
commission of the crime, using the test that a person is legally insane if "as a
result of mental illness that person lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law."'' 5 Thus, under the law of Michigan the jury must
decide three issues: criminal agency; ° the presence of mental illness;" 7 and the
100. 284 Md. at 599 n.12, 399 A.2d at 584 n.12. The court cited Gardner v. State, 41
Md. App. 187, 396 A.2d 303 (1979), as its source for this proposition. This is not an
accurate interpretation of Gardner, however, inasmuch as that opinion held that an
accused who could meet the first half of the new insanity test, that of appreciating the
criminality of one's conduct, would have mens rea. Id. at 194-95, 396 A.2d at 308.
101. Because the relationship between mens rea and the insanity defense was not
really at issue in Langworthy, the court may have chosen to await a case that squarely
raises it before providing a definitive analysis.
102. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 768 (Supp. 1979).
103. One commentator has questioned the innovative nature of the Michigan verdict.
noting that an informal guilty but mentally ill verdict in effect exists in most states, since
a judge can sentence the guilty but mentally ill defendant, but recommend to the penal
authorities that the defendant be placed in a treatment center rather than a general
prison. Thus, the Michigan guilty but mentally ill provision "is not a radical concept,
rather it is merely a statutory formalization of existing informal practices." Guilty But
Mentally Ill, supra note 96, at 354 n.17. See Grostic, The Constitutionalitv of Michiga,'s
Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict, 12 U. Micii. J. L. REF. 188 (1978); Comment. Guiltv But
Mentally Ill: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, supra note 96, at 472.
104. MitcH. CoMe. LAws ANN. § 300.400a (1975).
105. Id. § 768.21a(1) (Supp. 1979).
106. Id. § 768.36(1)(a).
107. Id. § 768.36(1)(b).
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presence of legal insanity.' 8 If the jury finds in the affirmative on all three
issues, the verdict shall be not guilty by reason of insanity. If it finds in the
affirmative with respect only to the first two, the verdict must be guilty but
mentally ill. If it affirmatively finds only the first, the defendant is found guilty.
The guilty but mentally ill verdict results from a finding that the defendant
committed the act with the requisite mens rea, but was suffering from a mental
illness at the time of the offense.'" Although it can only be considered if the
defendant first pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, the guilty but mentally
ill verdict does not replace the insanity defense; it merely acts as an alternative
to finding the defendant guilty.
When a defendant is found guilty of a crime but mentally ill, the Michigan
court may impose the same sentence as would be imposed upon a defendant
found guilty but not mentally ill." The difference in sentencing lies in the
nature of the confinement. Those found guilty but mentally ill may be provided
the necessary psychiatric treatment by the Department of Corrections, or the
defendant may be transferred to the custody of the Department of Health."'
Time spent receiving treatment under either department will be applied toward
the sentence imposed. Prior to the expiration of the defendant's sentence, a
complete report of his mental health and any recommendations for release or
continued treatment are submitted to the parole board. Continued treatment
can be made a condition of parole. If the defendant's incarceration is to continue
after the end of his sentence, a civil hearing to determine mental illness and
dangerousness must be provided.
There are similarities and differences between the guilty but insane verdict
accepted in Langworthy, and the guilty but mentally ill verdict of the Michigan
statute. The Langworthy verdict implicitly,"' and the Michigan verdict explicit-
ly,"' assume that the defendant had the requisite mens rea to be guilty of a
crime. Both defendants have the right to appeal their convictions, and both are
subjected to possible treatment in a mental health facility. On the other hand,
the Michigan verdict is a product of legislative action, whereas the Maryland
verdict is a judicial creation. In Michigan, the guilty but mentally ill defendant
is held responsible for his crime and subject to a definite sentence to be served in
either a prison or a mental health facility. In Maryland, the guilty but insane
defendant is not held criminally responsible, and is subject to an indefinite
period of confinement in a mental health facility."' The most significant
difference between the Maryland and Michigan approaches is that a defendant
108. Id. § 768.36(l)(c).
109. Guilty But Mentally Ill, supra note 96, at 354.
110. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (Supp. 1979).
111. Id.
112. See text accompanying notes 100 & 101 supra.
113. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
114. Statutory provisions allow a defendant to seek release as early as six months after
he has been committed for treatment and thereafter ordinarily only once in a 12-month
period. MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 27C (1979).
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found legally insane can receive a verdict of guilty but insane in Maryland. In
Michigan, which uses substantially the same requirement for insanity as does
Maryland, a defendant meeting the standards for legal insanity must be found
not guilty by reason of insanity. Legal insanity and mens rea cannot coexist in
an individual under Michigan law, while, at least impliedly, they can in
Maryland. The not guilty by reason of insanity plea and verdict is still vital in
Michigan, while in Maryland the plea does not exist,' and the verdict may have
been eliminated entirely by the Langworthv decision."'
Although the guilty but mentally ill verdict permitted under Michigan law
avoids the theoretical conflicts between insanity and mens rea, it creates the
potential for greater jury confusion than does the not guilty by reason of
insanity verdict acting alone. Michigan requires a lay jury to distinguish mental
illness and legal insanity. Although the "not guilty by reason of insanity"
verdict may be unappealing in some respects, it is at least familiar to jurors
faced with trials in which the insanity plea is entered. Practical objections aside,
however, the Michigan statute represents a progressive legislative resolution of
the theoretical clash of insanity and mens rea.
The effect of the Court of Appeals' holding in Langworthy extending the
final judgment rule to allow insane defendants to appeal their convictions"'
reflects a benevolent approach to the mentally ill. The insane defendant
deserves the same opportunity to prove that he was unlawfully convicted at his
trial that is traditionally accorded sane defendants. The notion that an insane
defendant has no need for an appeal because the finding of insanity amounts to
an acquittal"' has many flaws. The most serious shortcoming of this theory, as
noted by the Court of Special Appeals in Morris v. State,"' is its failure to
recognize that a trial court's action in finding a defendant not guilty by reason of
insanity is not an ordinary acquittal in which the defendant walks out of the
courtroom a free man. Instead, most often its effect is to restrain the defendant's
liberty for an indefinite period of time because the defendant will probably be
confined in a mental hospital.' 2° Even when an insane defendant is not confined
to a mental institution, he retains an interest in appealing his conviction.
Moreover, the argument that a defendant committed to a mental hospital as
a result of a verdict of not guilty because insane is in the same position as one
confined by a civil insanity hearing' is not persuasive. The right to appeal is
115. The Maryland rules provide that a defendant may, in addition to another plea,
"interpose the defense of insanity as permitted by law." Mo. R.P. 7 31(a).
116. See text accompanying notes 127 & 128 infra.
117. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
118. See text accompanying notes 10 to 12 supra.
119. 11 Md. App. 18, 24, 272 A.2d 663, 667, cert. denied, 261 Md. 727 (1971).
120. The irony of the not guilty by reason of insanity verdict is that while it originated
in the compassionate realization that a madman is punished by his madness alone, modern
commitment statutes often result in the "mad" being confined for a longer period of time
than the "bad."
121. Wagner v. Mayor of Baltimore, 134 Md. 305, 309, 106 A. 753, 755 (1919).
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important to the insane defendant, even when the deprivation of liberty suffered
is custodial rather than punitive. There is a stigma in being convicted of a crime
that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity does not remove. Further, it
must be realized that the decision by the Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene as to whether an individual is or could be dangerous'22 will inevitably
be influenced by the knowledge that the person under evaluation was convicted
of a crime. Finally, Maryland law demands that the trial court approve any
release of an insane criminal who has been confined for treatment."3
The most troublesome part of Langworthy is the Court of Appeals'
statement that if the defendant is found not guilty, the insanity plea becomes
moot, and the defendant should go free. 2 ' This result undoubtedly makes sense
when the state has been unable to prove that the defendant committed the actus
reus of the crime. In that situation, if the commitment of the accused appears
necessary, it should be accomplished through appropriate civil proceedings. But
if a jury decides that the state has been unable to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of the mens rea requisite to a specified crime, an unexpected
result may occur: the insane defendant must be acquitted of even a violent crime
in which the actus reus had been conclusively proven. A jury convinced that an
insane defendant either did not, or could not, entertain mens rea, due to the
nature of his particular mental illness, should find him not guilty. 5 Such a
criminally insane defendant would walk out of the courtroom a free man
because his acquittal precludes the consideration of his insanity plea and,
without a special verdict of insanity, the trial court has no discretion to commit
an individual until a civil proceeding is held."a Society's interests in removing a
dangerous person from its midst - one who has been shown to have committed
an actus reus - go unvindicated where the insanity plea is mooted by the
judgment of acquittal.
It can be inferred from the Court's opinion in Langworthy that a criminal
defendant may place the issue of his mental illness before the court only by way
of a plea of insanity. Langworthy does not address the question whether mental
illness can be raised as a criminal defense warranting the simple verdict of not
guilty. By drawing a clear distinction between insanity and "partial" or
"diminished" responsibility, some jurisdictions permit evidence of mental illness
to be considered on the issue of the defendant's mens rea' In Maryland,
122. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 27 (1979).
123. See id. § 28. Although a criminal defendant may use the same release procedure
afforded those committed civilly, id. § 27C(c), he may not be released solely upon an
administrative determination of non-dangerousness as may patients admitted under civil
procedures, see id. § 18(a).
124. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
125. Perhaps the chances of this occurring in reality are considerably lessened by the
necessity that a defendant must be able to meet certain mental standards before being
judged able to stand trial. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, §§ 23 & 24 (1979).
126. See id. § 27.
127. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 325-32 (1972).
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however, it appears that a defendant must either plead insanity or be held
completely responsible, and be punished for the offense charged.'u
In Langworthy, the Court of Appeals apparently sounded the death knell of
the "not guilty by reason of insanity" verdict in Maryland. Yet the court was far
from explicit in reaching this conclusion. In light of the authorities that hold -
due to the relationship between mens rea and the insanity defense- 129 that the
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is mandated by due process, 130 a more
elaborate explanation of its demise was in order. In fact, previous attempts in
other states to eliminate the verdict by legislation were unable to overcome
constitutional hurdles. 3' Nonetheless, the general public is untroubled with the
conceptual problems of mens rea and insanity, and can easily accept a verdict of
guilty but insane. In fact, to many, the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity
offends common sense.12 Therefore, to the extent that a judicial system should
reflect the general expectations of the public concerning criminal responsibility,
the guilty but insane verdict is sound.
The final and possibly most important sign of legislative intent to be
considered in interpreting a statute is the determination of the spirit and
purpose behind the law in question. In Maryland, the courts have consistently
held that the motivation behind all the insanity laws that have existed through
the years is entirely beneficient.' = The laws were enacted in the interest of and
for the protection of "an unfortunate class of the community."'' In fact, the
courts have repeatedly observed that the purpose of the insanity laws is to
128. The insanity defense must be interposed "at the time of pleading to the warrant,
indictment or information unless the court for good cause shown shall allow a later plea
... MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 25(b) (1979). See Riggleman v. State, 33 Md. App. 344,
364 A.2d 1159 (1976) (the defense of insanity must be pleaded specially); White v. State,
17 Md. App. 58, 299 A.2d 873 (1973) (same).
129. See text accompanying notes 81 to 96 supra.
130. E.g., Sinclair v. State, 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931) (statutes precluding
insanity defense in murder indictment held violative of state due process clause); State v.
Strasburg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P. 1020 (1910) (same).
131. See note 130 supra.
132. There is an interesting account of how
[tihe attempted assassination of Queen Victoria by one McLean led in 1883 to a
change in the nature of the verdict when insanity was raised as a defense. The
gracious Queen was unable to understand her advisors' explanation of mens rea. or
how a man she saw shoot at her could be found not guilty. . . Therefore, at her
urging, the jury was required thereafter to bring in, . . . a special verdict that the
defendant was guilty of the act or omission charged but was insane at the time the act
was done or omission made.
Figinski, supra note 19, at 322.
133. Robinson v. State, 249 Md. 200, 238 A.2d 875, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 928 1968);
Hamilton v. State, 225 Md. 302, 170 A.2d 192 (1961); Deems v. State, 127 Md. 624. 96 A.
878 (1916); Devilbiss v. Bennett, 70 Md. 554, 17 A. 502 (1889); Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28.
13 A. 809 (1888).
134. Devilbiss v. Bennett, 70 Md. 554, 558, 17 A. 502. 504 (1889).
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protect the offender from being punished as if he were sane for an offense
committed while insane.'5
A cursory examination of the two Langworthy decisions could lead one to
the conclusion that the Court of Special Appeals' treatment was more favorable
to the insane defendant than that of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Special
Appeals found such a defendant to be not guilty, 3 ' while the Court of Appeals
held him to be guilty but insane.'37 Upon reflection, however, it is apparent that
this conclusion is incorrect. The Court of Appeals' guilty verdict results in
granting the defendant the opportunity to appeal previously denied to him by
the Court of Special Appeals' characterization of the verdict as an acquittal. By
granting this right to appeal, the Court of Appeals has acted in concert with the
beneficient attitude consistently attributed to the legislature.",,
CONCLUSION
In the past, especially during the reign of the M'Naghten test for legal
insanity, it had been analytically appealing to characterize the successful
insanity plea as a defense that entitled the accused to a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity. The consequences of this theory were that a defendant found
legally insane could not appeal that finding because a judgment of acquittal is
unappealable. Accordingly, the legally insane defendant was subject to the cruel
farce of facing probable confinement for an indefinite period of time in a mental
health facility on the basis of a crime for which he was allegedly found not
guilty. Moreover, he was not entitled to the appeal granted any guilty defendant
who challenged the propriety of the verdict that he committed a crime.
In Langworthy, the Court of Appeals recognized the unfairness of precluding
appeals to the insane and opened the doors of appellate review to those found
guilty but insane. The court's expansion of the final judgment rule to permit a
convicted defendant to appeal is consistent with both the purpose and history of
the rule. The most remarkable aspect of the Langworthy decision, however, is
the court's willingness to disregard traditional legal thought in order to best
carry out the beneficient attitude toward the criminally insane underlying the
legislature's provision of the insanity defense.
135. E.g., Rowe v. State, 234 Md. 295, 306, 199 A.2d 785, 790, cert. denied, 327 U.S.
924 (1964); Hamilton v. State, 225 Md. 302, 170 A.2d 192 (1961); Deems v. State, 127 Md.
624, 96 A. 192 (1916).
136. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
137. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
138. See text accompanying notes 133 to 135 supra.
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INTERACTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE BUDGET AND
REFERENDUM AMENDMENTS OF THE MARYLAND
CONSTITUTION - BAYNE v. SECRETARY OF STATE
In 1916 Maryland voters began to enjoy the power to reject through
referendum acts passed by the General Assembly.' In 1917 the Maryland
Governor and General Assembly began to compile the state budget through a
centralized budget system.' These innovations were due, respectively, to the
so-called referendum3 and budget amendments.- Because the budget amendment
created a unique procedure for passing budget bills,5 and because the referen-
dum amendment excepted from its operation various sorts of appropriations,6
there existed a number of questions about the referability of all or part of a
budget bill. Bayne v. Secretary of State7 answered many of these questions.
The case arose when a citizens' committee circulated petitions to have
portions of an appropriation funding Medicaid abortions put to a referendum on
the 1978 Maryland general election ballot.' When they duly submitted their
1. MD. CoNsT. art. XVI (1915, amended 1978). The referendum amendment, ratified
on November 2, 1915, was applicable to all non-excepted acts beginning with the 1916
session of the General Assembly. See id.
2. The budget amendment, § 52 of article III of the Maryland Constitution, was
ratified on November 7, 1916, and became effective on April 4, 1916. See ch. 159, 1916 Md.
Laws 268, 277.
3. MD. CONST. art. XVI (1915, amended 1978).
4. MD. CONST. art. III, § 52 (1916, amended 1978).
5. See notes 32 to 37 and accompanying text infra.
6. See note 62 and accompanying text infra.
7. 283 Md. 560, 392 A.2d 67 (1978).
8. On April 11, 1978, the Maryland General Assembly passed House Bill 810, the
General Budget for fiscal year 1979. Ch. 44, 1978 Md. Laws 686. Item 32.01.05.03 of the
Budget's appropriation for the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, funding the
program of medical care for the indigent called Medicaid, contained a rider forbidding
compensation to health care providers for the performance of abortions except under one or
more of these four conditions:
1. Where continuation of the pregnancy is likely to result in the death of the woman;
or
2. Where there is a risk that continuation of the pregnancy would have a detrimental
effect on the health of the woman; or
3. Where there is a risk of the birth of the child with permanent physical deformity,
genetic defect or mental retardation; or
4. Where medical procedures are necessary for a victim of rape, sexual offense or
incest, when the rape, sexual offense or incest has been reported to a law
enforcement agency or to a public or private health or social agency.
Ch. 44, § 1, 1978 Md. Laws 760. The legislative history of the rider is set forth in Brief for
Appellee at 19-20, Bayne v. Secretary of State, 283 Md. 560, 392 A.2d 67 (1978). See also
ch. 44, 1978 Md. Laws 758-61. Appellants sought to have exceptions (2), (3), and (4)
referred. 283 Md. at 563-64, 392 A.2d at 69.
Medicaid is a program under federal aegis for the sharing by federal and state
governments of the administration and costs of providing medical care to the indigent. The
federal enabling legislation is Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-
1396d (1976). The specific authorization for the funds Maryland appropriated here was
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petition to the Secretary of State for verification of signatures,9 the Secretary
refused to act, contending that the appropriation was not constitutionally
referable.'0 Two members of the committee brought suit in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County for a writ of mandamus and mandatory injunction to
compel the Secretary of State and other state officials to process the petition.
The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants."
The plaintiffs then sought certiorari from the Court of Appeals, which was
granted." Judge Orth, writing for the court in its October 9, 1978 opinion, 3
reviewed the history of the budget and referendum amendments, and concluded
that a budget bill was not per se excluded from the referendum." An item of the
budget bill, according to the referendum amendment, could not be subject to
referendum, however, if the item was a "law making any appropriation for
maintaining the State Government .". '""The court established that the
budget item in question was an "appropriation,'" and that because it provided
medical care to indigent persons, it funded a "primary function" of government.'7
The court then considered whether an appropriation providing for the perform-
ance of a "primary function of government" was "for maintaining the State
Government," and thus excepted from the referendum. In deciding the issue, the
Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977). The Maryland enabling legislation, which
empowers the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene to administer the Maryland
Medicaid program, is found at MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 42(a) (1971 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
9. Verification of signatures on petitions for referendum is required by MD. CONST.
art. XVI, §§ 2-4 (1915, amended 1978) and MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 23-3 to -6 (1976 &
Cum. Supp. 1979).
10. 283 Md. at 564, 392 A.2d at 69.
11. Id. The circuit court held that it was permissible for the legislature to attach
conditions to the appropriation because the conditions were related to the purpose of the
appropriation and that the conditions were an inseparable part of the appropriation. The
court reasoned that providing health care for citizens was a proper governmental function,
and that the appropriation in question therefore fell within the constitutional exception
from referendum of appropriations "maintaining the State Government." Accordingly, the
circuit court ruled against appellants. See Brief for Appellants, App. at 9.
12. Appellants' petition for a writ of certiorari raised the following question: "Is that
portion of the budget bill affecting the appropriation for the State's Medicaid Program
sought to be petitioned to referendum an 'appropriation for maintaining the State
Government' and therefore not subject to rejection or appeal by referendum under Article
XVI of the Maryland Constitution?" 283 Md. at 565, 392 A.2d at 69-70. In the subsequent
exchange of briefs, appellees raised two other questions, which the court dealt with in its
opinion: "May Non-severable Portions of a Law be Petitioned to Referendum?" and "Are
Conditions 2 through 4 severable from the Medical Assistance Appropriation Item?" Brief
for Appellees at 16-22, Reply Brief for Appellants at 5-7.
13. The court issued a per curiam order on August 17, 1978, see 283 Md. at 562, 392
A.2d at 68, and issued the opinion later, in 283 Md. 560, 392 A.2d 67 (1978).
14. See id. at 569, 392 A.2d at 72.
15. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 2 (1915, amended 1978).
16. 283 Md. at 570, 392 A.2d at 72.
17. Id. at 571, 392 A.2d at 73.
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court relied on two earlier decisions, Winebrenner v. Salmon'8 and Bickel v.
Nice.'9 After summarizing and quoting from both Winebrenner and Bickel, the
court held that an appropriation funding a "primary function of government"
was "for maintaining the State Government,"2 and that provision of medical
care for the indigent was not a "new function."" It noted that the payee of an
appropriation "maintaining the State Government" did not have to be an
employee or organ of the state government," and concluded that "[uinder the
rationale of Winebrenner and the test in Bickel . . . the appropriation here was
for 'maintaining the State Government,'-"3 and therefore exempt from the
referendum."
The court also disposed of appellants' argument that the Medicaid abortion
appropriation set policy, in contravention of the rule against legislating within
the budget, and that Maryland allows referral of parts of otherwise excepted
laws, if the parts in question set policy.25 A recent Attorney General's opinion 6
that identified indicia of impermissible "legislating within the Budget" was
adopted by the court, 7 but because the appropriation exhibited none of those
indicia,28 it was concluded that the appropriation did not set policy.' The court
added that ordinarily no part of an excepted law could be referred2
In determining the referability of the appropriation in question, the court
first considered whether appropriations made pursuant to the budget amend-
ment were per se excluded from the referendum by the terms of the budget
amendment.3 ' The court reviewed the history of the budget amendment, which
governs all appropriations of the state government.22 Drafted and ratified in
1916, the budget amendment requires the governor to compile a centralized,
orderly, and exclusive budget for the state, and submit it to the General
Assembly each January.2 The General Assembly may only reduce the budget
bill, and it automatically becomes law upon passage by the General Assembly.:"
The only exceptions to this procedure are provisions for supplementary
18. 155 Md. 563, 142 A. 723 (1928).
19. 173 Md. 1, 192 A.2d 777 (1937).
20. 283 Md. at 573, 392 A.2d at 74.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 575-76, 392 A.2d at 75.
25. Id. at 574, 392 A.2d at 74-75.
26. 63 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 60 (1978).
27. 283 Md. at 574, 392 A.2d at 74-75.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 575, 392 A.2d at 75.
31. Id. at 569, 392 A.2d at 72.
32. MD. CONST. art. III, §52(3) (1916).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 52(6). The implementation of the budget amendment is largely governed by
MD. ANN. CODE art. 15A (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
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appropriation bills, which may be initiated by the General Assembly but are
restricted to single "works, objects or purposes,"35 and for extraordinary
appropriations, to be passed according to budget bill procedures at extraordinary
sessions of the General Assembly.38 The Bayne court noted that the amendment's
framers and proponents had viewed the amendment as a way of making the
budgeting process orderly where it had been chaotic. 7
Despite this easily discernable intent, and despite the likelihood of
disruption if the budgeting process could be halted by referendum, the court saw
no bar to use of the referendum on that account." It concurred in and quoted the
conclusion of an earlier decision, Dorsey v. Petrott:39 "The Budget Amendment
was not designed to interfere with the operation of the Referendum Amend-
ment.""0 While the budget amendment produced "an altered fiscal procedure,
' 4
'
according to Dorsey that change had no bearing on referability. The Bayne court
apparently reasoned that because the referendum amendment was in effect at
the time the budget amendment was drafted, the framers, had they desired to
except the budget from the operation of the referendum amendment, would have
indicated such intent.'2 But "in neither the Governors' papers, nor the
legislative Journals [was] there any indication that the Commission [that
prepared the budget amendment] or the Legislature were concerned with the
possibility that the Budget Bill was subject to referendum.' ' 3 Indication of an
intent to exclude, however, might have been discerned from subsection 14 of the
budget amendment: "In the event of any inconsistency between any provisions of
this section and any of the other provisions of the Constitution, the provisions of
this Section shall prevail."" Thus, the Bayne court implicitly ruled that a breach
of the budget process by a referendum would not constitute an "inconsistency"
within the meaning of the budget amendment. 5
The Dorsey and Bayne courts were surely correct in reaching this
conclusion. There would be an "inconsistency" if the budget amendment by its
terms excepted budget, supplementary appropriation or emergency appropria-
35. MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(8)(a) (1916). Each supplemental appropriation bill must
"provide the revenue necessary to pay the appropriation thereby made by a tax, direct or
indirect, to be levied and collected as directed in the said bill." Id. § 52(8)(b). Under Dorsey
v. Petrott, 178 Md. 230, 240-41, 13 A.2d 630, 635-36 (1940), such a levy would not be an
appropriation, but, if properly coupled with an appropriation, would be protected from the
referendum to the extent that the appropriation proper was so protected (and if improperly
coupled, would be of no force in any event). Id.
36. MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(14) (1916).
37. 283 Md. at 567, 392 A.2d at 71.
38. Id. at 569, 392 A.2d at 72.
39. 178 Md. 230, 241, 13 A.2d 630, 636 (1940).
40. 283 Md. at 571, 392 A. at 71-72.
41. 178 Md. at 241, 13 A.2d at 636.
42. See 283 Md. at 568-69, 392 A.2d at 71-72.
43. Id. at 568, 392 A.2d at 71.
44. MD. CONST. art. III, § 52 (14) (1916).
45. See 283 Md. at 569, 392 A.2d at 71-72.
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tion bills from the operation of the referendum amendment. But the budget
amendment says nothing of that nature. All the budget amendment does is to
direct the appropriations process through one of three channels." And while a
budget bill differs significantly from other legislation,"7 it has no inherent traits
inconsistent with referability. It would appear, therefore, that there is no
inconsistency between the amendments, either on the face of the budget
amendment or in its implications, and it is contrary to the canons of
constitutional and statutory construction of the Court of Appeals to read
constitutional provisions as inconsistent if an harmonious reading is possible."
Moreover, it is possible that the intent of the framers of the budget amendment
with regard to the "inconsistency" phraseology was to allay a concern that other,
earlier-written parts of the constitution, composed with the former budgeting
process in mind, might contain unrevoked provisions incompatible with the new
process. The referendum amendment is not incompatible with either the old or
the new budgeting process. Thus, as the Bayne court concluded, the budget
amendment does not per se exclude itself from the operation of the referendum
amendment, and the appropriation was not excepted merely because it was part
of a budget bill. 9
The court turned next to the referendum amendment to determine whether
the appropriation in question was excluded from the referendum by any of the
terms of the referendum amendment. Article XVI of the Maryland Constitution
provides for both statewide and county-wide referenda." Petitions for statewide
referenda must be submitted within a short time after the passage of the laws
46. See MD. CONST. art. III, §§ 52(3), (8), (14) (1916).
47. See notes 32 to 37 and accompanying text supra.
48. E.g., Department of Natural Resources v. France, 277 Md. 432, 461, 357 A.2d 78,
94 (1976). When two statutes cover similar subject matter, they are to be construed, if
possible, in a manner that gives full effect to each. Prince George's County v. White, 275
Md. 314, 319, 340 A.2d 236, 240 (1975); Mayor of Baltimore v. Clerk of Superior Court, 270
Md. 316, 319, 311 A.2d 261, 263 (1973); Loker v. State, 2 Md. App. 1, 9, 233 A.2d 342, 348,
cert. denied, 248 Md. 734 (1967), 393 U.S. 1082 (1969). The rules governing interpretation
of the constitution are the same as those applicable to interpretation of statutes. County
Council v. Supervisor of Assessments, 274 Md. 116, 120, 332 A.2d 897, 899 (1975).
49. It should be noted that although the court concluded that the budget bill was not
per se excluded from operation of the referendum, the possibility that a referendum could
have an adverse effect on a budget bill was recognized:
Although it may appear that to have the whole of State government brought to a
standstill while a Budget Bill was before the voters on referendum would run counter
to all the Commission stood for, being against its basic philosophy and the rationale
and raison d'etre of the Bill it proposed, there is no indication that the Commission,
the Legislature and the Governor were not content that any matter of referendum
regarding a Budget Bill was to be resolved within the strictures of the referendum
amendment itself.
283 Md. at 569, 392 A.2d at 72.
50. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 3(a) (1915). Acts of the General Assembly may be referred.
Id. § 1(a). Section 3(a) of article XVI authorizes referring "any Public Local Law for any
one county or the City of Baltimore .... Id. § 3(a). Because Bayne has no direct
implications for local referenda, only statewide referenda will be discussed herein.
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sought to be referred.5' They must bear the signatures of three percent of the
voters52 and must follow a form prescribed by the secretary of state.5 The
petitions must be submitted along with affidavits by the petitions' carriers
attesting to the signatures" to the secretary of state by June 1 of the year in
which the legislation sought to be referred was passed.55 The secretary verifies
the signatures,' and the governor then publishes the text of the law in question
in various newspapers.57 The secretary of state prepares and submits to the local
Boards of Election Supervisors the form of the words in which the referendum
question will be placed on the ballot.
The effect of referring a law is to suspend its operation until thirty days
after it is passed on by the voters during the balloting of the next congressional
election.59 This effect is drastic, and the power of referendum, according to
section 1 of article XVI, is absolute:
The people reserve to themselves power known as The Referendum, by
petition to have submitted to the registered voters of the State, to approve
51. The petition must be filed by June 1, unless the law it seeks to refer has been
passed fewer than 45 days previous to June 1, in which case petitioners have until 30 days
after the passage of the law to file petitions.
52. This percentage is "calculated upon the whole number of votes cast for Governor
at the last preceding Gubernatorial election, of whom not more than half are residents of
Baltimore City, or of any one county." MD. CoNsT. art. XVI, § 3(a).
53. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 23-3 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
54. Id. § 23-3(a). The petitions must be accompanied by a statement identifying
financial backers of the petitions and paid petition carriers. Id. § 23-6(a).
55. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 2 (1915, amended 1978).
56. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 23-3(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
57. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 5(a) (1915); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 23-9 (1976).
58. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 5(b) (1915); MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 23-1(a) (Cum. Supp.
1979). The State Administrative Board of Election Supervisors tabulates referendum votes
and certifies them to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and the governor. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 33, § 23-11 (1976). Finally, the governor "proclaims the result of the election." MD.
CONST. art. XVI, § 5(b) (1915). In practice, all of the above supervisory functions are now
performed by the Administrative Board of Election Laws. At the time of the adoption of
the referendum amendment, the secretary of state was the official responsible for
conducting elections. MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, § 87 (1911). It was for this reason,
presumably, that the framers entrusted oversight of referenda to the secretary. General
responsibility for elections was shifted to the Administrative Board of Election Laws by ch.
555, 1969 Md. Laws 1289. Because the constitution still calls for the secretary of state to
oversee referenda, he continues to receive petitions and perform other related duties, but
verification and certification is performed in his name by the Administrative Board of
Election Laws. Telephone interview with Willard Morris, State Administrator of Election
Laws, in Baltimore, Maryland (March 28, 1980).
59. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 2 (1915, amended 1978). The sole exception is for
"emergency laws," so designated by the General Assembly, provided, however, that "no
measure creating or abolishing any office, or changing the salary, term or duty of any
officer, or granting any franchise or special privilege, or creating any vested right or
interest, shall be enacted as an emergency law." Id. In any case, emergency laws, like
non-emergency laws, may be repealed (though not suspended pending a vote) by
referendum. Id. §§ 1, 2.
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or reject at the polls, any Act, or part of any Act of the General Assembly, if
approved by the Governor, or, if passed by the General Assembly over the
veto of the Governor.
6 0
Subsequent language, however, places three limitations on this broad power.
Section 6 excepts any "law licensing, regulating, prohibiting, or submitting to
local option, the manufacture or sale of malt or spirituous liquors."61 While the
liquor exception deals with all legislative enactments, the two remaining
exceptions, set forth in section 2, deal solely with appropriations. Section 2
states: "No law making any appropriation for maintaining the State Govern-
ment, or for maintaining or aiding any public institution, not exceeding the next
previous appropriation for the same purpose, shall be subject to rejection or
repeal under this Section."62 It has been argued that the section 2 exceptions
constitute but a single exception that provides in effect: "Appropriation
measures are not subject to referendum unless they exceed the previous
appropriation made for the same purpose, and then only that amount in excess
of the prior appropriation is subject to referendum."63 The Bayne court dismissed
this interpretation in a footnote, however, holding that the language excepting
from the referendum appropriations not exceeding the next previous appropria-
tion for the same subject was relevant only to appropriations for public
institutions, 4 and that the two exceptions "for maintaining the State Govern-
ment" and "for public institutions" were distinct."5
In order for the Medicaid abortion appropriation to be excepted, it had to
come under one of the three referendum exceptions, and only the exception for
appropriations for maintaining the state government seemed applicable." In
determining whether the appropriation was covered by this exception, the court
saw two basic questions: "Is it an 'appropriation?'" and "If so, is it for
maintaining the State Government?"67
60. Id. § 1(a).
61. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 (1915, amended 1978). The purpose of this provision may
well have been to prevent prohibitionist turmoil from upsetting the political compromises
under which the liquor trade was allowed in the state.
62. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 2 (1915, amended 1978).
63. Ralabate, Direct Legislation, in MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENI(IN COM.MIs-
SION, CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION STUDY DOCUMENTS OF TilE CONSTITUIONAL. CONVENI'ION ()F
MARYLAND 67-68 (1968).
64. 283 Md. at 566 n.2, 392 A.2d at 70 n.2. The phrase "public institutions" generally
refers to educational and eleemosynary institutions. 12 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 228, 237
(1927). See generally MD. ANN. CODE art. 19, § 28(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
65. 283 Md. at 566, 392 A.2d at 70.
66. Id. at 569, 392 A.2d at 72. Manifestly, the Medicaid abortion appropriation had
nothing to do with liquor laws, and thus was not affected by the section 6 exception.
Because the appropriation authorized payments to the Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene for disbursement to private health-care providers, it just as clearly did not
appropriate for "public institutions." The parties agreed that the only applicable exception
was "for maintaining the State Government." Id. at 569-70. 392 A.2d at 72.
67. Id. at 570, 392 A.2d at 72.
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In Dorsey v. Petrott "appropriation" was defined as "a constitutional
mandate or a lawful legislative act whose primary object is to authorize the
withdrawal from the State Treasury of a certain sum of money for a specified
public object or purpose to which such sum is to be applied. '69 The Bayne court
concluded, without elaboration, that the line item that included the rider was an
appropriation under Dorsey."
The court then addressed the second question, concluding that the
appropriation was "for maintaining the State Government." It approached the
issue obliquely, inquiring whether the appropriation was for a "primary
function" of government. It noted that the weight of authority supported the
position that the preservation of public health, and the relief of the indigent,
were primary functions of government. Because Medicaid was a program
providing medical services to indigent persons, the appropriation was for a
"primary function of government."' The issue thus became whether appropria-
tions for primary functions of government were appropriations for maintaining
the state government. The court resolved the issue by relying on two earlier
decisions, Winebrenner v. Salmon72 and Bickel v. Nice.73 Each had involved an
attempt to refer appropriations.' The Winebrenner appropriation was for the
State Roads Commission to build highways," and the Bickel appropriation was
for disbursement to contractors to construct a state office building.7" In each case
the court determined that the appropriation maintained the state government.77
68. 178 Md. 230, 13 A.2d 630 (1940).
69. Id. at 245, 13 A.2d at 637-38.
70. 283 Md. at 570, 392 A.2d at 72. Appellants conceded for the purpose of argument
that the line item in question was an appropriation under Dorsey. Id.
71. Id. at 570-71, 392 A.2d at 72-73.
72. 155 Md. 563, 142 A. 723 (1928).
73. 173 Md. 1, 192 A. 777 (1937).
74. But see note 76 infra.
75. The Winebrenner appropriation was to be made from a fund created by an increase
in the state gasoline tax. Money from the fund was to be disbursed to the State Roads
Commission, which in turn would presumably distribute the money to contractors whose
bids had been accepted for construction of lateral roads. See 155 Md. at 566. 142 A. at 724.
76. Bickel involved an act that authorized a bond issue by the Board of Public Works.
The proceeds of the bond issue were to be used by the Board for the construction of a state
office building. 173 Md. at 4-5, 192 A. at 779. Presumably, the proceeds would be paid
ultimately to private parties who either sold the necessary land to the Board or performed
the construction work. See id. Because the act authorized a bond issue, and did not
mandate withdrawal of a certain sum from the state treasury, it would not appear to
qualify as an "appropriation" under Dorsey. See note 69 and accompanying text supra. The
Bickel court, sitting three years before Dorsey was decided, apparently assumed that the
act did qualify as an appropriation, and proceeded to consider its referability under article
XVI, § 2. See 173 Md. at 10, 192 A. at 781.
77. See Bickel v. Nice, 173 Md. at 10-11, 192 A. at 781-82; Winebrenner v. Salmon,
155 Md. at 568, 142 A. at 725.
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Because Bayne relies so heavily on Winebrenner, it is useful to quote the
crucial passage from Winebrenner in full:
In construing the referendum amendment with reference to this exception
lof appropriations "for maintaining the State Government"], it is important
to consider the underlying idea in the mind of the Legislature in making the
exception. . . . It is apparent that the purpose was to provide against the
possibility of the government being embarrassed in the performance of its
various functions. Surely, in that view, "appropriations for maintaining the
government" including more than merely those which provide for overhead
expenses, such as salaries and expenses incident to keeping the government
afloat as a going concern. "The government" includes all its agencies, of
which the State Roads Commission is one of the most important. And
maintaining the government means providing money to enable it to perform
the duties which it is required by law to perform. . . .Certainly an act
would not be within this exception merely because it carried an appropria-
tion to an agency of the government, if it created an entirely new function
not theretofore recognized as coming within the sphere of governmental
activity. But "the establishment, construction and maintenance of public
roads is a primary function of government ... "78
The Bayne court seemed to draw from this passage in Winebrenner the
doctrine that appropriations for primary functions - or at least established
primary functions - of government were "for the maintenance of State
Government" and thus excepted. 7' The court apparently perceived support for
this doctrine in its application in Bickel."° Again, the entire passage from Bickel
relied upon bears quoting:
It is undoubtedly true that the actuating purpose of the excepting clause
was to prevent interruptions of government. But the court is of opinion that
the test intended by the excepting clause is not the need of the
appropriation or the project to carry out that purpose, but the design. If the
particular appropriation is one designed for maintaining the government
and the project stated is of a kind that may be within that classification of
maintaining the government, it is excepted."
Applying the "rationale of Winebrenner and the test in Bickel,"2 the court held
that the appropriation in question was "for maintaining State Government.""3
In light of the ordinary meaning of the words in the phrase "for maintaining
the State Government," such a holding is extraordinary. The Medicaid abortion
appropriation in Bayne benefited not the state government or any of its organs,
78. 155 Md. at 568, 142 A. at 725 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
79. See 283 Md. at 572-73, 392 A.2d at 73-74.
80. See id. at 573, 392 A.2d at 74.
81. 173 Md. at 10, 192 A. at 781.
82. 283 Md. at 573, 392 A.2d at 74.
83. Id.
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but private citizens. Although the appropriation was to be disbursed through the
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, its ultimate payees were not
employees or organs of the state government, but private citizens, chosen by
private citizens. The appropriation was thus, on its face, not for the state
government at all, let alone for that government's maintenance. The Bayne
holding thus rests on unusual readings of both "maintaining" and "State
Government." "Maintaining" in its strictest sense means, as Winebrenner
phrased it, providing "for overhead expenses, such as salaries and expenses
incident to keeping the government afloat as a going concern.""8 But Winebren-
ner rejected this narrow definition because it failed to comport with what the
Winebrenner court saw as the legislature's intent: "to provide against the
possibility of the government being embarrassed in the performance of its
various functions."M In the light of that intent, the Winebrenner court concluded
that "[m]aintaining the government means providing money to enable it to
perform the duties which it is required by law to perform.""
There are three further tests an appropriation must normally pass before
Winebrenner is satisfied and it may be excepted. First, the appropriation must
be to the government. "The government" was defined in Winebrenner as
"includ[ing] all its agencies,"87 and the State Roads Commission was given as an
example of an agency that qualified as part of "the government.", The second
test is a "new function" test. Winebrenner announced the rule that "an act would
not be within this exception, merely because it carried an appropriation to an
agency of the government, if it created an entirely new function not theretofore
recognized as coming within the sphere of governmental activity."9 Thus,
Winebrenner excepts from the maintenance exception appropriations that create
"new functions." The final test is a "primary function" test. If a function is
categorized as primary, apparently it cannot ever be considered new.10 Winebren-
ner thus answers the question whether an appropriation is for "maintaining" by
erecting four tests: (a) Is it an appropriation to the government?; (b) Is it to
enable the government to perform duties required by law?; (c) If so, is it
primary?; (d) If not, is it new? It appears, in addition, that an appropriation to
government for a duty required by law that is not a primary function will
84. 155 Md. at 568, 142 A. at 725. See Brief for Appellants at 15 (citing dictionary
definitions of "maintain."). There are other dictionary definitions more favorable to the
Bayne court's interpretation than those cited by appellants. E.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1362 (1966) ("4. to provide for: bear the expense of.")
85. 155 Md. at 568, 142 A. at 725.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (emphasis in original).
90. Id.; see notes 102 to 103 and accompanying text infra.
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nonetheless withstand referability, so long as it is not new either, but this
conclusion is based on a hypothetical in dicta."
The Bickel court applied only selected portions of the Winebrenner doctrine
to the facts before it. The appropriation in Bickel was to be paid out of funds
accumulated by the Board of Public Works from a bond issue to private
contractors. There was no accumulation of funds in the treasury to be disbursed
to another government agency, so that under Winebrenner it would appear that
there was no appropriation to the government.2 The Bickel court did not
confront this distinction, but ultimately resolved the issue in a two-step process.
First, it purported to apply the Winebrenner tests to the "appropriation" at hand,
but in fact applied only the "primary function" test. It noted that "[h]ousing for
state officers and employees would seem to be as much a primary function of
government as building lateral roads, and equally entitled to be classed as
maintaining the government."'93 It also recognized the "new function test,"
though it did not apply it. 4 Having ignored the other two Winebrenner tests, the
court proceeded to enunciate and apply a standard of loose judicial scrutiny, a
standard that uncritically expanded the scope of the "maintaining the State
Government" exception.
The loose scrutiny standard was invoked in response to a challenge to the
appropriation in question on the basis of need. The appellant in Bickel
apparently claimed that it was incumbent upon the state to prove that an
appropriation was necessary to the maintaining of the state government before
it could be deemed excepted from the referendum under the maintaining
exception.' The court disposed of this contention by concluding that an
appropriation need not be necessary to the maintenance of government in order
to come within the maintaining exception, but only arguably designed to
maintain government. "If the particular appropriation is one designed for
maintaining the government and the project stated is of a kind that may be
within that classification of maintaining the government, it is excepted."' Thus,
91. The dicta in question consist of two sentences:
Certainly an act would not be within this exception merely because it carried an
appropriation to an agency of the government if it created an entirely new function not
theretofore recognized as coming within the sphere of governmental activity. But "the
establishment, construction and maintenance of public roads is a primary function of
government."
155 Md. at 568, 142 A.2d at 725 (emphasis in original). Because the function in question
was primary, the Winebrenner court apparently found it unnecessary to deal with a
hypothetical non-primary, new function. In the first quoted sentence of dicta, however, the
court indicates that appropriations for non-primary, new functions would not be excepted.
By implication, therefore, appropriations for non-primary functions that were not new
would be excepted.
92. See note 76 supra.
93. 173 Md. at 10, 192 A. at 781.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 10-11, 192 A. at 781-82.
96. Id.
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if an appropriation meets the criteria of funding the maintaining of state
government, particular projects within that appropriation will be subjected to an
extremely loose standard of judicial scrutiny. A showing of plausible relation of
a project to the appropriative purpose to maintain will suffice, because the
courts are powerless "to consider the wisdom of the enactment,"97 which is to say,
its actual fidelity to the purpose of maintaining.
Bickel thus presented the Bayne court with a paradigm in which, if a
primary function were found, further scrutiny would be unnecessary under the
"design" test. Bayne applied the "new function" test acknowledged but not used
in Bickel, noting that Medicaid had been in existence and funded by the state for
more than thirty years, and was thus not a "new function."98 In other respects,
Bayne essentially followed the Bickel paradigm.
This was regrettable, not only because Bickel follows Winebrenner imper-
fectly, but because the logic of every step of the Winebrenner-Bickel-Bayne chain
is questionable. The second of the four tests in Winebrenner, whether the
appropriation is to enable government to perform duties required by law, was
based on the facile assumption that the framers' "apparent" intent was "to
provide against . . . the government being embarrassed in the performance of
its various functions."" There is virtually no legislative history to confirm this
reading,"° and a different intent seems equally possible on the face of the
referendum amendment itself. It is equally plausible that the legislature's
intent was simply to rule out the possibility that referenda would prevent the
keeping of "the government afloat as a going concern,"'' 1 while leaving referenda
full play over government programs of expenditure not necessary either to that
goal or to the maintenance of state institutions. In reaching its second test,
therefore, the Winebrenner court made an arbitrary and questionable determi-
nation of the legislature's intent. In the erection of the "primary function" and
"new function" tests, it wrote a gloss on the constitution for which there was no
textual justification.02 The court's motive, rather than representing any desire
97. Id. at 11, 192 A. at 782.
98. 283 Md. at 573, 392 A.2d at 74.
99. 155 Md. at 568, 142 A. at 725.
100. The text of the crucial passage about "maintaining the State Government" did not
change from the time the amendment was proposed on January 29, 1914 as S.B. 105 until
it was passed on April 4, 1914. 1 JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF
MARYLAND: JANUARY SEssioN 1914, at 203, 701, 1100, 1278, 1425, 1441, 1467; 2 id. 2188,
2521, 2527, 2703, 3196; 2 JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF
MARYLAND: JANUARY SESSION 1914, at 2981, 3130, 3487. Apparently no committee reports
or speeches survive.
101. 155 Md. at 568, 142 A. at 725.
102. There may have been an intent to defer to Maryland's policy of not legislating
within the budget, see note 136 and accompanying text infra, but the "primary
function/new function" test is an extremely inexact way of deferring to that policy, since
there may be novelty of means in fulfillment of an established and primary function. Such
an attenuated rationale, particularly in the absence of any citation to the Maryland
Constitution on the "no-legislation" policy, cannot be taken for "textual justification."
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to fulfill a constitutional mandate, seems to have been the wish to impose a sort
of grandfather clause on the referendum amendment, preserving programs and
agencies of long standing from check by referendum. However sound the test
may be as a matter of public policy, it simply has no basis in the text of the
constitution."3 Moreover, the opposition of "new" and "primary" is a semantic
anomaly. "New" is ordinarily contrasted with "old" or "established." "Primary"
makes no particular sense in the context, because there is no theoretical reason
why a government could not assume a primary function that was also new, or
continue a secondary one that was old. Nor is the sense of "primary" congruent
with "required by law," Winebrenner's touchstone.
Unfortunately, the "primary/new" test was all of Winebrenner that was
incorporated into Bickel, and thus into Bayne. Even more unfortunately, Bickel
rejected the need for further inquiry by erecting the "design" test, which
effectively ends judicial scrutiny of the issue whether an appropriation comes
under the "maintaining" exception whenever it passes the "primary function"
and "new function" tests. In its application in Bayne, the Bickel corruption of the
Winebrenner dialectic renders interpretations of "maintaining" and "State
Government" that vary considerably from the common usages of either word.'"
Yet words in statutes in general and the constitution in particular should be
interpreted according to ordinary usage. °" In interpreting "maintaining" and
"State Government" in its extraordinary way, Bayne expands the excepting
provision at the expense of the constitutional grant of power to the electorate.
Such exceptions, however, are supposed to be strictly interpreted in favor of the
general provisions in which they are found."M
The Bayne court might have reached the same result if it had thoroughly
applied Winebrenner and refused to perpetuate the loose judicial scrutiny
employed in Bickel. The appropriation in Bayne was directed initially to a
government agency, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, and was
therefore an appropriation to the government under the first Winebrenner test.07
103. See MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 2 (1915, amended 1978).
104. See note 84 and accompanying text supra.
105. See Howell v. State, 278 Md. 389, 392, 364 A.2d 797, 799 (1976); St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 275 Md. 130, 139, 339 A.2d 291, 296 (1975); Bouse v.
Thomas, 168 Md. 1, 4, 176 A. 645, 646 (1935); Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184, 197 (1859);
Manly v. State, 7 Md. 135, 147 (1854); 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES § 2 (59-60) (9th ed.
1783); E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 373 (1940); F. DWARRIS, A GENERAL
TREATISE ON STATUTES, in 9 LAW LIBRARY §§ 692, 702 (1853).
106. E. CRAWFORD, supra note 105, § 299; J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 47.11 (4th ed. D. Sands 1972). For discussion of the strictures against
restrictive interpretation of referendum provisions in other state constitutions, see
Colorado Project - Common Cause v. Anderson, 178 Colo. 1, 4-5, 495 P.2d 220, 221
(1972); Burks v. City of Lafayette, 142 Colo. 61, 67, 349 P.2d 692, 695 (1960); Opinion of
the Justices, 275 A.2d 800, 803 (Me. 1971); Kays v. McCall, 244 Or. 361, 373, 418 P.2d 511,
517 (1966).
107. See notes 87 & 88 and accompanying text supra.
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The appropriation passed both the primary and new function tests,'" but there
was no discussion of whether it enabled the government to perform duties
required by law. Winebrenner did not define "duties which [the government] is
required by law to perform,"'" but presumably this phrase encompasses
affirmative obligations imposed on a government agency through a legislative
enactment " ° other than the appropriation at issue.' The appropriation in
Winebrenner placed upon the State Roads Commission, in conjunction with
county government, the duty to write specifications, solicit bids, and make
contracts for each state highway built."' Obligations concerning the placement
and construction of roads were also imposed by general legislation."' Although
the Medicaid appropriation in Bayne placed four restrictions on the use of the
funds to reimburse private parties who had performed abortion services," ' no
affirmative duty other than an arguable duty to disburse was imposed by the
appropriation itself. Other duties related to the Department's reimbursement
function, however, were contained in separate legislation. The Department was
required to "administer a program of comprehensive medical and other care...
for indigent and medically indigent persons . . .,,5 and was authorized to
contract with private parties for provision of medical services to the indigent."
6
In addition, the Department had a continuing obligation to qualify the private
108. 283 Md. at 572-73, 392 A.2d at 73-74.
109. 155 Md. at 568, 142 A. at 725.
110. Since "duty imposed by law" is not defined, it might also include duties imposed
by the Maryland Constitution. In the case of general constitutional "duties," the test would
seem to shade into considerations similar to those involved in the other tests. The law
imposing the duty in Winebrenner was a statute, but there might be a detailed
constitutional provision that would impose a specific duty of the type usually found in
statutes.
111. To allow the duty sought in determining whether the appropriation meets this
part of the Winebrenner test to be found in the challenged appropriation itself would
destroy the test. Even where, as in Bayne, the challenged item is a part of a larger one,
another part of which might actually impose a duty, the artificial separation of the
challenged part of the item from the duty applicable to all parts would involve the same
type of bootstrapping.
The only duty likely to be found in an appropriation item is a duty to disburse
funds, perhaps with conditions of disbursal. The term "duties" could be read as "duties to
disburse funds." This interpretation would suggest that every appropriation to a state
agency would necessarily be an appropriation for maintaining state government, because
the appropriation would either cover "overhead expenses, such as salaries and expenses
incident to keeping the government afloat as a going concern," 155 Md. at 568, 142 A. at
725, or disbursements outside government pursuant to some program of expenditure. If of
the first sort, the appropriation would indisputably maintain the state government, and if
of the second, the appropriation would maintain the state government by hypothesis.
112. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
113. See ch. 277, §§ 8-12, 1924 Md. Laws 819-20; ch. 141, 1908 Md. Laws 247; ch. 225,
1904 Md. Laws 338.
114. See 283 Md. at 568, 392 A.2d at 68-69.
115. MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 42(a)(1) (1971 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
116. Id.
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physicians"7 and hospitals that performed the abortion services."8 It would
appear, therefore, that the Medicaid appropriation enabled the Department to
perform duties required by law. Under the four-part test announced in
Winebrenner, the appropriation would be one for maintaining the state
government.
It would have been preferable, however, for the Bayne court to have
rethought the "maintaining" exception on its own, without uncritical reliance on
precedent. Had it done so, it would have discovered only two analyses open to it.
One rests on a narrow interpretation of "maintaining State Government" that
would have left the appropriation referable. The other involves a per se
exclusion from the referendum of appropriations to state agencies, which would
have excluded the Medicaid appropriation.
The per se analysis rests on an expansive reading of "maintaining" to mean
"funding" and "State Government" to include the state government in all its
organs and activities. Such a reading is the natural extrapolation of the
perception of legislative intent shared and articulated by Winebrenner: "to
provide against the possibility of the government being embarrassed in the
performance of its various functions.""' Because a government's functions are by
definition whatever it does, either executively or passively, as in disbursing
payments, the only way to prevent its embarrassment is to except from the
referendum the funding for whatever the government does. The only constitu-
tional limitation upon such an exception would be that embodied in the "public
institutions" phraseology,"n allowing referendum of increases in appropriations
for public institutions "exceeding the next previous appropriation for the same
purpose."121 No other appropriations paid to or through state government would
be referable.
The narrow analysis is based on what is known of the climate of public
opinion at the time of the passage of the referendum amendment. The period
during which the referendum amendment was being formulated and ratified,
1914 to 1915, was the heyday of the Progressive movement.'22 One of the
principal programs of the Progressives was so-called direct legislation, law-
making by the electorate."n The theory - and indeed the reality in those times
117. Id. § 121.
118. Id. § 557 (1971).
119. 155 Md. at 568, 142 A.2d at 725.
120. To the extent that state institutions are part of the state government, see note 64
and accompanying text supra.
121. MD. CONST. art. XVI, §2 (1915, amended 1978).
122. See Ritchmount Partnership v. Board of Supervisors, 283 Md. 48, 60 n.8, 388 A.2d
523, 531 n.8 (1978); D. BUTLER & A. RANNEY, REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
PRACTICE AND THEORY 4, 5 (1978); J. SULLIVAN, DIRECT LEUISI.ATION (1893); American
Academy of Political and Social Science, Initiative and Referendum - Do They Encourage
or Impair Better State Government? 43 ANNALS (Sept. 1912), 5 Fi.A. ST. L. REV. 925, 937-38
(1977). The Supreme Court refused to declare the referendum unconstitutional, deeming
the issue a political question, in Pacific State Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 151
(1912) and Kiernan v. City of Portland, 223 U.S. 151, 163 (1912).
123. See E. OBERHOLTZER, THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA 426 (3d ed. 1971).
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- was that laws passed by legislatures were likely to reflect the will of political
bosses rather than that of the electorate."2 The vehicles of direct legislation, the
initiative and the referendum, were designed to wrest control of the processes of
legislation from the distrusted legislatures."n With the initiative, the electorate
through petition proposed laws and voted on them. With the referendum, laws
passed by the legislature were submitted by petition to the electorate for
approval or rejection."2M Only the referendum was adopted in Maryland. 7 It was
arguably necessary to check the referendum power by providing that it not be
used to revoke appropriations absolutely necessary to the survival of govern-
ment, and this rationale would completely explain the "maintaining the State
Government" exception. But it would hardly be consonant with the goal of
popular check upon the legislative will that every appropriation to a govern-
ment agency, for whatever purpose, no matter how unnecessary to the
subsistence or even the convenience of government, should be excepted as well.
This reading would exclude direct popular input from the budgeting process,"2 a
far wider exclusion than necessary to protect the state government from
devastation by referendum.
Under the first analysis, the Bayne appropriation would not have been
referable. Under the second it would have been eminently referable. The second
analysis, because it more likely reflects the will of the framers and because it
conforms with the rule that exceptions are to be strictly construed,'29 would have
been the preferable one.
Having determined that the appropriation was "for maintaining State
Government," the Bayne court turned to appellants' argument that the
appropriation in question set policy, and that language in section 1(a) of the
referendum amendment"M and Winebrenner3 ' guaranteed that policy-making
124. Beall v. State, 131 Md. 669, 677, 103 A. 99, 102 (1917). See generally R. LUCE,
LEGISLATIVE PRINCIPLES 563 (1930); E. OBERHOLTZER, THE REFERENDUM IN AMERICA (3d ed.
1912). A representative contemporary attack on the referendum appeared in H.N.
Campbell's The Initiative and Referendum, 10 MICH. L. REV. 427 (1912). A contemporary
anthology of writings pro and con was THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (2d ed.W.
Munro 1920).
125. D. BUTLER & A. RANNEY, supra note 122, at 29.
126. The means of direct and quasi-direct government are otherwise classified in an
important theoretical work, D. BUTLER & A. RANNEY, supra note 122, at 23-24, but this
classification includes "facultative" elections, those initiated by government action rather
than by petition.
127. On the local level, Maryland voters may by popular petition create county charter
boards. MD. CONST. art. XI-A, § 1 (1915). This is a limited and local form of the initiative.
128. It might not exclude appropriations for transfer-of-wealth payments such as
welfare benefits, if they were paid directly from the Treasury to beneficiaries, because
barring a "primary function of government" test, the appropriation might be said to be "for
the maintaining of the beneficiaries," and not of the state government.
129. See note 106 supra.
130. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § l(a) (1915).
131. Appellants relied on the following language:
In State v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, it was argued that there were a number of
questions of policy in the act there under consideration which were peculiarly within
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parts of appropriations bills were always referable. The court first dealt with the
assertion that the appropriation made policy. It agreed that budget bills are
restricted from setting policy, a task reserved to "general legislation."'32 The
court rejected appellants' claim that the rider conditions set policy, adopting a
recent opinion of the Maryland Attorney General" and stating that the General
Assembly had:
the authority to condition or limit the use of money appropriated, or the use
of the facility for which the money is appropriated, provided the condition or
limitation is directly related to the expenditure of the sum appropriated
and does not, in essence, amend either substantive legislation or adminis-
trative rules adopted pursuant to legislative mandate, and is effective only
during the fiscal year for which the appropriation is made.'34
Because the conditions sought to be referred did none of these things, they did
not set policy. 3 5
There is a Maryland policy against passing "general legislation" within the
Budget, although there is no affirmative statement anywhere in the constitution
to that effect. Section 52(4) of the budget amendment enumerates all possible
the purview of the referendum, and that the people should not be precluded from the
right to vote on such questions by attaching an appropriation to the act. The answer of
the court was: 'The people very wisely forestalled the possibility of the situations
suggested by counsel, when they reserved the right to refer part of the bill. Their
evident purpose was to prevent the stoppage of the State's established functions
pending a vote upon some question of policy.'
155 Md. at 571, 142 A. at 726.
132. 283 Md. at 574, 392 A.2d at 74.
133. 63 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 60, 73 (1978). The attorney general's opinion adopted in
Bayne had been issued in response to an inquiry by a member of the Maryland House of
Delegates regarding the constitutionality of the line item sought to be referred in Bayne.
Id. at 60.
134. 283 Md. at 574, 392 A.2d at 74.
135. Id. at 574, 392 A.2d at 74-75. It is possible that the line item violated the
prohibition against legislating within the budget because it amended an administrative
rule adopted pursuant to a legislative mandate. Until January 18, 1978, the Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene's regulation governing reimbursement of physicians for
abortion services was very similar to the restrictions imposed by the line item in the
budget bill. Compare 10 C. Md. R. 9.06.05.C (1977) with Item 32.01.05.03, at note 8 supra.
Both provided that physicians would be reimbursed only upon certification that the
abortion had been necessary under one of four enumerated criteria. On January 18, 1978,
however, prior to passage of the budget bill, the following amendment to the regulation
governing reimbursement for abortion services became final: "Therapeutic abortions 1will
be paid fori upon certification by the physician performing the procedure that the
procedure is necessary, in his professional judgment, taking into consideration the health
of the patient, including physical, emotional, psychological and familial factors, and the
patient's age." 10 C. Md. R. 9.06.05.C (printed as amended in 4 Md. Reg. 1838-39 (1977)).
The amended regulation appears to give greater discretion to the certifying physician than
the restrictions imposed by the line item in Bayne. Thus, it would appear that the Bayne
appropriation did amend an existing administrative rule, thereby violating the prohibition
against legislating in the budget.
[VOL. 39
BUDGET AND REFERENDUM AMENDMENTS
sorts of budget bill appropriations in such a way that there could be a budget bill
appropriation pursuant only to either the constitution or the laws of the state.'3
In effect, every appropriation must be made pursuant to the constitution or a
preexisting piece of "charter" legislation, passed according to the usual
procedures, and not the unique budget bill procedures. The Attorneys General,
in a long line of opinions, have articulated the no-legislation principle'37 and its
rationale: "[Tihe Budget Bill may not be employed as a vehicle of general
legislation, since it, unlike other Acts, is not subject to gubernatorial veto, and
thus does not enjoy the safeguards provided by the Constitution against hasty
and ill considered legislation.
'
'
38
The opinion of the Attorney General adopted by the Bayne court, as the
court indicated, addressed legislating within the budget, activity that either
exceeds a legislative charter or conflicts with other legislation; it did not address
the issue of policy-making. Policy is made when a decision is reached to do or not
to do something. 9 Policy can be made with various degrees of specificity. It is a
policy decision to commence a general program, but making that decision does
not foreclose subsequent choices about the means of implementing that program.
Each one of the subsequent choices may be a policy decision as well. When the
General Assembly passes a broad program such as Medicaid, it has made a
policy decision, but many further policy decisions remain to be made. If those
decisions are made within the budget bill, by authorization of line items
appropriating for various possible implementations and not others, none of these
line items will exhibit the Attorney General's indicia of legislating within the
budget, but they will surely be policy decisions if there is no prior general
legislation specifically authorizing them. The General Assembly's policy on
Medicaid abortions was made within the rider sought to be referred. The
Maryland Medicaid statute"' is broad and permissive, rather than directive, and
makes no mention of abortion."' What abortion policy existed outside the rider
136. MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(4) (1916).
137. 63 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 60, 73 (1978); 61 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 454, 457-58 (1976); 59
Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 70, 75 (1974); 48 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 19, 20 (1963); 39 Op. Md. Att'y
Gen. 112, 113 (1953); 38 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 110, 110 (1953); 37 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 139,
141 (1952).
138. 38 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 110, 110 (1953).
139. Webster's Third New International Dictionary lists only one relevant definition of
"policy": "a definite course or method of action selected (as by a government, institution,
group, or individual) from among alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide
and usu. Isici determine present and future decisions." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATION-
AL DICTIONARY 1754 (1966).
140. See note 8 supra. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447-48 n.15 (1972), appears to state
that a state receiving Medicaid funds need not use them to fund non-therapeutic abortions,
a category that presumably includes the sort detailed by the fourth condition of the rider
sought to be referred. See note 8 supra. So it would seem that at least some of the Medicaid
abortion funding authorized by the rider had never been mandated by federal court
decisions or federal laws and regulations, nor had they before the formulation of the rider
been addressed by Maryland lawmakers.
141. See id.
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had been set by the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene pursuant to the
Medicaid statute, by executive promulgation. 4 ' The only place in which the
General Assembly had ever spoken to the specific issue of abortion funding was
in the very appropriation sought to be referred.'
In reaching the conclusion, therefore, that the appropriation did not make
policy, the court seems to have confused "policy" with "legislation." The court
should have noted the distinction and determined, with the distinction clearly in
mind, whether the Maryland policy against legislating within the budget
extends to all forms of policy-making as well. This would have been a delicate
task. Inasmuch as a genuine, if minor, policy decision occurs in fixing each
allocation of funds between various line items, even those specifically mandated
by general legislation, there quickly comes a point at which to require general
legislation for all policy matters is to require that the budget be passed in toto in
general legislation before it can be incorporated into and passed as a budget bill.
Such a requirement would totally frustrate the intent of the budget amendment,
to which the no-legislation policy is usually traced. On the other hand, it is
highly unsatisfactory if major and highly controversial policy decisions, such as
whether to fund abortions for the indigent, may be arrived at without the
"safeguards provided in the Constitution [for general legislation] against hasty
and ill considered legislation,"'' 4 and the additional check of the referendum.
Such an arrangement totally frustrates the intent of the referendum amend-
ment."'
The best practicable compromise between these undesirable alternatives
might be to introduce a "new line item" rule, similar but not identical to the
"new function" rule promulgated by Winebrenner. Under this proposed rule, the
court could interpret section 4(g) of the budget amendment, which directs that
one class of appropriations fund "such other purposes as are set forth in the
Constitution and laws of the state,"'' 6 to mean that all line items must have been
specifically set forth in a piece of general legislation in or before the year of the
budget bill in which those line items appear. If a particular line item had never
been so "set forth," it could then be held to have been improperly placed in a
budget bill, and not a proper subject for an appropriation under section 4(g). In
order to keep this rule from causing chaos, however, in the period during which
142. Pursuant to recommendations in 62 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 11, 18-19 (1977). the
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene issued its first abortion regulations in 1977 in
10 C. Md. R. 9.02.04.K and 9.06.05.C. The amended regulations had the effect of law upon
publication of a statement to that effect in 5 Md. Reg. 18 h1978). See Mi). ANN. C01).: art.
41, § 256-0 (1978); note 135 supra. Once the regulation became effective, its validity could
have been challenged on the ground that it violated constitutional provisions, exceeded the
statutory authority of the issuing agency, or was adopted without compliance with the
statutory rule-making procedures. See Mis. ANN. Cisni.: art. 41, § 249 (1978). It would not
have been subject to the referendum during this period because it was not an act of the
General Assembly. MD. CoNs-r. art. XVI, § 1 11915).
143. See note 8 supra.
144. 38 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 110, 110 (1953).
145. See notes 122 to 128 and accompanying text supra.
146. MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(4)(g) (1916).
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the General Assembly was changing its procedures to bring them into line with
the new rule, the challenged line item could be allowed to remain as an
appropriation, but be deemed to have been preceded by an authorizing piece of
general legislation that, unlike an appropriation, would be subject to the
referendum. If the "constructive" general legislation were referred, the approp-
riation would be suspended, just as a piece of general legislation would be
suspended by the referendum,"7 and if the "constructive" general legislation
were voted down, the connected appropriation would fail. This policy would
cover the "changeover" period, and would apply to the appropriation in question
in Bayne. Under such a rule, the referendum proposed in Bayne would have been
allowed to continue.148
On the premise that there was no distinction between legislation and
policy-making, however, the court may have been correct in concluding that the
appropriation in question did not set policy.' 9 Appellants had argued that the
appropriation was referable because it set policy, and the court's determination
concerning policy had destroyed that premise. It was not necessary, therefore, to
decide whether Maryland allows the referendum of policy-making parts of
excepted acts, but the court chose to do so.
Appellants had noted that the referendum amendment allows the referring
of part of any act," and interpreted Winebrenner'5 ' as recognizing that
appropriations that set policy were always referable. 5 ' Appellees had countered
with a public policy argument that allowing referendum of part of an act,
excepted or not, might wreak havoc with a carefully considered and comprom-
ised enactment.'53 The court did not deal with the policy argument, but instead
considered the permissibility of partial referendum from a constitutional
perspective. While conceding that the referendum amendment does explicitly
permit referring "part of any Act of the General Assembly,"'" the court
147. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
148. Under this proposal, constructive general legislation would be deemed to have
been passed for each line item not specifically mentioned in actual general legislation. In
the first year of implementation, all constructively legislated line items would be deemed
to have been passed at the passage date of the budget, and the period of referability would
start on that date. See note 51 supra. After the lapse of referability, the constructive
legislation would be deemed unreferred actual legislation and no longer referable. This
would minimize the problems of the changeover period.
Beginning with the next legislative session, the Governor and the General
Assembly would be held to the rule that actual general legislation must first be passed
specifically naming each new line item before that line item would be permitted in a
budget bill. If placed in a budget bill without the sanction of general legislation, the line
item would be void.
149. See note 135 supra.
150. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (1915).
151. See 155 Md. at 57, 142 A. at 726.
152. Brief for Appellants at 7.
153. Brief for Appellees at 16-17.
154. MD. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (1915).
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nonetheless held that under the criteria of Berlin v. Shockley'55 the power of
partial referendum does not extend to otherwise excepted laws:
In Berlin v. Shockley .. .we dealt with the provision of the referendum
amendment expressly providing for submission of "part of any act," as being
cited as a statement that part of an excepted law might be referred. We
were "constrained to hold that the constitutional provision does not permit
it . ... " We said:
"An association in a single enactment of a reLerable law and one of
the kinds excepted from the referendum, if that would be feasible
without violation of the constitutional prohibition in article 3, section
29, against including more than one subject, might, perhaps, be found
to leave part of an enactment referable, but not part of the excepted
law. That law, with its incidents, still could be referred." .
We turned to the case then before us:
"The system of sale of liquor through a public dispensary requires as a
necessary incident some disposition of profits if there should be any;
and the provision for it could not be regarded as unrelated and merely
associated. There seems to the court to be no authority for lifting it out
of the excepted law as sought in these cases." . . . The conditions here,
being part of an excepted law, may not be lifted out and referred.1s
Underlying this complex passage is a fundamental distinction between "act"
and "law." An act of the General Assembly is a complete statutory enactment '
beginning with the words, "Be it enacted by the General Assembly of
Maryland, ' ' sa and running perhaps hundreds of pages.'59 A law, on the other
hand, appears to be a subset or part of an act."a Part of the quoted passage from
Berlin16 suggests that a law has "incidents," which are apparently separate from
the law itself. The law and its incidents are to be distinguished from "unrelated
and merely associated" aspects of an enactment. The Berlin case illustrated the
distinction when it implied that a "system of sale of liquor through a public
dispensary" was a law of which the "disposition of profits" was a "necessary
incident."'' 2 In this context, therefore, "law" would mean a discrete provision
155. 174 Md. 442, 199 A. 500 (1938).
156. 283 Md. at 575, 392 A.2d at 75 (citations omitted).
157. For an excellent summary of general usage of "act," see the discussions in two
Oklahoma cases, In re Initiative Petition Number 259, 316 P.2d 139, 158-9 (Okla. 1957),
and Board of Trustees of Firemen's Relief & Pension Fund v. Templeton, 184 Okla. 281,
283, 86 P.2d 1000, 1002 (1939). Confirmation that Maryland's usage concurs may be
gleaned from observations of the many incidences of the word "Act" in Kelly v. State, 139
Md. 204, 144 A. 888 (1921).
158. MD. CONST. art. III, § 29 (1867).
159. The act under consideration in Bayne, for instance, was 272 pages long. Ch. 44,
1978 Md. Laws 686.
160. Support for this proposition can be found in the following phrase from Berlin:
"lain association in a single enactment of a referable law and one of the kinds excepted
from the referendum . 174 Md. at 446, 199 A. at 501.
161. See id.
162. 174 Md. at 446, 199 A. at 501.
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within an act, seemingly limited to the verbiage necessary to enunciate the rule
or prohibition, but with none of the implementing directions ("incidents") or
cognate provisions ("merely associated") also found within the enactment. Berlin
suggested three bars, two definite, one hypothetical, to the referring of parts of
an act containing an excepted law. First, if the part or parts sought to be
referred were "incidents" of the excepted law, they would be excepted. Second,
though "merely associated" parts of an act might be referable, article III, section
29 of the constitution might foreclose the possibility of "mere association."
Section 29 specifies that each act shall embrace "but one subject," and Berlin
seems to suggest that nothing within an act properly limited to "one subject"
could avoid being either part of a law or one of its incidents." The third bar
occurs when the part of an act sought to be referred is also part of an excepted
law.
The Bayne court determined that the parts of the Medicaid abortion
appropriation sought to be referred were part of an excepted law and therefore
not referable.'" Implicit in this conclusion is a finding that the appropriation
constituted a "law," and that the conditions to be referred were either necessary
incidents or parts of that law. The conditions would appear to be parts of the
law. Conditions upon an appropriation are logically part of an appropriation
measure because they define the extent or availability of the appropriation.
Without its conditions, the appropriation would have a different denotation.
Whether deemed incidents or parts of the appropriation, however, the conditions
would be excepted under Berlin."' Although Berlin's precedential value can be
questioned,' the Bayne court's conclusion that part of an otherwise excepted
163. Neither Bayne nor Berlin pursued this issue. It appears that the purpose of the
"one subject" requirement was to stop the compilation by logrolling of acts dealing with
disparate subjects, which could not be guessed at from the titles of bills, and that no
subject is too broad for compliance if it can be comprehended within a proper title. In
Leonardo v. County Comm'rs, 214 Md. 287, 134 A.2d 284, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 906 (1957),
the Court of Appeals stated: "This court has consistently held that the Constitution is
complied with if the title of the legislation fairly advises the legislature and the public of
the real nature and subject matter of the legislation sought to be enacted." Id. at 299, 134
A.2d at 289.
The classical instance of the broad subject is the budget itself, and the
constitutional acceptability of its breadth is emphasized by contrast with the requirement
that a supplementary appropriations bill be restricted to "some single work, object or
purpose." MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(8)(a) (1916). In Panitz v. Comptroller, 247 Md. 501, 232
A.2d 891 (1967), the court suggested that a supplemental appropriations bill making three
separate appropriations comprehended only one "subject" within article III, § 29 of the
constitution, but more than a "single work, object or purpose" within article III, § 52(8)(2).
Id.at 511, 232 A.2d at 896-97 (dicta). Thus, it is unlikely that any part of an act could be
considered merely associated and still meet the requirements of article III, § 29.
164. See 283 Md. at 575, 392 A.2d at 75.
165. See notes 162 to 163 and accompanying text supra.
166. The acts under consideration in Berlin, chs. 175 & 301, 1937 Md. Laws 298, 569,
were excepted from referendum under § 6 of the referendum amendment, which excepts all
liquor laws. Berlin purportedly relied on Poisel v. Cash, 130 Md. 373, 100 A. 364 (1917),
but Poisel stated unequivocally that "It he manifest purpose of 1§61 was to deny a
referendum upon any Act dealing with the subjects mentioned in that section." Id. at 375,
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law is not referable seems correct." 7 Allowing the referral of parts of an excepted
law might result in a drastic alteration in its meaning, and allowing the referral
of incidents of an excepted law might result in a drastic alteration in its
viability.
The Bayne court reached four conclusions: (a) that the budget amendment
did not by its terms except budget bills from the referendum; (b) that the
Medicaid abortion appropriation was excepted from the referendum because it
fulfilled a primary and established function of government and thus came
within the exception of appropriations "for maintaining State Government"; (c)
that the Medicaid abortion appropriation did not legislate within the budget and
therefore did not set policy; and (d) that parts of excepted laws are not referable.
The first and last of these determinations, it has been suggested, are correct, but
the second and third are capable of great mischief for both the budgeting process
and the referendum.
The budget is not frequently challenged by referenda,"' but the Bayne court
has armored future appropriations against what may be legitimate court
challenges on constitutional grounds. The appellants in Bayne were arguing
that because the appropriation in question set policy, it should be referable.6 9
The court turned back this challenge with its implicit equation of policy and
general legislation. In doing so, it propounded a very limited notion of the ways
in which a budget bill may impinge upon the field properly occupied by general
legislation. Many sorts of policy may be made within a budget bill and not usurp
the role of general legislation, within the Bayne indicia."7 ° This would appear to
foreclose future court challenges to budget items that set policy but do not
100 A. at 364. This was a per se exclusion of entire acts, rather than mere laws. Berlin
nonetheless implied that parts of acts containing laws excepted from referendum might yet
be referred. The parts of Berlin quoted in Bayne, so far as they admit the possibility that
parts of acts containing excepted laws might be referable, either apply only to acts
excepted under § 2, or the court is tacitly qualifying Poisel. In either case, Bayne, building
its entire consideration of partial referendum on Berlin, is applying cases explicitly based
only on § 6 of the referendum amendment, and not § 2, under which Bayne arises. If Poisel
is still good law, and if the Bayne holding that there is no per se exclusion of budget bills
from the referendum be true, see notes 38 to 40 and accompanying text supra, § 2 and § 6
should be treated differently for purposes of partial referral. Otherwise, the existence
anywhere in a budget bill of a nonreferable law, which is virtually assured in every budget
bill because it is in the budget that most appropriations "for maintaining State
Government" and "for state institutions" are made, would instantly except the entire
budget. But if § 6 and § 2 exceptions are to be treated differently, it may be that nothing in
Berlin necessarily applies to Bayne.
167. In the court's summary of the case, the partial referendum discussion is
encapsulated in this way: "A part of an excepted law is ordinarily not referable." 283 Md.
at 576, 392 A.2d at 75. This phrasing seems to be a deflation of the claim of immunity from
referendum because it leaves open the door for referral of a part of an excepted law under
undisclosed circumstances. The court gave no indication, however, of how it might apply
Berlin in future cases.
168. See the excellent synoptic table in Ralabate, supra note 63, at 68-69.
169. See notes 130 to 131 and accompanying text supra.
170. 283 Md. at 574, 392 A.2d at 74.
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legislate generally, on the basis that such items are not proper parts of the
budget. Yet it seems clear from the text of subsection 4 of the budget
amendment, 7' which lists the possible sorts of appropriations in a budget bill,
that every appropriation is intended to be subsequent to a policy decision made
outside the budgeting process; budgeting is intended to be a process of allocation
among predetermined goals, and not a determination of what those goals are. 7 '
Bayne may therefore make it difficult to retain the safeguards on policymaking
that are implicit in the budget amendment.
As to the referendum, it must be conceded that it has been in Maryland
more a matter of theory than of practice: there apparently have been only eleven
state-wide referenda since 1916.11 And of course Bayne will have no effect on the
referability of purely legislative, non-appropriative acts. The advent of measures
like California's Proposition 13,1" however, suggests that attempts to control
government spending through the referendum may increase. And to any
attempt at asserting popular control over any aspect of public finances, Bayne
has dealt a nearly definitive rebuff.
The key is the entirely spurious "primary function" test. 5 "Primary" is a
hierarchical term, implying the existence of the "secondary" or "subordinate."
Apparently, secondary functions of government might be referable, but, in the
light of Bayne, it seems unlikely that any secondary function could ever be
found. The providing of abortions is not really a primary function of govern-
ment, but secondary and subsidiary to the function of providing medical care to
the indigent, which in turn might be said to be secondary to the primary
government function of protecting the welfare of all citizens. Clearly the Bayne
court thought that any function subsidiary or ancillary to a truly primary
function borrows that function's primacy. Probably all of any government's
functions at some number of removes partake of or aid in the fulfillment of
primary functions. Consequently, the list of functions likely to be found not to be
primary, and for which appropriations are still referable, diminishes almost to
the vanishing point.
Only one class of appropriations would seem unlikely to be affected by the
"primary function" test: first-time appropriations for entirely new purposes. The
continued viability of this exception would seem to be guaranteed by its
endorsement in Winebrenner and in Bayne, at least in dictum. But genuinely
new functions may go unrecognized until too late. The situation faced by the
Bayne appellants is instructive. State moneys had already been spent on
171. MD. CONsT. art. III, § 52(4) (1916).
172. The decisions to fund the various branches of the government are mandated by
the constitution, as are the decisions to pay the state debt, salaries of state employees, and
to fund public schools. MD. CONST. art. III, § 52(4) (1916). The decision to fund "such other
purposes as are set forth in the Constitution or laws of the state," id., are made in the
constitution or the laws. This exhausts subsection 4 and all the possible objects of a budget
bill.
173. See note 168 supra.
174. CAL. CONST. art. XIII A (1978).
175. See notes 102 to 103 and accompanying text supra.
19801
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Medicaid abortions for some years, pursuant to the charter Medicaid legisla-
tion."6 The charter legislation made no mention of abortion, and could not have
been positively identified at the time of its passage as warranting state abortion
spending. Consequently, appellants could hardly have been expected immediate-
ly to refer the charter legislation in order to interdict abortion appropriations
made pursuant to it. Yet the constitution required them either to move to refer
immediately177 or to forego recourse to the mechanisms of direct government,
because Maryland, unlike most states with the referendum, has no initiative
provision.1 8 The general charter legislation would therefore appear to have been
nearly invulnerable to referendum.9 On the other hand, once the period for
referring the charter legislation had passed, the "new function" test of
Winebrenner would apparently cease to apply, because it would likely be said
that the charter legislation had created the new function, at least in posse, and
the appropriation actually funding the new activity was not creating, but only
implementing the activity. Thus, the "new function" test would apparently have
lapsed in effectiveness.
When the "primary function" test does not render appropriations invul-
nerable to the referendum, the "design" formulation will. As long as the
appropriation may plausibly be represented as meeting the apparently infinitely
expandable test of fulfilling a "primary function" of government, the "design"
test will exempt it from any further scrutiny. In effect, the "design" test, in the
wake of Bayne, will be used to justify, if not to mandate, an affirmative refusal
to look beyond "primary function" and perhaps "new function. 180
CONCLUSION
Bayne can only be seen as a per se exception in fact, if not in theory, of all
appropriations from the referendum. 8' In a wider perspective, what the Court of
176. 62 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 11, 15 (1977).
177. MD. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 2, 3(b) (1915, amended 1978).
178. Maryland and New Mexico are alone in reserving referendum but not initiative
power to their citizens. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES
244-45 (1978).
179. Even if it had been recognized by the appellants at the time of its passage as a
potential charter for objectionable appropriations, a successful referendum of the Medicaid
legislation would have been most wasteful because it would have caused the citizens of the
state to forgo millions of dollars worth of assured contributions to public health care in
order to ward off one speculative allocation of a small part of those moneys. This is a
situation in which the proposed line item rule might be helpful. See notes 146 to 148 and
accompanying text supra.
180. See notes 93 to 97 and accompanying text supra.
181. It might be maintained, on the basis of some of the questioned uses of "act" and
"law" in the part of the case discussing partial referability, that Bayne also set forth the
standard that no part of an act, including a budget bill, may be referred if any part is
excepted. If this is in fact what the court says, its implication is clearly further to except
budget bills, because every budget bill contains excepted matter. As noted above, it seems
more probable that all the court held was that parts of excepted laws were excepted, and
this would not further shield any appropriations from the referendum.
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Appeals did in Bayne was decrease the power of the electorate, to the
aggrandisement of the Governor and the General Assembly, in an era when
powers reserved to the electorate are being widely reasserted. Bayne has
increased the discretion of the Governor and the General Assembly over the uses
to which the people's money will be put, and decreased the power of the people to
exercise a check on that discretion. That the budget and referendum amend-
ments should have been used as vehicles to reach this end would probably have
surprised the legislators and voters of 1915 and 1916 who enacted these
amendments.
THE UNIFORM POST CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT GIVES A
POST-CONVICTION COURT THE POWER TO GRANT AN
APPEAL TO RAISE ISSUES NOT HEARD ON DIRECT APPEAL
DUE TO THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE
COUNSEL - WILSON v. STATE
In Wilson v. State' the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed the question
whether a post-conviction court may order that a convicted criminal defendant
be granted an appeal to raise issues not heard on direct appeal of his conviction
due to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Finding first that there is a
right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel,2 the court facilitated the
enforcement of that right by holding that the Maryland Uniform Post
Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) gives a post-conviction court the power to
review the effectiveness of appellate counsel and to grant a defendant an appeal
to raise issues not heard on the direct appeal of his conviction due to appellate
counsel's ineffectiveness.4
In two separate trials before the Criminal Court of Baltimore Kenneth
Maurice Wilson was convicted of rape and robbery' and of carnal knowledge and
perverted practices.' The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the convictions,7 and
Wilson's petitions for certiorari to the Court of Appeals were denied Having
exhausted all appellate recourse, Wilson filed a petition in the Criminal Court of
Baltimore under the UPCPA.9 He alleged that eleven errors at his two trials
1. 284 Md. 664, 399 A.2d 256 (1979).
2. Id. at 671, 399 A.2d at 260.
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645A, 645E, 6451, 645J (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
4. 284 Md. at 679, 399 A.2d at 264.
5. Id. at 665, 399 A.2d at 257. Wilson was sentenced to life imprisonment for rape
and was given a concurrent ten-year sentence for robbery. Id. at 664-65, 399 A.2d at 257.
6. Id. at 666, 399 A.2d at 257. Wilson was sentenced to two years for carnal
knowledge and ten years for perverted practices. The sentences were to run consecutively
but concurrently with the sentences imposed in the rape and robbery trial. Id.
7. Id. Before the Court of Special Appeals ruled on his appeals, Wilson filed a
petition in the Criminal Court of Baltimore seeking relief under the UPCPA but later
withdrew it. Id. The two appeals were briefed and argued together. With respect to the
rape and robbery convictions, Wilson argued that the trial court erred in failing to
suppress a judicial identification of the defendant and in admitting evidence of a prior
conviction and that the evidence was not legally sufficient to sustain the verdicts. As to
the convictions of carnal knowledge and perverted practices, he contended that the trial
court erred in admitting into evidence a statement given by him to police, in denying a
motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of perverted practices, and in refusing to
permit the police physician to testify as to certain information obtained from the victim.
The court rejected these arguments, affirming the convictions. Id.
8. 278 Md. 739 (1976).
9. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 645A, 645E, 645-I, 645J (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
Section 645A(a) of the UPCPA provides that a petitioner
may institute a proceeding under this subtitle in the circuit court for the county or the
Criminal Court of Baltimore to set aside or correct the sentence, provided the alleged
error has not been previously and finally litigated or waived in the proceedings
resulting in the conviction, or in any other proceeding that the petitioner has taken to
secure relief from his conviction.
See MD. R.P. BK 40.
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constituted grounds for reversal of his convictions." The post-conviction court
found that nine of these allegations were without merit." From the testimony of
petitioner and his appellate counsel, however, the court determined that the two
remaining issues - prejudice of the presiding judge and violation of petitioner's
right to a speedy trial - were arguably meritorious, but, on the advice of
petitioner's appellate counsel, had not been raised on direct appeal. 2 The court
found that petitioner's appellate counsel had spent only two and a half hours
preparing the appeal and therefore was not sufficiently familiar with the trial
transcript to realize that those issues had been raised at trial and were thus
preserved for appeal. 3 Accordingly, the court concluded that the petitioner was
not afforded "genuine"' representation of counsel on his appeal and ordered that
he be permitted to appeal the speedy trial and judicial prejudice issues to the
Court of Special Appeals.'5
The Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal sua sponte, holding
alternatively that the UPCPA did not grant the post-conviction court the power
to review either appellate counsel's conduct or issues previously raised or waived
on appeal and that the appellate court itself had no jurisdiction to hear a
"second" appeal granted by a post-conviction court. 6 With respect to the power of
the post-conviction court, the court reasoned that relief under the UPCPA is
available only to a prisoner whose "sentence or judgment was imposed"
erroneously.' 7 Because only trial courts "impose" sentences or judgments, only
errors relating to the validity of the judgment "imposed" at trial could be the
subject of post-conviction review; the conduct of appellate courts and appellate
counsel are unreviewable under the UPCPA." The court expressed the concern
that permitting circuit courts sitting as post-conviction courts to review
10. The errors alleged were: (1) perjury; (2) inadmissible evidence; (3) improper
admission of certain perjurious testimony; (4) illegal sentence; (5) unconstitutional
evidence; (6) prejudice of the presiding judge; (7) violation of constitutional right to due
process and equal protection; (8) unconstitutional shifting of burden of proof; (9) violation
of the right to a fair and impartial trial by requiring the defendant to prove his alibi by an
independent source and by a preponderance of the evidence; (10) violation of the
constitutional right to a speedy trial; and (11) suppression of evidence by the state. The
petitioner did not raise the claim of ineffective appellate counsel. Wilson v. State, 39 Md.
App. 113, 115, 383 A.2d 77, 79 (1978), rev'd, 284 Md. 664, 399 A.2d 256 (1979).
11. Id. A portion of the post-conviction court's opinion is reproduced as an appendix to
the Court of Special Appeals' opinion. Id. at 119-21, 383 A.2d at 81-82.
12. Id. at 119, 383 A.2d at 81.
13. Id. at 120, 383 A.2d at 81-82.
14. Id. at 121, 383 A.2d at 82. Courts and commentators use the words "genuine,"
"effective," "competent," and "adequate" interchangeably to express the quality of
representation. See Comment, Standard for Effective Assistance of Counsel, 1976 WASH.
U.L.Q. 503, 503 n.3.
15. 39 Md. App. at 121, 383 A.2d at 82. The state did not appeal the order granting
the belated appeal as it could have under MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645-I (Curi. Supp.
1979). 284 Md. at 668, 399 A.2d at 259.
16. 39 Md. App. at 116, 383 A.2d at 80.
17. Id. at 117, 383 A.2d at 80 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(a) (1976)).
18. Id.
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appellate proceedings would result in an "unending circle of review."'9 Every
appeal would be subject to post-conviction review in a trial-level court, which
itself could then be appealed, causing, the court feared, "the wheels of justice
. ..probably to come to a screeching halt."2
The court held further that it had no jurisdiction to hear a second appeal
ordered by a post-conviction court.2 It reasoned that under Maryland case law a
trial court cannot order an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals once an appeal
to that court has already been entered.22 At that time the appellate court
assumes exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Because Wilson had already
entered an appeal at the time he filed his post-conviction petition, the court
held, the post-conviction court had no authority to order another appeal. The
court recognized, however, an exception to the rule divesting the trial court of
jurisdiction once an appeal has been entered: a trial court may direct a belated
appeal when counsel fails to enter the defendant's appeal properly.23 The court
concluded by noting that neither the statute" nor the rules25 pertaining to
appeals permit "a second appeal for either picking up issues overlooked or
rehashing after an adverse decision."'
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where a criminal defendant has
a right of appeal, he has a constitutionally guaranteed right to effective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal of his conviction27 and that the UPCPA
confers upon a circuit court the authority to grant the defendant an appeal to
raise issues not heard on the direct appeal of his conviction due to the ineffective
assistance of his appellate counsel." The court first concluded, apparently on
federal constitutional equal protection grounds,' that there is a right to the
19. Id. at 118, 383 A.2d at 81.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 116, 383 A.2d at 79.
22. Id. at 117-18, 383 A.2d at 81 (citing State v. McCray, 267 Md. 111, 145, 297 A.2d
265, 283 (1972); Stacy v. Burke, 259 Md. 390, 401, 269 A.2d 837, 844 (1970); Bullock v.
Director, 231 Md. 629, 633, 190 A.2d 789, 792 (1963)).
23. Id. at 117, 383 A.2d at 80.
24. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-101 to -702 (1974).
25. MD. R.P. 800-899, 1000-1099.
26. 39 Md. App. at 119, 383 A.2d at 81.
27. 284 Md. at 669-71, 399 A.2d at 259-60. The state conceded this issue, and
requested that the court establish a "standard of competency" for appellate counsel. Brief
for Appellee at 2, 8.
28. 284 Md. at 671-76, 399 A.2d at 260-63.
29. The court did not rely on the Maryland Constitution in reaching its decision,
although it began by citing the provision of the Declaration of Rights that "in all criminal
prosecutions, every man hath a 'right . . .to be allowed counsel," MD. CONST., Decl. of
Rts., art. 21. 284 Md. at 669, 399 A.2d at 259. It added that the provision had been
construed as only abolishing common law prohibitions on representation by counsel, id.
(citing Betts v. Brady, 315 U.S. 455, 456 (1942); Raymond v. State, 192 Md. 602, 607, 65
A.2d 285 (1949)), and noted that the practice had been to allow representation by counsel
on appeal, as well as at trial, id.
It is not clear whether the court's discussion is based entirely on equal protection
grounds, however. The court began by noting that the state conceded "with good reason,"
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assistance of appellate counsel. It noted that a Maryland statute ° ordinarily
gave criminal defendants an absolute right to appeal their convictions and that
the practice had been to allow representation by counsel on appeal.3 The court
then discussed briefly Supreme Court cases establishing that where appeals
were granted criminal defendants, indigents could not be denied the assistance
of counsel on appeal.32 It concluded by noting that, if there were any doubt as to
the right to appellate counsel, the passage of the statute establishing the
Maryland Office of the Public Defender had dispelled it.3 The act, designed to
assure counsel to indigents in criminal proceedings, provides that public
defenders are to represent indigents in appeals of convictions to the Court of
Special Appeals!" Because indigents are thus afforded the right to counsel on
appeal, the court reasoned, others cannot be denied it. Such a denial would
violate the equal protection clause." Given the existence of the right to appellate
counsel, the court had little difficulty in construing it to include effective
284 Md. at 669, 399 A.2d at 259, that where a criminal defendant had a right to an appeal,
he was entitled to effective assistance of appellate counsel. The framing of the question in
terms of a defendant who has a right to appeal suggests an equal protection analysis, and
the court went on to discuss Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), and Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), also citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), all
cases dealing with appellate review given indigents decided on equal protection grounds.
See note 32 infra. The court also quoted, however, from Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963), noting it had applied the sixth amendment right to counsel through the
fourteenth amendment. See note 32 infra.
The second part of the court's discussion of the right to appellate counsel,
unnecessary to its holding, clearly involved an equal protection analysis. See notes 33 to
35 and accompanying text infra.
30. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 12-301, -308 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
31. 284 Md. at 669, 399 A.2d at 259.
32. The court first stated that Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), had established
that states could not grant appellate review so as to discriminate against indigents. 284
Md. at 669, 399 A.2d at 259. Griffin held that a state that allowed criminal defendants an
appeal could not discriminate against indigents by requiring them to pay for a trial
transcript necessary to prosecute an appeal.
The court noted that Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), had applied the
sixth amendment right to counsel to the states because no one, including poor defendants,
could be assured a fair trial without counsel. 284 Md. at 669-70, 399 A.2d at 259. Finally,
it stated that Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), foreclosed denial to indigents of
the assistance of counsel on a first appeal, granted as of right. 284 Md. at 670, 399 A.2d at
260. It also cited Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), another equal protection case
dealing with indigents' right to assistance of counsel on appeal. 284 Md. at 670, 399 A.2d
at 259.
33. 284 Md. at 670-71, 399 A.2d at 260.
34. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 4(b)(2) (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
35. The court said:
Unconstitutional discrimination does not travel a one-way street. It is clear from the
rationale of the Supreme Court decisions that an accused with the means to hire
counsel to represent him on appeal could not be denied such representation in light of
the statutory provisions granting legal assistance to an indigent accused.
284 Md. at 671, 399 A.2d at 260.
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appellate counsel: "Entitlement to assistance of counsel would be hollow indeed
unless the assistance were required to be effective. '3 6
The court then looked to the language of the UPCPA, and to Maryland case
law, to hold that post-conviction courts have power to grant belated appeals, and
that the Court of Special Appeals has jurisdiction to hear such appeals . 3 The
court found that State v. Shoemaker," in which it had upheld a post-conviction
court's order granting a defendant a "delayed" appeal of his conviction because
his attorney failed to Dress the original appeal, was "sufficiently analogous" to
be controlling. 9 It also read the UPCPA as giving a remedy for the errors
alleged by Wilson, errors, the court found, related "to the validity of the original
judgment," and not to the appellate stage."° Finally, the court found that the rule
that the jurisdiction of a trial court ends once an appeal is entered does not
apply to post-conviction proceedings, and did not bar the post-conviction court
from acting in Wilson's case.4'
The Supreme Court has never explicitly established a constitutional right to
the effective assistance of counsel on appeal. However, the Court of Appeals'
grant of that right is a logical collation and extension of Supreme Court cases
that guarantee the right to effective assistance of trial counsel and establish a
right to counsel for indigent defendants on appeals granted by states as a matter
of right. The Supreme Court has long recognized a right to the effective
assistance of trial counsel. In Powell v. Alabama," the Court held that under the
36. Although the facts of the case may limit the court's holding to the appeals of
indigent defendants, the equal protection clause requires that the constitutional right to
effective assistance apply to indigent and non-indigent alike. See Mayer v. Chicago, 404
U.S. 189 (1971); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963). Moreover, the Court of Appeals'
discussion of the entitlement of non-indigents to assistance of appellate counsel on
different equal protection grounds, see notes 33 to 35 and accompanying text supra,
indicates non-indigents would also be entitled to effective assistance.
37. 284 Md. at 671-79, 399 A.2d at 260-64.
38. 225 Md. 639, 171 A.2d 468 (1961). Shoemaker is discussed in the text
accompanying notes 67 to 70 infra.
39. 284 Md. at 674, 399 A.2d at 262.
40. Id. at 676, 399 A.2d at 263.
41. Id. at 677, 399 A.2d at 263. The case was remanded to the Court of Special
Appeals. In a detailed opinion, the court held that Wilson's right to a speedy trial had been
denied in one of the cases, and reversed. 44 Md. App. 1, 18, 408 A.2d 102, 112 (1979). The
court faced a difficult task in resolving the speedy trial issue because of the recent
developments in Maryland concerning defendants' rights to speedy trial. See State v.
Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 403 A.2d 356 (1979). The court did not reach the issue whether
Wilson's trials had been tainted by the prejudice of the trial judge. 44 Md. App. at 18, 408
A.2d at 112.
42. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The trial court in Powell had appointed "all the members of
the bar" of Scottsboro, Alabama to represent seven defendants charged with rape. From
the time of arraignment to the mornings of the trials, no individual attorney had been
named as counsel. At the trials, a member of the bar and an out-of-state lawyer, neither of
whom had prepared the cases, represented the defendants in pro forma fashion. Six of the
seven defendants were convicted. The Supreme Court concluded "that defendants were not
accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense" because the defendants' attorneys
were not afforded sufficient time to confer with defendants and to prepare a defense. Id. at
58.
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due process clause of the fourteenth amendment indigent defendants in state
cases involving a capital offense have a right to court-appointed counsel and
that counsel must effectively assist in the preparation and trial of the case.'3
Relying on Powell, the Supreme Court maintained in later decisions that the
right to counsel includes a right to the effective assistance of trial counsel. In
state cases, the Court held that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
guarantees effective assistance of trial counsel, at least in cases involving a
capital offense," and in federal cases found the source of that right in the sixth
amendment. 5 In Gideon v. Wainwright," the sixth amendment's guarantee of
the assistance of counsel, and presumably the Court's interpretation of that
right as requiring effective assistance, was made applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.
Although the Supreme Court has never found that the Constitution
guarantees a right to appeal a criminal conviction, 7 in Douglas v. California" it
held that where a state grants a right to direct appeal it must provide indigent
defendants with the assistance of counsel on that appeal. In Anders v.
California," the Court pointed the way to, but fell short of, establishing a
constitutional right to effective assistance of appellate counsel for indigent
criminal defendants. The Court held that California's system for handling
43. The concept of effective assistance of counsel has a procedural aspect, which goes
to the timing of the appointment of counsel, as addressed in Powell, see id. at 76. The issue
presented in Wilson, however, concerned the substantive aspect of effectiveness of counsel,
which relates to performance of counsel after appointment. See S. KRANTZ, C. SMITH, D.
ROSSMAN, P. FROYD & J. HOFFMAN, RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 166 n.13 (1976).
44. E.g., Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 89-90 (1955) (appointment of counsel the day
after defendant's indictment, so as to preclude the right to object to the composition of the
grand jury before indictment, as required by the state law, is a denial of effective
assistance of counsel and due process); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1940)(although only two days elapsed between appointment of counsel and trial, defendant not
deprived of effective assistance of counsel where Court found that counsel were zealous,
earnest, and effective in pursuing appeals as far as possible).
45. E.g., McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 & n.14 (1970) ("It has been long
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.");
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942) (effective assistance of counsel as required
by the sixth amendment denied where defendant's attorney was also appointed counsel for
co-defendant; new trial granted).
46. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
47. "A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal case, however
grave the offence of which the accused is convicted, was not at common law and is not now
a necessary element of due process of law." McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894).
The Court also held that the right to appeal does not inhere in the fifth amendment to the
Constitution. Id. at 688.
48. 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The Supreme Court had previously addressed the rights of
indigent defendants on appeal in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), in which it held
that failing to provide such defendants with trial transcripts, which were required for an
appeal, denied them equal protection under the fourteenth amendment. In Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court held that there is no right to counsel in discretionary
appeals, refusing to extend Douglas beyond first appeals granted by right.
49. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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indigents' appeals, under which court-appointed counsel, rather than the court,
decided the merits of the appeal, did not meet "[t]he constitutional requirement
of substantial equality and fair process [that] can only be attained where counsel
acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his client, as opposed to that of
amicus curiae."50 The Court reasoned that appellate counsel's role as advocate
requires that he support his client's appeal to the best of his ability and raise
any issue in the record that might arguably support the appeal, even if counsel
regarded the appeal as frivolous. 1
Maryland law also supports the court's conclusion in Wilson. Both the Court
of Appeals 2 and the Court of Special Appealsu have held that criminal
defendants have a right to the effective assistance of trial counsel. Moreover,
there is a statutorily guaranteed right to direct appeal of criminal convictions."
Finally, in establishing the Office of the Public Defender, the Maryland
legislature declared that it is the state's policy to provide for "the realization of
the constitutional guarantees of counsel in the representation of indigents...
in criminal . . . proceedings . and to assure effective assistance and
continuity of counsel . . .,.5
As the court pointed out in Wilson,' the guarantee of effective appellate
counsel is a natural corollary of the established rights to effective trial counsel
and to direct appeal in criminal cases. The value of a criminal defendant's
assurance that he will be represented by effective counsel at trial would be
lessened if he did not have the same assurance with respect to his appellate
counsel. Because the effectiveness of appellate counsel is thus at least as
important, both to the defendant and the judicial system, as is the effectiveness
of trial counsel, the constitutional right to the effective assistance of appellate
counsel should be as zealously protected as is the right to effective assistance of
trial counsel. Moreover, the statutorily granted right to a direct appeal of a
criminal conviction would be worth little if a defendant were forced to press that
appeal without the aid of counsel.
Having decided that the Constitution guarantees the right to effective
assistance of appellate counsel, the Court of Appeals next considered the
jurisdictional authority of the post-conviction court to grant an appeal on issues
50. Id. at 744.
51. Id. Under Anders if the court agrees the appeal is wholly without merit, it may
grant counsel's request to withdraw and dismiss the appeal. If the court finds the appeal
not frivolous, the indigent must be afforded assistance of counsel to argue the appeal. Id.
52. E.g., Woodell v. State, 223 Md. 89, 162 A.2d 468 (1960) (effective assistance of
trial counsel guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment).
53. E.g., Evans v. Warden, 8 Md. App. 26, 257 A.2d 474 (1969); Thomas v. Warden, 7
Md. App. 214, 254 A.2d 373 (1969); Green v. Warden, 3 Md. App. 266, 238 A.2d 920 (1968).
54. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 12-301 (1980).
55. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 1 (1976). The statute further provides that it is the
duty of the Public Defender to provide legal representation "where the defendant is
charged with a serious crime, before ... the Court of Special Appeals." Id. § 4(b)(2) (Cum.
Supp. 1979).
56. See 284 Md. at 671, 399 A.2d at 259.
[VOL. 39
UNIFORM POST CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT
not raised previously on direct appeal to a petitioner who has been denied
effective assistance of appellate counsel. In the opinion below, the Court of
Special Appeals had held that the UPCPA did not confer jurisdiction upon a
trial court to review either appellate proceedings or appellate counsel's conduct,
or to grant an appeal when a petitioner had already taken an appeal to that
court." It concluded that the post-conviction court had in effect granted Wilson a
second appeal, which the appellate court had no jurisdiction to hear, and
therefore dismissed the case.'
The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the UPCPA conferred
jurisdiction on post-conviction courts to grant appeals under these circum-
stances.59 In so ruling, the court characterized Wilson's appeal as a "belated," not
a second, appeal.6 Because the issues to be argued on appeal had never been
heard, the appeal challenged the validity of Wilson's original conviction, not the
validity of the appellate proceedings to which he had already been a party. Thus
his appeal did not concern issues already settled by an appellate court, but
instead raised new issues following direct appeal.
The UPCPA provides that a claim may be brought under the Act "provided
the alleged error has not been previously and finally litigated or waived in the
proceedings resulting in the conviction, or in any other proceeding that the
petitioner has taken to secure relief from his conviction. 6 1 Under the UPCPA,
an allegation of error is deemed to be finally litigated when the Court of Special
Appeals has rendered a decision on the merits of that claim.6 2 The issues to be
argued in Wilson's case had not been finally litigated, the court reasoned,
because they had never been decided by the Court of Special Appeals. Thus
Wilson's appeal was a belated, not a second, one. The UPCPA further provides
that an allegation of error is considered to have been waived when petitioner
knowingly and intelligently failed to raise the claim when it could have been
raised, "unless the failure to make such allegations shall be excused because of
special circumstances."' ' Because it was appellate counsel's misconduct that
prevented the two possibly meritorious allegations of error from being raised,
those allegations could not be deemed to have been knowingly and intelligently
waived by the defendant.
In concluding that the UPCPA confers jurisdiction on post-conviction courts
to grant belated appeals, the court relied on State v. Shoemaker," in which it had
57. 39 Md. App. at 116, 383 A.2d at 79.
58. Id.
59. 284 Md. at 677-79, 399 A.2d at 263-64.
60. Id. at 671-76, 399 A.2d at 260-63.
61. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The statute in force at the
time the court decided Wilson was identical in all material respects to the present version.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(a) (1976).
62. Id. § 645A(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
63. Id. § 645A(c) (1976).
64. 225 Md. 639, 171 A.2d 468 (1961). The case was before the court on the state's
application for leave to appeal, which the Court of Appeals denied. Shoemaker is
noteworthy for the fact that it was the first time a belated appeal was allowed when the
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upheld a post-conviction court's grant of a belated appeal to an indigent criminal
defendant who did not take a direct appeal because his counsel failed to inform
him that he could proceed without cost as a pauper. The court found that the
circumstances of Wilson's appeal were analogous to Shoemaker's in that "direct
appeal had been noted but full review had been thwarted by an act of omission
on the part of the accused's appellate counsel." It also found significant that in
both Shoemaker and Wilson the grants of belated appeals by the post-conviction
court were "predicated on factual findings by the hearing judge which were fully
supported by the record made at a plenary hearing." ' The court concluded that
because Wilson, like Shoemaker, was denied adequate appellate review as of
right due to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the post-conviction
court had the power to grant the "delayed appeal" 7 and that the Court of Special
Appeals had the power to hear it.
The Court of Special Appeals had some justification for not considering
Shoemaker dispositive.1 First, Wilson and Shoemaker are distinguishable on
their facts. In Shoemaker, the defendant, in effect, was never granted a first
appeal. An appeal was noted, but it was never perfected by the accused's
appellate counsel.69 Shoemaker was wholly deprived of actual appellate review of
his claims, and his delayed appeal was a first, although belated, one. Wilson,
however, had already had a direct appeal to the Court of Special Appeals in
which some, but not all, of his claims of error were finally litigated. Shoemaker,
the Court of Special Appeals might have reasoned, was only controlling when a
defendant was denied any appellate review at all because of his counsel's
conduct. Second, although, as the Court of Appeals noted, the Shoemaker case
had been "recognized"70 by Maryland courts, it had simply been cited in dicta,
original appeal was prevented by someone other than a state official. Cf. State v. Cox, 10
Md. App. 211, 269 A.2d 106 (1970) (belated appeal not allowed where no state official
interfered with defendant's right to appeal and no intention to appeal was apparent).
65. 284 Md. at 674-75, 399 A.2d at 262.
66. Id. at 675, 399 A.2d at 262.
67. Id. at 674, 399 A.2d at 262.
68. Indeed, the Court of Special Appeals did not discuss or even cite Shoemaker.
69. The court did not expressly hold in Shoemaker that the defendant had been denied
the effective assistance of appellate counsel. In upholding the lower court's order that
Shoemaker be allowed to appeal, however, the court observed, "The prisoner was not
apprised that his original lawyer was no longer in the case or that he had a new lawyer
and, apparently with justification, believed that the appeal which he requested was being
perfected." State v. Shoemaker, 225 Md. 639, 642, 171 A.2d 468, 469 (1961). Thus,
appellate counsel's conduct was implicated in the court's grant of a belated appeal,
although the court did not characterize that conduct "ineffective."
70. 284 Md. at 673, 399 A.2d at 261. The court said that Shoemaker had been
"recognized" in Sewell v. Warden, 235 Md. 615, 200 A.2d 648 (1964); State v. Brown, 235
Md. 401, 201 A.2d 852 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978 (1965); State v. Cox, 10 Md. App.
211, 269 A.2d 106 (1970); McCoy v. Warden, 1 Md. App. 188, 227 A.2d 375 (1967); and
Schaedler v. Warden, 1 Md. App. 25, 226 A.2d 684 (1967). An examination of those cases
reveals that they simply cite Shoemaker as support for dicta that a belated appeal may be
granted in certain circumstances.
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and its rule had not been applied before Wilson. Finally, Shoemaker is a brief,
three-page opinion, devoid of any reasoning or analysis; the court did not raise
or resolve the issue later determined in Wilson.
The Court of Appeals rejected the Court of Special Appeals' ruling that the
post-conviction court had no power to review appellate counsel's conduct because
a trial court's jurisdiction ends upon the entering of an appeal." The court held
that the rule divesting the trial court of jurisdiction when appeal is entered does
not apply to post-conviction proceedings because the express language of the
UPCPA permits petitions for post-conviction relief to be filed at any time.72
Further, the UPCPA recognizes that a post-conviction petition may be filed after
an appeal has been entered.73
In Wilson, the Court of Appeals recognized a constitutional right to effective
assistance of appellate counsel and ensured criminal defendants a means of
enforcing that right in a state court.7' Although the court held that appellate
71. 284 Md. at 674-79, 399 A.2d at 261-63.
72. Id. at 677, 399 A.2d at 263. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(e) (Cum. Supp.
1979).
73. "[Wlhere an appeal has been taken from the judgment of conviction to the Court
of Special Appeals, it shall not be necessary to . . . take any action whatsoever on the
petition, until the judgment of conviction becomes final in the Court of Special Appeals."
Id. The court noted that the statute gives the lower court an option, when direct appeal is
pending, to dispose of the petition or to postpone its action until the appellate court
renders its decision. 284 Md. at 678, 399 A.2d at 263 (quoting Vernon v. Warden, 11 Md.
App. 340, 342, 274 A.2d 405, 406 (1971)). See Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 395 A.2d 464
(1978); O'Connor v. Warden, 6 Md. App. 590, 253 A.2d 434 (1969); ABA STANDARDS
RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES § 1.1, Comment, at 23 (approved draft 1968)
(accepted usage of post-conviction remedies means those that can be invoked after a final
appeal from conviction has been decided or after the time for taking an appeal has passed).
74. Because they are provided a remedy in state court, state prisoners will not be
compelled to resort to invoke federal habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1977), to test the
constitutionality of their convictions. Extensive use of federal habeas corpus holds
disadvantages for the federal judicial system. Federal courts will not hear a habeas corpus
petition from a state prisoner unless that prisoner has exhausted all avenues of appeal and
collateral review, such as the UPCPA, on the state level. Id. § 2254(b). Because a
Maryland state prisoner would have to petition the post-conviction court for relief before
he could petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, judicial efficiency would be increased
if all the petitioner's claims could be disposed of by the state's post-conviction or appellate
court. State courts would also be able to deal most effectively with the matters of state law
- though a great deal of the law that is applied in the post-conviction context is federal
constitutional law - that might arise in petitions for post-conviction relief, and which, if
brought to federal courts by habeas corpus proceedings, could engender federal-state
conflicts. By broadening the spectrum of relief allowed in the state court system, the Court
of Appeals has perhaps enhanced federal-state comity. See Northrop, The Supreme Court
and Criminal Procedure, 26 MD. L. REV. 1 (1966). Judge Northrop, of the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, commends the state for accepting responsibil-
ity for administration of its criminal laws instead of thrusting the burden on the federal
judicial system. See generally 11 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 477 (1974); Finan, The
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act: One State's Experience, 2 HARV. J. LEGIS. 185
(1965). Finan, a former Attorney General of Maryland, states that Maryland adopted the
UPCPA to maintain the effectiveness of Maryland courts in dealing with the constitution-
al objections of state prisoners and to avoid an increase in the workload of federal courts.
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counsel must render effective assistance, it provided no standards by which
courts can judge whether counsel's conduct is "effective."75 Nor has the Supreme
Court set specific standards for the meaning of effective assistance of counsel.78
However, Maryland courts have established standards for effective assistance of
trial counsel,' as have other states"8 and the federal courts of appeals." Those
standards test whether, under the circumstances of the case, counsel was so
incompetent that the accused was not afforded genuine and effective legal
representation.' In determining the standard by which appellate counsel's
performance will be evaluated, Maryland courts may find it expedient to apply
the standard presently used to judge the conduct of trial counsel.81 Certainly, the
application of a uniform standard would avoid confusion by courts faced with
ineffective assistance claims.
Even if a uniform standard is adopted, the question what specific actions or
omissions of appellate counsel will give rise to a successful claim of ineffective
assistance will remain.82 Most courts will not deem counsel ineffective for failing
to raise an untenable issue on appeal,' but when appellate counsel fails to raise
75. See 284 Md. at 679 n.6, 399 A.2d at 264 n.6.
76. Cf. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (advice regarding guilty
pleas must be "within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.").
77. E.g., Green v. Warden, 3 Md. App. 266, 238 A.2d 920 (1968) (counsel must afford
accused genuine and effective legal representation).
78. E.g., People v. Chandler, 44 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 358 N.E.2d 1293 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Bowers, 245 Pa. Super. Ct. 214, 369 A.2d 370 (1976).
79. E.g., United States v. Williams, 575 F.2d 388, 393 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
842 (1978) (counsel must be competent and act as a diligent and conscientious advocate);
United States v. Wright, 573 F.2d 681, 683-84 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 949 (1978)
(counsel must be effective so as not to reduce the proceedings to a farce and a mockery);
Brubaker v. Dickson, 310 F.2d 30, 37 (9th Cir. 1967) (counsel must offer reasonably
effective assistance). For a comprehensive treatment of the tests for effective assistance of
counsel, see Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals 1977-78, 67 GEO. L.J. 317, 516-21 (1978); Comment, Standard for Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 503.
80. Maryland courts have abandoned the test of whether counsel's assistance was so
ineffective as to reduce the proceeding to a farce and a mockery. See O'Connor v. Warden,
6 Md. App. 590, 595, 253 A.2d 434, 438 (1969).
81. See Rawlins v. Craven, 329 F. Supp. 40, 42 (E.D. Cal. 1971) (standards of
competence apply equally to trial and appellate counsel); Rook v. Cupp, 18 Or. App. 608,
613 n.2, 526 P.2d 605, 607 n.2 (1974) (no difference between trial and appellate counsel as
far as rule that tests competence is concerned).
82. Because that question was not before it in Wilson, the Court of Appeals did not
address it. See 284 Md. at 679 n.6, 399 A.2d at 264 n.6. The state had asked the court to
apply the same standard for the effective assistance of appellate counsel that it applies to
the effective assistance of trial counsel. Brief for Appellee at 6.
83. See, e.g., People v. Chandler, 44 Il. App. 3d 1067, 358 N.E.2d 1293 (1976); People
v. Healey, 23 Il. App. 3d 214, 318 N.E.2d 89 (1974); Storms v. Cupp, 13 Or. App. 273, 508
P.2d 450 (1973); Commonwealth v. Bowers, 245 Pa. Super. Ct. 214, 369 A.2d 370 (1976).
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arguably meritorious claims, courts have found their conduct to be ineffective.1
Failure to perfect an appeal has been held by Maryland courts," among others,
to be a ground for relief on allegations of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. For this claim to be successful in Maryland, the accused must also show
that he requested an appeal to be taken." Because of the dearth of case law in
which a litigant's claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel has been
deemed meritorious, courts hearing such a claim have little guidance. For the
immediate future, Maryland courts must decide the merit of allegations of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel on a case-by-case basis. If Maryland
applies the test for the effectiveness of trial counsel to the context of the
effectiveness of appellate counsel, the vague nature of that test will require
careful scrutiny of the facts pertaining to all claims to determine whether
counsel has indeed been ineffective.
In Wilson, the Court of Appeals provided post-conviction relief as a vehicle
to remedy the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Upon a finding of
ineffective assistance, the post-conviction court may order one of two remedies.
If the ineffectiveness of counsel pervaded the entire appeal because appellate
counsel failed to perfect the appeal or despite the fact that counsel raised all
arguable issues, a new appeal would be the appropriate remedy. If counsel's
ineffectiveness were more discrete, as with a failure to raise or present
adequately a certain claim, a new appeal on the merits of those specific issues
could be granted, equivalent to the "belated" appeal granted by the post-
conviction court in Wilson. 9
The first remedy, an entirely new appeal, may pose a conflict with the rules
of waiver if the defendant is allowed to argue a claim that could have been, but
was not, raised on the first appeal and was not itself the cause of the ineffective
assistance of counsel determination." If an issue is not raised on direct appeal as
the result of the defendant's conscious choice not to raise it, the issue is waived
84. E.g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. Vincent, 370 F. Supp. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(habeas corpus petitioner's counsel's failure to raise on appeal trial court's erroneous
instruction when petitioner would have almost certainly succeeded in obtaining a reversal
deprived petitioner of effective assistance of counsel in violation of his sixth amendment
rights); In re Smith, 2 Cal. 3d 850, 471 P.2d 8, 87 Cal. Rptr. 687 (1970) (inexcusable failure
of state habeas corpus petitioner's appellate counsel to raise crucial assignments of error
that arguably might have resulted in reversal deprived petitioner of effective assistance of
appellate counsel).
85. E.g., State v. Shoemaker, 225 Md. 639, 171 A.2d 468 (1961).
86. E.g., Perez v. Wainwright, 440 F. Supp. 1037 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
87. State v. Brown, 235 Md. 401, 201 A.2d 852 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 978
(1965); State v. Shoemaker, 225 Md. 639, 171 A.2d 468 (1961); Lucas v. Warden, 10 Md.
App. 359, 270 A.2d 330 (1970); Scott v. Warden, 6 Md. App. 200, 251 A.2d 17 (1969).
88. Strazzella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses, New Problems, 19
ARIZ. L. REV. 443, 468 (1977).
89. Id. See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa. 129, 140 n.5, 371 A.2d 468, 473 n.5
(1971).
90. Strazzella, supra note 88, at 468-69.
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for purposes of relief under the UPCPA.9 ' However, if an entirely new appeal is
ordered because appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance not stemming
from the failure to raise that issue, the defendant would be able to raise the
issue on his second appeal and could thus avoid the consequences of his waiver.
Moreover, in the new appeal the defendant might be allowed to relitigate an
issue determined adversely on the first appeal.2 If appellate counsel's ineffective
assistance affected so many aspects of the appeal as to cause a court to order an
entirely new appeal, but his ineffective assistance did not relate to an issue
determined adversely to the appellant, the appellant would have the opportunity
to argue that issue again on the new appeal. It has also been suggested that if
an entirely new appeal is granted and there is a change in the law between the
time of the first and second appeals, defendants might be able to raise an issue
based on a change in the law that is not retroactive, but which the defendant
has an opportunity to invoke on his new appeal. 3
These possibilities are not addressed in Wilson. The remedy granted to
Wilson by the post-conviction court and approved by the Court of Appeals called
for appellate review limited to the two previously unreviewed issues. However,
the procedural rules pertaining to the UPCPA prescribed by the Court of
Appeals support the conclusion that post-conviction courts should be accorded
flexibility in fashioning a full and effective remedy for the denial of genuine
appellate counsel. Those rules allow a post-conviction court to rule on a petition
"as justice may require" and grant such courts the power to provide for
"rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, discharge, correction of sentence, or other
matters that may be necessary and proper.""5
The Court of Special Appeals favored a restrictive view of the language of
the UPCPA. The court suggested that the language in the UPCPA granting
post-conviction courts jurisdiction to hear "claims that the sentence or judgment
was imposed in violation of the Constitution"" related only to such claims
arising in the original trial. The court believed that its reasoning was:
derived from the clear and limiting nature of the words of the statute
reflecting the obvious legislative intent of its enactment . . . . There is no
language in the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act which even
implicitly permits a supplicant to institute a proceeding under a claim of a
legal or constitutional rights violation during the course of an appeal.
However, because post-conviction petitions may be brought after appeal and
constitutional violations may arise on appeal, the reasoning of the Court of
91. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(c) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
92. Strazzella, supra note 88, at 468.
93. Id.
94. MD. R.P. BK 45(a).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
97. 39 Md. App. at 116-17, 383 A.2d at 80.
98. MD. ANN. ConE art. 27, § 645Ale) (Cum. Supp. 1979.
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Special Appeals may be questioned. The court's opinion reflected its distaste for
the eventuality that "a trial court whose proceedings are being reviewed on
appeal may adjudge the propriety of its reviewer's proceedings.",
The Court of Appeals responded to the problem of a trial court's reviewing
its reviewer's proceedings. The court agreed that the UPCPA does not intend for
the post-conviction court to review appellate proceedings unless a constitutional
error has occurred."° The court reasoned that in Wilson the post-conviction court
reviewed only the effectiveness of appellate counsel's assistance, not the
appellate proceedings per se.1°' In Wilson's post-conviction petition, the alleged
constitutional errors were raised at trial and preserved for appeal, but were not
raised on appeal because of the incompetence of appellate counsel. Thus, the
constitutional errors considered by the post-conviction court necessarily related
back to errors committed at trial; the original trial judgment was in question,
not the appellate proceedings.02
Although the Court of Special Appeals expressed apprehension at the idea
of a trial-level court's reviewing appellate proceedings,' 3 the Court of Appeals
correctly recognized the post-conviction court as an appropriate forum for the
review of the effectiveness of appellate counsel. The allegation of ineffective
assistance of counsel on direct appeal would not best be taken to the Court of
Special Appeals itself or to the Court of Appeals because they are appellate, not
factfinding, courts.11' The Court of Appeals' construction of the UPCPA is
consonant with the practicability of using an established procedural mechanism
to deal with the issues presented in Wilson. The UPCPA was devised to allow
post-conviction courts to hear claims regarding the constitutionality of criminal
convictions and sentences."° Further, a post-conviction court is better suited to
review appellate proceedings because it is authorized to receive and record
evidence.'" If the remedy for ineffective appellate counsel lay only with
appellate courts, there could be no evidentiary hearing in which to build a
record from which to ascertain appellate counsel's actions and to judge whether
petitioner had been afforded the effective assistance of counsel.
99. 39 Md. App. at 118, 383 A.2d at 81.
100. 284 Md. at 676, 399 A.2d at 262-63.
101. Id.
102. The court's decision in Wilson is supported by Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 472 Pa.
129, 371 A.2d 468 (1977), in which, in a case procedurally similar to Wilson, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court permitted a post-conviction court to review appellate
counsel's conduct.
103. 39 Md. App. at 117-18, 383 A.2d at 80-81. The court's apprehension should have
been eased by the fact that it could review any decision of a post-conviction court. See MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645-I (1976); note 15 supra.
104. See 284 Md. at 675, 399 A.2d at 262.
105. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 645A(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
106. MD. R.P. BK 44(d). Wilson's appointed appellate counsel testified at his
post-conviction hearing as to the efforts he exerted in preparing the appeal. 284 Md. at
667, 399 A.2d at 257-58.
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The result of the Court of Appeals' broad interpretation of the UPCPA in
Wilson is an expansion of the claims that may be heard by a post-conviction
court and the relief that can be granted by that court. The court's interpretation
of the statute comports with the American Bar Association's directive relating to
post-conviction remedies:
No matter how specifically the grounds for post-conviction relief are
stated, it is necessary that the contours of the form of relief be broad enough
to include any new substantive grounds that may develop. During the past
few years there has been frequent change in the number and types of claims
recognized as proper for post-conviction review. With the subject generally
in a fluid state, it seems appropriate to permit the courts to determine, on a
case-by-case basis, whether and when new claims shall be allowed.M
The Court of Special Appeals' concern that a broad interpretation of the
UPCPA will permit every appeal by a state prisoner to be reviewable by a
post-conviction court is unfounded.I" Under Wilson, direct appeals will be
reviewable by post-conviction courts only if the petitioner alleges that he has
been denied effective appellate counsel. This holding might be extended to
permit post-conviction courts to consider other constitutionally guaranteed
rights that have been violated on appeal, thereby increasing the number of
post-conviction petitions. The post-conviction court's jurisdiction and its case-
load, however, will remain restricted by the language of the statute to cases
involving constitutional and statutory rights that the prisoner has not been
afforded an opportunity to have reviewed. Although the ruling in Wilson might
produce an increase in cases for the post-conviction court, the balance of judicial
economy and the guarantee of constitutional rights seems to weigh in favor of
the court's hearing those cases. Enforcement of those guarantees is ample
justification for allowing expansion of the post-conviction court's function in
Maryland.
107. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES, supra note 73, § 2.1, at
33-34.
108. 284 Md. at 679 n.8, 399 A.2d at 264 n.8.
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AND THE LIABILITY OF PUTATIVE LIMITED
PARTNERS - KLEIN v. WEISS
In Klein v. Weiss' the Court of Appeals of Maryland faced the question
whether a limited partnership's receiver, appointed on behalf of creditors, could
enforce the stated capital contributions of the limited partners based on either a
partnership agreement and a certificate of partnership that had been signed by
the limited partners2 but had never been recorded, or on the certificate of
partnership that had been recorded but had been altered by the general partners
so as to greatly increase the liability of each limited partner without his
knowledge or express consent. Although the court failed to answer the question
of ultimate liability3 - who should pay for the misconduct of the general
partners, the limited partnership's creditors or the limited partners - it did
address a number of important issues concerning limited partnership law in
Maryland.
The various holdings in Klein turned on a complex factual situation. John
Fulton and Victoria Rinaldi desired to purchase, and later develop, a tract of
land in Ocean City from the Seventy-Sixth Street Joint Venture (the Joint
Venture).' To raise sufficient capital to buy the land, Fulton hired an attorney to
establish the Seventy-Sixth Street Limited Partnership (the Limited Partner-
ship), in which both Fulton and Rinaldi would be general partners. The attorney
prepared four documents - an instruction letter, a subscription agreement, a
limited partnership agreement, and a certificate of limited partnership.' All
were "to be used in the solicitation of prospective limited partners."' The
instruction letter stated the steps necessary to become a limited partner, which
included signing the subscription agreement and the instruments of execution to
the partnership agreement and certificate. 7 The subscription agreement pro-
vided, inter alia, that Fulton and Rinaldi would, contemporaneously with the
Limited Partnership's settling on the property it was formed to purchase,
contract in their individual capacities with the Limited Partnership to purchase
that property one year after the settlement date, for a price that would generate
$100,000 of profit to the limited partners.'
The original limited partnership agreement stated the capital contributions
of each limited partner. Each limited partner agreed to make an initial capital
contribution of $9,000' and to make additional contributions totalling $15,298"
1. 284 Md. 36, 395 A.2d 126 (1978).
2. The limited partners signed "Instruments of Execution," which were attached to
the partnership agreement and certificate. See notes 15 to 16 and accompanying text infra.
3. See note 57 and accompanying text infra.
4. 284 Md. at 40, 395 A.2d at 129-30.
5. Id. at 41, 395 A.2d at 130.
6. Id.
7. Record Extract at 373, Klein v. Weiss, 284 Md. 36, 395 A.2d 126 (1978).
8. Id. at 374.
9. Id. at 377.
10. Id.
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over a nine-year period, as set forth in an attached mortgage payment schedule."
A power of attorney clause in the original agreement in pertinent part provided:
Each limited partner . . . does irrevocably constitute and appoint the
General Partner as his true and lawful attorney and agent, with full power
and authority in his name, place and stead to execute, swear to,
acknowledge, deliver, file and record in the appropriate public offices (1) all
certificates and other instruments (including counterparts of this agree-
ment) which the General Partner deems appropriate to qualify or continue
the Partnership as a Limited Partnership in the jurisdictions in which the
Partnership may conduct business, [and] (2) all instruments which the
General Partner deems appropriate to effect a change or modification of the
Partnership in accordance with the terms of this Agreement .... 12
The agreement provided for a maximum of twenty-five limited partnership
units and stated, "no part of the capital contribution of any Limited Partner
shall be withdrawn unless all liabilities of the Partnership, except liabilities to
the General Partner and to the Limited Partners on account of their
contributions, have been paid or unless the Partnership has assets sufficient to
pay the same.""
The certificate of limited partnership reiterated the capital contributions set
out in the limited partnership agreement. The $15,298 in additional capital
contributions was represented as the per-unit share of the principal and interest
payments on the mortgage on the partnership property. The certificate stated:
[These additional contributions] shall be paid in accordance with the
mortgage payment schedule furnished to the Partners. The specific dates for
these payments will be furnished to the Limited Partners by the General
Partner or escrow agent named in the Limited Partnership Agreement not
later than ninety (90) days before the first such payment is due. 5
Neither the limited partnership agreement nor the certificate was intended to be
signed by the limited partners. Rather, each limited partner executed documents
styled "Instruments of Execution"'6 that were to be appended to both the
agreement and the certificate and incorporated the agreement and the
certificate by reference." Both instruments made reference to Exhibit "A," the
11. Id. at 389. Exhibit "A," the mortgage payment schedule, was attached to the
Limited Partnership agreement and incorporated therein by reference in paragraph 6(b) of
the agreement. Id. at 377. Because the general partners had agreed to repurchase the
property one year after settlement, the limited partners apparently did not expect actually
to be required to make these future payments. 284 Md. at 43, 395 A.2d at 131.
12. Record Extract at 47, 387.
13. Id. at 376.
14. Id. at 380.
15. Id. at 391.
16. 284 Md. at 44, 395 A.2d at 131.
17. See Record Extract at 49-53, 408-12.
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mortgage payment schedule described above. Neither the agreement nor the
certificate required any capital contribution by the general partners. 8
As the transaction was originally contemplated, the Limited Partnership
would buy the land from the Joint Venture for $450,000.19 Fulton and Rinaldi, as
general partners of the Limited Partnership, contracted with the Joint Venture 0
for this purchase in October 1972, three to four months before the limited
partnership documents were drafted.2 Fulton and Rinaldi made a $10,000 down
payment. The contract provided for settlement on March 15, 1973, when the
Limited Partnership would pay an additional $175,000 in cash, assume an
existing mortgage not to exceed $124,000, and execute a purchase money
mortgage to the Joint Venture for $141,000." If all twenty-five Limited
Partnership units had been sold, the initial capital contributions would have
generated $225,000 in cash. Of this sum, $185,000 would have been applied to
the cash purchase price, and the balance would have covered settlement costs
and the debt service on the first year of the mortgages.2
The general partners only managed to sell seven Limited Partnership
units. 4 As a result, the Limited Partnership did not have sufficient capital to
conclude the settlement as stipulated, and Fulton arranged a one-week
extension until March 22, 1973.1 During this one-week period, Fulton, on behalf
of the Limited Partnership, arranged a first mortgage, $309,000 two-year loan
from the Commercial Credit Development Corporation (Commercial Credit) and
directed the Limited Partnership's attorney to amend the limited partnership
certificate and agreement to reflect the increased indebtedness of the Limited
Partnership." Fulton told the attorney that he, Fulton, "would contact the
18. Paragraph 6A(a) of the Limited Partnership Agreement provided: "The General
Partner shall not make any contribution to capital of the Partnership." Id. at 377.
19. 284 Md. at 40, 395 A.2d at 130.
20. Id. In paragraph 23 of the original Limited Partnership Agreement, the Limited
Partner generally consented "to any contract ... as the General Partners deem necessary
to accomplish the purposes of the Partnership." Record Extract at 384.
21. 284 Md. at 40-41, 395 A.2d at 130. The documents were drawn by the lawyer in
late January or early February 1973. Id. at 41, 395 A.2d at 130.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 43, 395 A.2d at 131. The sale of the units generated only $63,000 in cash.
Three and one-half Limited Partnership units were purchased by the appellees in Klein:
Frederick Weiss owned one unit, Constantine Anthony owned one unit in his own name
and one as a tenant in common with Chris Christ, and Harry Hammond owned a one-half
share in one unit that he had purchased as a tenant in common with another subscriber
not a party to the Klein litigation. Id. at 44, 395 A.2d at 131. The owners of the remaining
three and one-half units settled with the receiver prior to the institution of the lawsuit. Id.
at 47 n.1, 395 A.2d at 133 n.1.
25. Id. at 44, 395 A.2d at 132. The contract of sale entered into on October 10, 1972,
between Rinaldi and Fulton (on behalf of the nonexistent limited partnership) and the
Joint Venture, provided that if the Limited Partnership failed to proceed to settlement, the
Joint Venture would retain the $10,000 deposit as liquidated damages. Record Extract at
366-68.
26. 284 Md. at 44-45, 395 A.2d at 132.
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limited partners, notify them of the changes, and obtain their consent."27 The
attorney revised the agreement and certificate so that each limited partner,
instead of being liable for an additional capital contribution of $15,298, as
provided in the original documents, was liable for four percent of all principal
and interest payments on the mortgages on the partnership property,'
estimated at $22,425 per unit.2 He also removed the mortgage payment
schedule that had been attached to the original limited partnership agreement
and attached the instruments of execution, which had been signed by the limited
partners in connection with the original agreement and certificate, to the
revised documents.
3 0
On the basis of these revised documents, Fulton and Rinaldi went to
settlement on March 22, 1973. Counsel for the Limited Partnership, Commercial
Credit, and the Joint Venture were present. It appears that neither counsel for
Commercial Credit nor the Joint Venture closely examined the partnership
documents, and they were not informed that the original documents had been
revised." The amended certificate of limited partnership was recorded after the
settlement was concluded. 3
When the Limited Partnership's attorney became aware3 3 that Fulton had
never notified the limited partners of the revisions in the limited partnership
agreement and certificate, he prepared a document styled "Notice to Limited
Partners of Right to Rescind Limited Partnership Subscription of Seventy-Sixth
Street Limited Partnership and of Right to Receive Refund of Limited
Partnership Capital" (the Notice)3 ' and sent it to the limited partners. In the
Notice the limited partners were advised of changes in the distribution of the
profits and losses, the increase in the capital contribution per unit, and the
removal of Exhibit "A," the mortgage payment schedule, from the agreement.3 1
It also contained an offer by the general partners to refund the initial capital
contributions by purchasing each limited partner's interest in the Limited
27. Id. at 45, 395 A.2d at 132.
28. See id.
29. Id. at 46, 395 A.2d at 133.
30. Id. at 45, 395 A.2d at 132. All references to Schedule "A" were deleted in the
revised Limited Partnership agreement. Compare Record Extract at 377 with id. at 37.
The only other change involved distribution of the profits and losses of the unsold shares to
the general partners. Compare id. at 379 with id. at 39. The instruments of execution
remained unchanged and thus still made reference to Exhibit "A," the mortgage payment
schedule. See id. at 49-53, 408-12. The certificates were revised to reflect the changes
made in the limited partnership agreement. See id. at 55-56.
31. 284 Md. at 45, 395 A.2d at 132.
32. Id. at 46, 395 A.2d at 132.
33. He became aware of Fulton's failure to act shortly after settlement. Id.
34. Id.
35. Record Extract at 65-66. Noticeably absent from the Notice was any indication
that the revised documents, not the originals, had been used at settlement, and that the
revised certificate, not the original, had been recorded.
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Partnership pursuant to the terms of the limited partnership agreement." Each
limited partner was requested to respond to the offer in writing, electing either
to rescind or not to rescind. Appellees Anthony and Christ rescinded purchase of
the unit they owned in common, but Anthony decided not to rescind as to the
unit he owned individually. Appellee Hammond rescinded purchase of his
one-half unit, but appellee Weiss never made the election because he did not
receive the Notice.37 Neither the agreement nor the recorded certificate was
amended to reflect the events described above, and none of the Limited
Partnership's creditors were notified. 8
One year after the settlement, Fulton and Rinaldi defaulted on their
contract to purchase the land from the Limited Partnership, and the Limited
Partnership, being severely undercapitalized, defaulted on its mortgages.
Commercial Credit foreclosed and obtained a deficiency decree for $100,372; the
Joint Venture recovered nothing on its second mortgage.39 Gerald Klein was
appointed receiver for the Limited Partnership, and he filed suit against the
limited partners on the basis of the revised limited partnership agreement and
certificate to recover the amounts of their initial capital contributions that had
been returned and to enforce the limited partners' alleged obligations to
contribute four percent of the mortgage debt per unit owned." It was not until
the trial that Klein learned of the alteration of the limited partnership
documents, and hence of the existence of the original documents. His motion to
exclude the original documents, on the ground that the appellees had not
apprised him of their existence in answering his interrogatories, was denied.4'
The trial court held that Weiss, Hammond, Anthony, and Christ were not liable
to the receiver because the material alteration of the partnership documents,
substantially increasing the financial risk of each limited partner, rendered
those documents void. It ruled that the alteration of the documents, without the
knowledge and consent of the limited partners, constituted a fraud upon them.
Alternatively, the court held that the existence of the Limited Partnership was
predicated on the sale of all twenty-five units; because only seven units had been
sold, no limited partnership was formed.3 Klein appealed this decision to the
Court of Special Appeals, and the Court of Appeals granted certiorari prior to
decision by the lower appellate court.
36. Id. at 66. Paragraph 26 of both the original and revised agreements provided, "No
Limited Partner may sell, transfer or assign his interest in the Limited Partnership
without the written consent of the General Partner." Id. at 44, 427. An offer to buy,
tendered by the general partners and accepted by a limited partner, would not violate this
provision of the limited partnership agreement.
37. 284 Md. at 46, 395 A.2d at 133. The capital contributions of the limited partners
who elected to rescind were returned to them. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 46-47, 395 A.2d at 133.
40. See id. at 47, 395 A.2d at 133.
41. Id. This ruling was upheld on appeal. See note 43 and accompanying text infra.
42. 284 Md. at 48-49, 395 A.2d at 133-34.
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In an opinion by Chief Judge Murphy, the Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the trial court, holding that (1) the trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in admitting evidence of the original limited partnership certificate
and agreement;' 3 (2) the sale of all twenty-five limited partnership units was not
a precondition to the limited partners' liability;"4 (3) the failure of the general
partners to make calls upon the limited partners for additional capital
contributions, even though the calls were contemplated by the limited partner-
ship agreement and certificate, did not defeat the right of the receiver to recover
the unpaid stated capital contributions of the limited partners;" (4) the general
partners who acted on behalf of the limited partners possessed only the
authority actually delegated by the express consent of the limited partners; 6 (5)
the delegation of authority to the general partners to handle partnership
documents was not a sufficient act or manifestation by the limited partners to
third parties so as to clothe the general partners with apparent authority to
alter those documents; 7 (6) the Limited Partnership's attorney was not an agent
of the limited partners;" (7) the limited partners were not bound by the terms of
the recorded certificate, which contained false statements, merely because it was
recorded; 9 (8) because of the unauthorized changes made in the Limited
Partnership's certificate by the general partners, the recording of the Limited
Partnership's certificate failed to comply with the good faith requirements of
section 10-102(b) 5° of the Maryland Uniform Limited Partnership Act (MUL-
PA),91 and therefore no limited partnership was created under the statute;52 (9)
mere notice to a limited partner of the particular changes to the partnership
documents made by the general partners did not constitute sufficiently full and
complete information so as to support a subsequent ratification of those changes
by the limited partners;' and (10) the estoppel provisions' of the Maryland
43. Id. at 54, 395 A.2d at 137. It is somewhat doubtful that resolution of this issue
was necessary to the court's decision. As the court recognized, id. at 56, 395 A.2d at 138,
because the case was remanded Klein suffered no prejudice from the admission into
evidence of the original documents; he would have ample time to familiarize himself with
them before a second trial.
44. Id. at 56, 395 A.2d at 138.
45. Id. at 58-59, 395 A.2d at 139.
46. Id. at 60-61, 395 A.2d at 140. "We hold that the general partners did not have the
actual authority to revise the partnership certificate and agreement absent the express
consent of the limited partners." Id.
47. See id. at 61, 395 A.2d at 140.
48. Id. at 62, 395 A.2d at 141.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 65, 395 A.2d at 142.
51. MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 10-101 to -129 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1979). The
statute in force at the time Klein was decided is identical in all material respects to the
present version.
52. 284 Md. at 65, 395 A.2d at 142.
53. Id. at 66 n.4, 395 A.2d at 143 n.4.
54. MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 9-308, -702(b) (1975).
MARYLAND UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT
Uniform Partnership Act (MUPA)M are applicable to limited partnerships by
virtue of section 9-101(f) of the MUPA.6 In light of the evidence of the
alteration of the original documents adduced at trial, the Court of Appeals
remanded the case to the trial court to afford the receiver an opportunity to
establish the limited partners' liability "for an amount equal to their capital
contributions under any contract, estoppel, or other theory of liability arising
from [their] execution of the partnership documents." 57
THE MARYLAND UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT
The MULPA is identical in all material respects to the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act (ULPA),5M which was adopted by the Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws in 1916.1' Limited partnership statutes prior to the
ULPA took the approach that limited partners were general partners who
secured limited liability by strict compliance with the requirements for
recording a limited partnership certificate.' This approach exposed a limited
partner to the risk of becoming a general partner whenever the limited
partnership certificate contained a false statement, regardless of whether the
limited partner knew of the false statement or whether a creditor in fact relied
on that false statement.6 The ULPA had a different philosophy. It was believed
that the way to attain the policy underlying the ULPA - the encouragement of
investment - was to distinguish clearly the liabilities of limited partners from
those of general partners and to establish that limited partners were more in
the nature of contributors or investors than general partners.62 Hence, under the
ULPA limited partners could be held liable to the extent of their knowledge of
false statements in a certificate, but did not become general partners because of
some technical flaw in the recorded certificate.n
55. Id. §§ 9-101 to -703.
56. 284 Md. at 66, 395 A.2d at 143.
57. 284 Md. at 68, 395 A.2d at 144. The remand was made in accordance with MD.
R.P. 871(a). It is unclear from the court's opinion whether the receiver was asserting the
rights of the Limited Partnership or the creditors against the limited partners. The court
framed the issue in the case as "whether the receiver of the Limited Partnership,
appointed on behalf of creditors, may enforce agreements executed by the limited partners
for capital contributions to the Limited Partnership." 284 Md. at 40, 395 A.2d at 129.
Because creditors, or a receiver asserting their rights, may not be able to sue limited
partners directly to retrieve capital contributions, see note 181 infra, the court's suggestion
that the receiver could recover the capital contributions on remand indicates that the
receiver may have been asserting the rights of the Limited Partnership against the limited
partners.
58. See 284 Md. at 51-52, 395 A.2d at 135.
59. See Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 715
(1917).
60. Id. at 724.
61. Id. at 720-21.
62. See 2 R. ROWLEY & D. SIvE, ROWLEY ON PARTNERSHIP § 53.0 (2d ed. 1960).
63. See UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1, comment.
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Prior to the adoption of the MULPA, Maryland limited partnership law was
similar to the pre-ULPA law discussed above.4 The MULPA, adopted in 1918,5
gave limited partners substantial protection against the risk of becoming
general partners and thus being subject to liability beyond their investments.'
It appears that the policies leading to the adoption of the MULPA were precisely
those that were sought to be furthered by the ULPA.6 Under the MULPA, a
limited partnership consists of one or more general partners and one or more
limited partners." The general partners are "subject to all the restrictions and
liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners,"69 while the
limited partners are not "bound by the obligations of the partnership."7
Generally, limited partners are liable only to the partnership,7 and then
only for the amount of their contributions stated in the certificate of partnership
as having been made or due at some definable future time. 2 This rule, however,
has exceptions. A limited partner will become liable as a general partner if he
takes part in the control of the business73 or if his surname appears in the
partnership name and creditors "extend credit to the partnership without actual
knowledge that he is not a general partner."74 Also, if the limited partner signs
the certificate of limited partnership with knowledge75 that it contains a false
64. See, e.g., Lineweaver v. Slagle, 64 Md. 465, 482, 2 A. 693, 695 (1886) (limited
partnership provisions of the Maryland code interpreted as holding a limited partner liable
as a general partner when the recorded certificate contained a false statement).
65. Ch. 280, 1918 Md. Laws 664.
66. See, e.g., Gilman Paint & Varnish Co. v. Legum, 197 Md. 665, 669-74, 80 A.2d
906, 908-10 (1951) (under MULPA failure to form a limited partnership does not
automatically convert limited partners to general partners).
67. Id. at 670, 80 A.2d at 908.
68. MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 10-101 (1975).
69. Id. § 10-108.
70. Id. § 10-101.
71. Id. § 10-116.
72. Id. § 10-116(a).
73. Id. § 10-106(b)(1). What constitutes "taking part in the control of the business" is
an oft-litigated issue, that is necessarily determined on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g.,
Gilman Paint & Varnish Co. v. Legum, 197 Md. 665, 676-77, 80 A.2d 906, 911-12 (1951);
56 MiCH. L. REV. 285, 286 (1957). See generally Filesi v. United States, 352 F.2d 339 (4th
Cir. 1965); Donroy, Ltd. v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Cal. 1961), affd, 301 F. 2d
200 (9th Cir. 1962); Russell v. Warner, 96 Cal. App. 2d 986, 217 P.2d 43 (1950); Millard v.
Newmark & Co., 24 A.D.2d 333, 266 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1966); S. Rowley, The Influence of
Control in the Determination of Partnership Liability, 26 Mici. L. REV. 290 (1928).
74. MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 10-106(b)(2) (1975). However, the limited
partner will not become liable as a general partner if his surname is also the surname of a
general partner or the business had been carried on under a name of which the limited
partner's surname was a part prior to the time that person became a limited partner. Id.
§ 10-105.
75. "Knowledge" in this context means either actual knowledge or "knowledge of such
other facts as in the circumstances shows bad faith." Id. § 9-102(a). This section, part of
the MUPA, is applicable to the MULPA by virtue of MUPA § 9-101(f), which states:
"IT)his title shall apply to limited partnerships except insofar as the statutes relating to
such partnerships are inconsistent with this title."
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statement, or subsequently learns of a false statement in the certificate prior to
a third party's action in reliance on that statement but takes no action to correct
the certificate, he is liable to any third party who suffers a loss in reliance on
that statement." A person who erroneously believes himself to be a limited
partner does not become a general partner by virtue of the exercise of his rights
as a limited partner, "provided that on ascertaining the mistake he promptly
renounces his interest in the profits of the business, or other compensation by
way of income."" A limited partner can be liable to the partnership for more
than simply capital contributions not yet made. Under the MULPA, if a limited
partner has otherwise properly received a return of his contribution, he is still
liable to the partnership for that portion of the return "necessary to discharge
[the partnership's] liabilities to all creditors who extended credit or whose
claims arose before the return.""8
FULL SUBSCRIPTION AS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO THE
FORMATION OF A LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
In Klein the Court of Appeals held that the failure of the general partners to
sell all twenty-five limited partnership units did not prevent a limited
partnership from being formed and did not release the Limited Partnership
subscribers from their contractual obligations, 9 In rejecting the trial court's
conclusion that full subscription was a precondition to formation of the Limited
Partnership, the court examined the language of both the partnership agree-
ment and the certificate. Although the general partners may have contemplated
full subscription, and needed the capital that would have been generated by the
sale of all twenty-five units in order to meet their contractual obligation to the
Joint Venture, the court noted, "nothing in the partnership documents - the
agreement or the certificate - calls for the sale of all 25 units as a contractual
precondition to the formation of the Limited Partnership."' With regard to the
limited partners' obligations to make their initial capital contributions, the
court pointed out that the partnership agreement referred to limited partners
"additional" to those executing the agreement and also provided that the
76. Id. § 10-106(a) (1975).
77. Id. § 10-110.
78. Id. § 10-116(d).
79. 284 Md. at 56, 395 A.2d at 138.
80. Id. at 57, 395 A.2d at 138. Even if a precondition to formation existed on the
partnership certificate, it would appear that recordation of the certificate would result in
formation of a limited partnership, as long as the requirements of § 10-102 were fulfilled,
whether or not the stated condition had been met. See MD. CORP. & Ass'NS CODE ANN.
§ 10-102 (1975). Conditions regarding a limited partner's obligation to make initial or
additional capital contributions, however, probably would be given effect if they appeared
on the certificate. Thus, even if a limited partnership was formed, a limited partner would
not become liable for his capital contribution until the stated precondition to liability was
fulfilled.
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partnership would commence when the agreement was executed.8' Each limited
partner, therefore, became obligated to make his initial capital contribution on
the date that the partnership agreement was executed. 2
The court also decided that full subscription was not a precondition to each
limited partner's obligation to make additional capital contributions. The
amount of each limited partner's future contributions had been calculated
originally on the basis of twenty-five units, but neither the partnership
agreement nor the certificate, original or revised, described full subscription as a
precondition to payment of additional capital contributions.83 Section 10-
102(a)(7) of the MULPA 4 was interpreted by the court as requiring that
conditions regarding additional capital contributions be contained in the
partnership certificate,85 and no such condition was contained in the revised
certificate recorded by Fulton. Noting that one purpose of the MULPA recording
requirement was to acquaint third parties with the capital structure of a limited
partnership, the court refused "to give effect to alleged conditions not set out in,
or at variance with, the certificate and partnership agreement."86
Klein is in accord with Peerless Mills, Inc. v. American Telephone and
Telegraph Co.,87 apparently the only other case to treat the issue, in which the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to imply full
subscription as a condition precedent to the liability of a limited partner in the
absence of express contractual language. Peerless had loaned one Cohn 2,000
shares of AT&T stock, to be used as Cohn's capital contribution on becoming a
general partner in a securities firm organized as a limited partnership. Peerless
alleged that Cohn never became a partner because nineteen others originally
intended to be partners did not sign the partnership agreement.8" As a result,
Peerless contended, the stock had been wrongfully converted by the securities
81. 284 Md. at 57, 395 A.2d at 138.
82. Id. All of the appellees involved in Klein had signed the instruments of execution
by March 15, 1973. Id. at 44, 395 A.2d at 131.
83. Id. at 57, 395 A.2d at 138.
84. Section 10-102 of the MULPA enumerates the information that must be
contained in a partnership certificate, and § 10-102(a)(7) provides that a certificate should
list "[tlhe additional contributions, if any, agreed to be made by each limited partner and
the times at which or events on the happening of which they shall be made," MD. CORP. &
ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 10-102(a)(7) (1975).
85. 284 Md. at 57, 395 A.2d at 138.
86. Id. At common law, there was a presumption that full subscription was a
precondition to liability on the part of all preincorporation subscribers to the stock of a
corporation. See Wright v. Lewis, 161 Md. 674, 681, 158 A. 704, 707 (1932). This
presumption was abrogated with regard to corporations by § 2-202 of the Maryland
Corporation Code, which in part provides: "Unless the subscription agreement providcs
otherwise, a subscription is not void or unenforceable solely because less than all of the
authorized stock is subscribed for." MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CoDE ANN. § 2-202(b) (1975). In
Klein the court refused to extend the common law presumption with respect to
corporations to limited partnerships. 284 Md. at 58, 395 A.2d at 138-39.
87. 527 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1975).
88. Id. at 448.
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firm; it brought suit to compel AT&T to issue a certificate for the 2,000 shares in
Peerless' name. 9 The Second Circuit found "no evidence which would indicate
that Cohn ever made it a condition to his becoming a partner that. . . anyone
else would also become partners."' In the absence of evidence of this alleged
precondition, the court affirmed the lower court's holding that the fact that
nineteen others did not become partners did not negate Cohn's having become a
partner." The Peerless court did not limit its search for preconditions to the
establishment of a limited partnership and the resultant liability to the
language of the limited partnership certificate. It relied on Cohn's own
testimony that he did not condition his contribution on anyone else becoming a
partner.'
It is unclear from the Klein opinion what type of evidence Maryland courts
should consider in determining the existence of preconditions to enforceable
limited partnership obligations. The court examined both the partnership
agreement and the certificate before concluding that full subscription was not a
precondition to liability of the limited partners." Certain language in the
opinion, however, suggests that the court might not give effect to any
precondition that is not contained in the recorded partnership certificate. The
court stated that "the certificate . . . did not contain any condition with respect
to the obligation of the limited partners to make additional contributions, as
required by § 10-102(a)(7) of the [MULPA], if any such conditions were to be
imposed."9 This language suggests that the court interpreted section 10-
102(a)(7) as requiring all conditions that would defeat the obligation of a limited
partner to make additional capital contributions to appear on the certificate.
This interpretation finds support in the court's statement that "the purpose of
recording the partnership certificate is to acquaint third persons dealing with
the partnership with its essential features, including its capital structure."95 The
certificate puts third parties on notice of the capital available to the limited
89. Id. The securities firm sold the 2,000 shares contributed by Cohn on the open
market. Shortly before he left the firm, Cohn caused 2,000 shares of AT&T stock to be
transferred from the firm's name to Peerless' name. Peerless then advised AT&T to enter a
stop transfer order on these 2,000 shares. After the securities firm discovered the
unauthorized transfer, it suspended Cohn and requested AT&T to retransfer the 2,000
shares back to it. AT&T did so. Peerless, after unsuccessfully seeking to have AT&T
retransfer the stock, sued AT&T for a judgment directing AT&T to issue 2,000 shares of
AT&T stock to Peerless. Peerless lost in the trial court, and appealed to the Second
Circuit. Id. at 447-48.
90. Id. at 448. Cohn testified that he did not take into account the potential limited
partners when he made his contribution. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 448. Cf. Bencoe v. Bencoe, 62 N.M. 95, 99, 305 P.2d 370, 373 (1960)
(agreement to form a limited partnership held not enforceable on the alternative grounds
of lack of consideration and failure to comply with two preconditions to formation).
93. See notes 79 to 86 and accompanying text supra.
94. 284 Md. at 57, 395 A.2d at 138.
95. Id. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 15 Ariz. App. 333, 488 P.2d 689, 695 (1971); Tiburon
Nat'l Bank v. Wagner, 265 Cal. App. 2d 868, 874-75, 71 Cal. Rptr. 832, 837-38 (1968).
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partnership and enables them to make informed decisions in reliance on the
stated capital structure of the limited partnership. 6 Thus, the court's emphasis
on the notice aspect of the MULPA indicates that at least when the rights of
third party creditors are involved, preconditions to additional capital contribu-
tions by the limited partners must be contained in the partnership certificate.
It is possible that the court will look beyond the partnership certificate in a
case involving only parties to the partnership agreement when deciding whether
to give effect to an alleged precondition to a limited partner's obligation to make
capital contributions that does not appear in the certificate. This would be
consistent with the court's emphasis on the certificate's serving as notice to third
parties of the capital structure of the limited partnership, as well as with the
approach to section 10-102(a)(7) taken in Solomont v. Polk Development Co., 7 a
California district court of appeal opinion, which appears to be the only other
case on point. The court of appeal considered evidence of financial transactions
by the limited partners extrinsic to the limited partnership agreement and
certificate and occurring during the ten-month period between the execution and
the recordation of the certificate, in finding that at the time the parties signed
the agreement they had no present intent to form a partnership."
THE EFFECT OF THE FAILURE OF THE GENERAL
PARTNERS TO MAKE CALLS FOR ADDITIONAL
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS
The court reemphasized that a primary function of the recorded certificate
of limited partnership is to give third party creditors notice of the financial
structure of the limited. partnership when it held, by analogy to suits by
receivers of insolvent corporations, that the failure of a general partner to make
calls for additional contributions, even when contemplated by the limited
partnership documents, does not defeat the right of the receiver of the limited
partnership to enforce the limited partners' unpaid capital obligations as stated
in the certificate." The corollary of this proposition is that even when the
96. The court's statement that "to give effect to alleged conditions not set out in, or at
variance with, the certificate and partnership agreement is to fatally undermine the
operation of the [MULPAI," 284 Md. at 57, 395 A.2d at 138 (emphasis supplied), should not
be viewed as a qualification of its apparent interpretation of § 10-102 (a) (7). The capital
contribution provisions in Klein were identical in the certificate and the agreement,
compare Record Extract at 37 with id. at 55 and id. at 377 with id. at 391, and the court
employed the conjunctive form in stating "the certificate and partnership agreement,"
rather than the alternative form, "or partnership agreement," see 284 Md. at 57, 395 A.2d
at 138.
97. 245 Cal. App. 2d 488, 54 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1966).
98. Id. at 496, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 27. The court observed that "where the parties purport
to establish a partnership to engage in business at a future time or upon the happening of
the contingency, the partnership does not come into being until the time specified or until
the contingency is removed." Id. The fact that the partnership was to come into being at a
future time was not stated in the certificate, but was deduced by the court from the
conduct of partnership affairs. Id.
99. 284 Md. at 58-59, 395 A.2d at 139.
610 [VOL. 39
MARYLAND UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT
limited partners, relying on a provision in the certificate requiring a call for
additional capital contributions, believe in good faith that they are no longer
obligated to make the additional contributions, that duty still exists.1R
Both the original and revised limited partnership agreements and certifi-
cates in Klein provided that a mortgage payment schedule would be furnished to
the limited partners and that the limited partners would be notified ninety days
prior to the due date of the first payment.'' Despite these provisions, the general
partners never notified the limited partners that their additional contributions
were due, thus failing to make a call for additional capital contributions. In
Wright v. Lewis, 2 a case cited by the Klein court as support,0 3 the trustee in
bankruptcy of an insolvent corporation brought suit against subscribers to the
corporation's stock to compel them to contribute the unpaid portions of the par
value of their stock. The Court of Appeals held that because the subscribers'
liability was fixed at the time of subscription"° the failure of the corporation to
make calls did not affect the shareholders' liability to third parties."2 The
extension of this rule to limited partnerships is consistent with the Court of
Appeals' and the MULPA's emphasis on the certificate's serving as notice to
third parties of the financial position of that limited partnership. Third party
creditors have no control over the actions of the general partners. In the scheme
of the MULPA, the creditors should be, and under this holding probably are,
entitled to rely on the limited partners' obligations as stated in the recorded
certificate."
100. A limited partnership is formed only when there has been a "substantial
compliance in good faith" with MULPA § 10-102(a)'s requirement that a certificate be
recorded. MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 10-102(b) (1975). Bearing in mind that a
primary purpose of the recorded certificate is to give third party creditors notice of the
financial structure of the limited partnership, it would appear that good faith would
encompass the proposition that the stated obligations of limited partners are not to be
defeated by virtue of technical noncompliance with the provisions of the certificate that
protect the limited partners rather than the creditors. For a discussion of the good faith
requirement under MULPA, see notes 160 to 170 and accompanying text infra.
101. Record Extract at 37, 55, 377, 391.
102. 161 Md. 674, 158 A. 704 (1932).
103. 284 Md. at 59, 395 A.2d at 139.
104. 161 Md. at 680, 158 A. at 706-07.
105. Id. at 685, 158 A. at 708. A similar result was reached in Crawford v. Rohrer, 59
Md. 599 (1883), in which the court, invoking the so-called trust fund doctrine, found that
shareholders hold their unpaid subscriptions to the capital of the corporation as a trust
fund for the benefit of the corporation's general creditors. Id. at 604. See also Goldstein v.
Leitch, 142 Md. 184, 187-88, 120 A. 369, 370-71 (1923). These rules were codified in 1951.
Act of March 21, 1951, ch. 135, § 27, 1951 Md. Laws 268. The statute currently provides:
"A stockholder or subscriber for stock of a corporation is not obligated to the corporation or
its creditors with respect to the stock, except to the extent that: (1) The subscription price
or other agreed consideration for the stock has not been paid . MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns
CODE ANN. § 2-215(a)(1) (1975).
106. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
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While this holding of Klein clarifies the MULPA when the rights of third
party creditors are involved, it leaves open the question whether the same result
would follow when only the rights of the parties inter sese are involved. In
addition, it is unclear what other types of conditions, which are stated in the
certificate and of which the creditors are aware, will be deemed relevant to
enforcement of obligations of limited partners.07
AGENCY AND THE EFFECT OF RECORDATION
The Court of Appeals held that the limited partners were not bound by the
terms of the altered, recorded certificate.'0 This holding was based on four
alternative grounds: (1) the general partners did not have actual authority to
revise the certificate on behalf of the limited partners; n (2) the general partners
did not have apparent authority to revise the certificate;"' (3) the Limited
Partnership's attorney, who was an agent of the general partners and of the
Limited Partnership, was not the agent of the limited partners;"' and (4) the
limited partners were not bound by the recorded partnership certificate, which
contained false statements, merely because it was recorded."'
Klein argued that the limited partners were bound by the terms of the
recorded certificate on the alternative grounds that the general partners, as well
as the Limited Partnership's attorney,"' were agents of the limited partners
generally and therefore possessed actual authority to revise and record the
certificate and that the partnership agreement gave them actual authority to
revise the certificate.14 The court rejected this contention, reasoning that
because a limited partner is an investor rather than a partner or a principal,"5
and because a fiduciary relationship exists between the general and the limited
partners in a limited partnership,"" "the principal-agent relationship which
107. It is unlikely that the court would hold the limited partners liable if the rights of
third parties were not involved. See, e.g., Dycus v. Belco Industries, Inc., 569 P.2d 553
(Okla. Ct. App. 1977), in which the Court of Appeals of Oklahoma concluded that Belco, a
general and a limited partner, had waived its right to enforce a call for additional capital
contributions to the limited partners when (1) Belco itself had failed to respond and (2)
Belco had not insisted that Dycus respond until after Dycus instituted suit. Id. at 557. The
Oklahoma court's refusal to enforce the call did not affect the rights of third party
creditors.
108. 284 Md. at 60-62, 395 A.2d at 140-41.
109. Id. at 60-61, 395 A.2d at 140.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 62, 395 A.2d at 141.
113. See notes 147 to 150 and accompanying text infra.
114. Brief for Appellant at 25.
115. 284 Md. at 59, 395 A.2d at 139.
116. Id. See MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 9-404 (1975) (as applied to limited
partnership through §§ 9-101(f) and 10-108). One court has held that limited partners
may assert breach of this fiduciary duty as a defense against a third party who dealt with
the limited partnership through a general partner and had actual knowledge that the
general partner was acting in violation of his fiduciary duty. Chemical Bank v.
Ashenburg, 94 Misc. 2d 64, 67-68, 405 N.Y.S.2d 175, 178-79 (1978).
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exists between the parties of an ordinary partnership is not per se present
between general and limited partners in a limited partnership."..7 The mere
existence of a limited partner-general partner relationship is not sufficient to
establish a principal-agent relationship. Relying on the presumption that
"authority not specifically delegated in the limited partnership agreement to
general partners is presumed to be withheld, " '8 the court examined the
partnership agreement and found that the limited partners had not granted the
general partners the actual authority to revise the certificate."' The court
observed that this result would be consistent with section 10-108 of the
MULPA,' 2° which delineates the rights and powers of general partners.
The question whether the limited partners had given the general partners
actual authority to revise the certificate turned on the interpretation of the
following clause in the partnership agreement, which vested the general
partners with power and authority, on behalf of the limited partners, to:
execute, swear to, acknowledge, deliver, file and record in the appropriate
public offices (1) all certificates, and other instruments . . . which the
General Partner deems appropriate to qualify or continue the Partnership
as a Limited Partnership in jurisdictions in which the Partnership may
conduct business, [and] (2) all instruments which the General Partner
117. 284 Md. at 59, 395 A.2d at 139. The court's conclusion is in accord with those
jurisdictions that view a limited partnership, a creature of statute, as more closely related
to a corporation than to a general partnership. See Klebanow v. New York Produce Exch.,
344 F.2d 294, 297-98 (2d Cir. 1965); Miller v. Schweickart, 405 F. Supp. 366, 369
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lynn v. Cohen, 359 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). But see Donroy,
Ltd. v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 54, 59 (N.D. Cal. 1961), affd, 301 F.2d 200 (9th Cir.
1962).
118. 284 Md. at 60, 395 A.2d at 139.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 60, 395 A.2d at 140. Section 10-108 of the MULPA provides, in pertinent
part:
A general partner shall have all the rights and powers and be subject to all the
restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners,
except that without the written consent or ratification of the specific act by all the
limited partners, a general partner or all of the general partners have no authority to:
(1) Do any act in contravention of the certificate ....
MD. CORP. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 10-108(1) (1975). To determine the rights, powers,
restrictions, and liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners,
reference must be made to § 9-301 of the MUPA, which provides, in pertinent part: "An
act of a partner which is not apparently for the carrying on of the business of the
partnership in the usual way does not bind the partnership unless authorized by the other
partners." Id. § 9-301(b).
Section 10-108(1) is the only section arguably related to the court's statement
concerning consistency. By linking agency principles to § 10-108 of the MULPA in this
manner, the court seemed to imply that for a general partner to exert any authority not
specifically delegated in the limited partnership certificate would be tantamount to doing
an act in violation of the certificate, which is prohibited by that section of the MULPA, see
id. § 10-108(1).
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deems appropriate to effect a change or modification of the Partnership in
accordance with the terms of this Agreement .... "I
Ostensibly, the court strictly construed this clause. 2' The court's opinion,
however, virtually ignores the language of the clause, and simply states in
conclusory terms that the limited partners did not give the general partners
power, as agents of the limited partners, to revise unilaterally the partnership
documents. ' In the absence of an express delegation, and in light of the court's
ruling that a principal-agent relationship is not per se present between the
general and limited partners in a limited partnership, the court concluded that
the general partners were not possessed of actual authority to revise unilateral-
ly the Limited Partnership documents.TM
Before evaluating the effect of the power of attorney clause, the court
reviewed United States v. Mansion House Center North Redevelopment Co.,' in
which a federal district court interpreted a power of attorney clause similar to
that in Klein as delegating only ministerial, not discretionary, functions to the
general partners of a limited partnership. The clause gave the general partners
the authority, on behalf of the limited partners, "to make, execute, acknowledge
and file (i) any and all amendments of the partnership which may be required to
be filed by the Partnership. . . upon the substitution of a new Limited Partner
. . . or the admission of a new General Partner."'26 The agreement also provided
that a person becoming a new general partner by acquiring more than fifty
percent of the interest of any general partner needed the approval, in writing, of
limited partners holding eighty percent of all limited partner interests.' A
general partner attempted to justify his unilateral appointment of a new general
partner, without the written consent of the limited partners, on the power of
attorney clause in the agreement. The court held, however, that the "power of
121. Record Extract at 47, 387. (emphasis added). The court quoted only the language
beginning at (1). 284 Md. at 60, 395 A.2d at 140.
122. The court noted approvingly the general rule that "a power of attorney will be
strictly construed . .. and held to grant only those powers which are clearly delineated."
284 Md. at 61, 395 A.2d at 140. Accord, 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 29 (1976).
123. 284 Md. at 60-61, 395 A.2d at 140. The court's interpretation of the scope of the
power of attorney clause was supported by paragraph 25 of the Limited Partnership
Agreement, which provided: "This Agreement may from time to time be amended upon
written unanimous agreement on [sic] all of the Partners, both General and Limited."
Record Extract at 44, 384. It appears to be the general rule that courts will give full force
and effect to the limited partnership agreement as a contract in determining the authority
delegated to the general partners. See Hammond v. Chastain, 230 Ga. 747, 749-50, 199
S.E.2d 237, 239 (1973); Lanier v. Bowdoin, 282 N.Y. 32, 38, 24 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1939);
Mist Properties, Inc. v. Fitzsimmons Realty Co., 228 N.Y.S.2d 406, 409-10 (1962). In fact,
in another part of its opinion in Klein, the court recognized that "[a] partnership is ... a
contractual relation to which the principles of contract law are fully applicable." 284 Md.
at 63, 395 A.2d at 141.
124. 284 Md. at 60-61, 395 A.2d at 140.
125. 426 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
126, Id. at 481.
127. Id.
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attorney related only to ministerial functions and could not be construed to
extend to the approval of a General Partner."'"
The Klein court relied on Mansion House in concluding that the power of
attorney clause in Klein did not grant the general partners the authority
unilaterally to modify the Limited Partnership documents. The rationale of this
rule would appear to be that limited partners are entitled to know what they are
getting themselves into, and that it would be unfair to bind them to actions of
the general partners that were never agreed upon. In a sense, the court has
placed the risk of unauthorized acts by the general partners on third party
creditors, rather than on the limited partners. The court may be intimating that
the notice function of the requirements of recordation of the certificate is not
always controlling, especially when the court believes it is equitable to afford
some type of protection to the limited partners themselves. Whether this is the
case or not, it appears that in Maryland, in the absence of a per se
principal-agent relationship, a general power of attorney clause of the type
found in Klein will be deemed to grant only ministerial authority to the agent;
delegation of the authority to perform specific discretionary acts must be
express.12a
128. Id.
129. In Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 922, 524 P.2d 233 (1974), the
Washington Supreme Court explained why courts are reluctant to imply consent by
limited partners to the actions of general partners. Id. at 925-28, 524 P.2d at 236-38.
Limited partners are statutorily prohibited from taking part in the control of partnership
affairs. See, e.g., MD. CORP. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 10-106(b)(1) (1975) ("A limited partner
shall not become liable as a general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights
and powers as a limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business."). Therefore,
limited partners must "be able to rely on the highest standard of conduct from the general
partner. Any deviation from this must be clearly stated in terms that would give the
limited partner the option of deciding whether or not, in the first instance, to join the
partnership." 83 Wash. 2d at 928, 524 P.2d at 238.
It is arguable that persons seeking to become limited partners should be charged
with knowledge of all the statutory powers possessed by the general partners. These
powers would include the right to carry on the partnership business, as an agent of the
partnership, in the usual way. MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 3-301(a) (1975). However,
if charged with knowledge of the powers of general partners, limited partners should be
entitled to rely on the statutory obligations of the general partners as well. A general
partner is accountable as a fiduciary, id. § 9-404, and is prohibited from doing any act in
contravention of the limited partnership certificate, id. § 10-108(l). It follows, then, that
when a general partner attempts to do any act that is not within the scope of the carrying
on of the business in the usual way, see id. § 9-301(a); note 120 and accompanying text
supra, he should be found to possess only the authority specifically delegated by the
limited partners in either the partnership agreement or certificate, or, perhaps, in some
extrinsic agreement entered into by the parties. But when a general partner has acted in
an ultra vires manner neither specifically authorized by the limited partners prospectively
nor subsequently ratified, he has acted beyond the scope of his agency and should be held
accountable to the partnership for any profits derived therefrom. Similarly, as in Mansion
House and Klein, when a general partner in a limited partnership has exercised
discretionary authority not specifically delegated by the limited partners, he has acted
outside the scope of his agency, and the action should not bind the limited partners.
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The court also held that the general partners did not have apparent
authority to alter the partnership documents; the limited partners could not be
held liable to third parties on an apparent authority theory.3 0 The court's
discussion of this issue was very brief and conclusory. It first stated the general
apparent authority rule: apparent authority is premised upon some act or
manifestation by the alleged principal to third parties that would be viewed as
legally sufficient to enable the third party justifiably to rely on the power of the
agent to act for the principal."'1
The court applied this rule in Klein by examining the authority actually
delegated to the general partners by the limited partners, rather than on the
acts of the general or limited partners that could have induced reasonable
reliance on the authority of the general partners by third parties. It held that
the general partners did not have apparent authority to alter the partnership
documents.3 ' It appears from the court's reliance on the limited partners'
delegation of actual authority to the general partners that it viewed the limited
partners, rather than the Limited Partnership, as the principal in the apparent
authority situation. This interpretation would explain the court's invocation of
the general rule that authority to alter documents will not ordinarily be implied
from "an agency. . . involving the mere handling of [instruments]"'33 in holding
that the general partners lacked apparent authority to alter the partnership
documents."'
The rule of apparent authority that views the reasonableness of creditors'
reliance on the apparent authority of general partners as determinative was
approved in dicta, but not applied, in Klein.3' In contrast, the Supreme Court of
Washington thoroughly discussed the application of this apparent authority
principle, including its statutory basis, in the context of limited partnership law
in Cummings v. Nordmark.)'
130. 284 Md. at 61, 395 A.2d at 140.
131. See id. This is not a new rule in Maryland. In Reserve Ins. Co. v. Duckett, 240 Md.
591, 214 A.2d 754 (1965), appeal after remand, 249 Md. 108, 238 A.2d 536 (1968), the
Court of Appeals explained:
Although the cases and texts refer both to "apparent authority" and to "agency by
estoppel" there seems to be no clear line of demarcation. Each results from certain acts
or manifestations by the alleged principal made to third parties. It must be reasonable
for the third person dealing with the alleged agent to believe that the agent has
authority to act. The third person must in fact believe that the alleged agent has such
authority, i.e., he must rely upon such acts or manifestations.
Id. at 600, 214 A.2d at 759.
132. 284 Md. at 61, 395 A.2d at 140.
133. Id.
134. See id.; 4 AM. JUR. 2d Alteration of Instruments § 15 (1962).
135. See 284 Md. at 61, 395 A.2d at 140; notes 149 to 150 and accompanying text infra.
136. 73 Wash. 2d 322, 438 P.2d 605 (1968). Washington, like Maryland, has adopted
both the Uniform Partnership Act and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 25.04.010-.430, .08.010-.310 (1969). Thus the statutory basis for the
Washington court's analysis was the same as that in force in Maryland.
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John Nordmark was the sole general partner of a limited partnership. The
certificate of limited partnership described the character of the business as "the
acquisition for investment only, and not for development except for rental
purposes, of real property.' 3 7 Nordmark, acting for the limited partner-
ship, hired the plaintiffs, architects, to design a sports building. The plaintiffs
were not paid for their work and sought recovery for the value of their services
from Nordmark as the general partner of the limited partnership. The court
found that Nordmark, as the general partner, had the apparent authority to
enter into the contract on behalf of the limited partnership and that the
plaintiffs were entitled to rely on that authority.'3 In tracing the statutory basis
for this finding of apparent authority, the court first relied on Washington
Revised Code Annotated (WRCA) section 25.08.090,'"' which states that "[a]
general partner [in a limited partnership] shall have all the rights and powers
and be subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership
without limited partners . "..."140 The court then examined the applicable
partnership law to determine the rights and liabilities of general partners.'4' The
Washington Uniform Partnership article applies "to limited partnerships except
insofar as the statutes relating to such partnerships are inconsistent here-
with.'. 2 WRCA section 25.04.090 provides that "[elvery partner is an agent of
the partnership for the purpose of its business . . . ."I' On the basis of this
statutory authority, the court held that, as the contract in issue was apparently
within the nature of the limited partnership's business, the general partner was
clothed with apparent authority to enter into the disputed contract on behalf of
the partnership.'" The court reaffirmed a principle from one of its earlier
decisions:
So far as third persons who deal with a partner without notice are
concerned, the copartners [and hence, the limited partnership] are bound if
the transaction be such as the public may reasonably conclude is directly
and necessarily embraced within the [limited] partnership business as being
incident or appropriate to such business according to the course and usage of
conducting it. 4 1
Klein could have been evaluated in a similar fashion. If the court had done
so, the question would not have been whether the general partners had
137. 73 Wash. 2d at 322, 438 P.2d at 605 (emphasis supplied).
138. Id. at 325, 438 P.2d at 606-07.
139. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.08.090 (1969). See MD. CORP. & AsS'NS CODE ANN.
§ 10-108 (1975).
140. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.08.090 (1969).
141. 73 Wash. 2d at 324-25, 438 P.2d at 606.
142. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.04.060(3) (1969). See MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.
§ 9-101(f) (1975).
143. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.04.090(1) (1969). See MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.
§ 9-301 (1975).
144. 73 Wash. 2d at 325, 438 P.2d at 606-07.
145. Id. at 324, 438 P.2d at 606 (quoting Merrill v. O'Bryan, 48 Wash. 415, 417-18, 93
P. 917, 918 (1908)).
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authority to revise the partnership documents, but whether the partnership
documents or the general partners led the partnership creditors reasonably to
rely on the authority of the general partners to bind the limited partners. It
appears from the facts that if the creditors had examined the partnership
documents, they would have discovered that the purpose of the Limited
Partnership was to purchase the Joint Venture property and that the general
partners were empowered to mortgage the property to effectuate this purpose.'
These facts seem sufficient at least to raise an inference that the creditors had
cause to reiy on the representations of the general partners, and their authority,
by their acts, to obligate the limited partners.
The Limited Partnership's attorney, not the general partners, was the
individual who actually revised the partnership documents.'47 The court held
that the attorney, admittedly an agent of the general partners and of'the
Limited Partnership, was not an agent of the limited partners.' While the court
gave no rationale for this holding, it appears to rest on the theory that a limited
partnership, like a corporation but unlike a traditional partnership, is a
separate entity distinct from its capital contributors, the limited partners.'
146. See notes 12 & 15 and accompanying text supra.
147. 284 Md. at 46, 395 A.2d at 132.
148. Id. at 62, 395 A.2d at 141.
149. No Maryland case has addressed the question whether a limited partnership is an
entity separate from its members. This question has been answered with respect to general
partnerships, with Maryland courts holding that, in most instances, a partnership is not a
legal entity, separate and distinct from the partners. Therefore, when state law prohibited
a wife from maintaining an action in tort against her husband, and the wife suffered
injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of a partnership of which her husband was a
general partner, the Court of Appeals held that the wife could not maintain a tort action
against the partnership, which did not have a legal identity separate from that of the
partners, including her husband. David v. David, 161 Md. 532, 538, 157 A. 755, 757 (1932).
It appears that the cornerstone of this general rule is the several liability of each partner
for the wrongful act, omission, or breach of trust of any other partner. Id. at 537-38, 157
A. at 757 (1932); MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 9-304 to -307 (1975). This is clearly
distinguishable from the statutory position of a limited partner, who generally is liable
only to the partnership, and then only for the amount of his capital contribution as stated
in the limited partnership certificate Id. § 10-116.
Under certain limited circumstances, however, Maryland treats partnerships as
separate entities, distinct from the partners. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum,
358 F. Supp. 661, 668 (D. Md. 1973) (Maryland law applied in concluding that "for the
purpose of asserting the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination a
partnership has an identity separate and distinct from that of the individual partners.
.. ."); Townsend v. L.J. Appel Sons, Inc., 164 Md. 255, 258, 164 A. 679, 680 (1933) (truck
owned by partnership not subject to attachment to satisfy debt of individual partner, in
accordance with § 25(c), art. 73A of the Code, Uniform Partnership Act (current version at
MD. CORP. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 9-502(b)(3) (1975)).
Although never decided in Maryland, a few cases from other jurisdictions have
addressed the question of the limited partnership as a separate entity. See Amsler v.
American Home Assurance Co., 348 So. 2d 68, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (any duty
which a limited partnership attorney owes to the limited partners is owed to the entire
membership of the partnership; "Florida adopts the common law aggregate theory of
partnerships as opposed to the entity theory" but under ULPA § 26, in a limited
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Under the "separate entity" theory, one who is appointed an agent of the limited
partnership is not per se the agent of the limited partners. Therefore, even
though the attorney acted as the agent of the general partners and of the
Limited Partnership in revising the documents, without the consent of the
limited partners he was not also acting as their agent. If the court had taken the
opposite view, and had treated the Limited Partnership as a partnership with no
legal identity separate from that of its members, including the limited partners,
a different result would have followed. As an agent of the Limited Partnership,
the attorney also would have been the agent of the members of the Limited
Partnership.5'
In accordance with its treatment of the limited partnership as a contractual
relationship between the general and the limited partners, the court held that
under section 10-106 of the MULPA limited partners are not bound by a
partnership, only the general partners can sue to enforce this duty); Chemical Bank v.
Ashenburg, 94 Misc. 2d 64, 67, 405 N.Y.S.2d 175, 178 (1978) (in New York, a limited
partnership, like a partnership, generally is not a legal entity separate from the
individuals composing it). But cf. Kobernick v. Shaw, 70 Cal. App. 3d 914, 918-20, 139
Cal. Rptr. 188, 190-91 (1977) (limited partners, like shareholders of a corporation, can
intervene and/or file cross claims in a lawsuit against the limited partnership despite
ULPA § 26, which states that limited partners are not proper parties).
150. This would depend, of course, on the scope of the apparent authority possessed by
the attorney because of his position as the Limited Partnership's attorney. Reliance by
third parties on the attorney's authority to revise partnership documents, if such reliance
could be proven, might be reasonable under certain circumstances. If the court had taken
the aggregate, as opposed to the separate entity, approach, reasonable reliance on the acts
of the attorney would bind his principals, who would be the limited partners as well as the
general partners and the Limited Partnership.
For cases holding that a partnership is not a legal entity separate and distinct
from the partners, see Battista v. Lebanon Trotting Ass'n, 538 F.2d 111, 116 (6th Cir.
1976) (in contrast to a corporation, which is a separate legal entity apart from its
shareholders, officers, and directors); Reed v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 10 Cal. 2d 191,
192-93, 73 P.2d 1212, 1213 (1937); Millbrae Ass'n for Residential Survival v. Millbrae,
262 Cal. App. 2d 222, 232-33, 69 Cal. Rptr. 251, 259 (1975) (partners can intervene, in
their individual capacities, in a lawsuit involving partnership matters); Magan Medical
Clinic v. California State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 249 Cal. App. 2d 126, 134-36, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 256, 263-64 (1967) (in contrast to a corporation); Scoggins v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
139 Ga. App. 805, 807, 229 S.E.2d 683, 684 (1976) (in contrast to a corporation, which is a
separate legal entity apart from its stockholders); Scott Co. v. Enco Constr. Co., 264 So. 2d
409, 411 (Miss. 1972); Brollier v. Van Alstine, 236 Mo. App. 1233, 163 S.W.2d 109, 112
(1942) (overruled as to workmen's compensation claims in Crall v. Hockman, 460 S.W.2d
668, 672 (Mo. 1970)); Windisch v. Farrow, 159 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942); 501
DeMers, Inc. v. Fink, 148 N.W.2d 820, 824 (N.D. 1967). Some courts weigh the equities
involved in making the "separate entity" determination. E.g., Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co. v. Huddleston, 514 S.W.2d 676, 678 (Ky. 1974); Grober v. Kahn, 47 N.J. 135, 146, 219
A.2d 601, 607 (1966) ("It is true that a partnership is for some purposes an entity separate
and apart from the partners, but . . . the entity concept, which exists to further a just
result, cannot be invoked to achieve an unjust one."). Some courts find that a partnership,
like a corporation, is an entity distinct from the partners. E.g., Morse v. Mayberry, 183
Neb. 89, 157 N.W.2d 881, 883 (1968); Hassen v. Rogers, 123 Okla. 265, 253 P. 72, 74 (1926)
(at least insofar as contract debts are concerned).
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recorded certificate of limited partnership merely because it has been recorded.'
The court recognized that the purpose of the recording requirement is to protect
third parties having dealings with the limited partnership. Balancing this
purpose against the express statutory provisions, however, the court found the
MULPA controlling.' Section 10-106 of the MULPA provides that when:
the certificate [of the limited partnership] contains a false statement, one
who suffers loss by reliance on the statement may hold liable any party to
the certificate who knew the statement to be false:
(a)(1) At the time he signed the certificate; or
(2) Subsequently, but within a sufficient time before the statement was
relied upon to enable him to cancel or amend the certificate, or to file a
petition for its cancellation or amendment as provided in § 10-124 of this
title.5
The court interpreted this section as limiting a limited partner's responsibility
for false statements in the certificate to instances in which the limited partner
knows the statements to be false. Impliedly identifying the revisions to the
partnership documents as the false statements in issue, the court noted that
there was no false statement at the time the limited partners signed the
certificate and no evidence that they became aware of the false statements
before third party reliance on the certificate. Therefore, the limited partners
were not liable for the statements.'
A limited partner is not liable for false statements in a recorded certificate
simply because he knows that the statements are false. The MULPA requires
that third parties rely on the false statement before they can hold the limited
partners liable.'55 Further, the statute does not impose liability on limited
partners if they acquire knowledge of the statement prior to third party reliance
but have insufficient time to cancel or amend the certificate prior to that
reliance.' In Klein the certificate was revised prior to settlement and recorded
151. 284 Md. at 62, 395 A.2d at 141.
152. See id.
153. MD. CORP. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 10-106(a) (1975).
154. 284 Md. at 62, 395 A.2d at 141. The more typical case concerning a limited
partner's liability for false statements in a recorded certificate arises when a limited
partner is aware of a statement in the certificate, and also knows that the statement is
false. For example, in Walraven v. Ramsay, 335 Mich. 331, 55 N.W.2d 853 (1952), cited by
the court in Klein, a limited partner signed a certificate that stated he had contributed his
half interest in certain property to the limited partnership. The agreed value of his
contribution was stated as $25,000. Evidence adduced at trial, however, showed that he
had knowledge at the time he signed the certificate that the actual value of his
contribution was substantially less than the stated amount. The court, proceeding upon
the premise that agreed value means actual value "so far as concerns the rights of third
parties who rely on [the] certificate to their detriment," id. at 337, 55 N.W.2d at 856, held
that the limited partner was liable under Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated § 449.206
(which is identical to § 10-106 of the MULPA) for the full, actual, amount of his stated
contribution, id. at 338, 55 N.W. at 857.
155. MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 10-106 (1975).
156. Id. § 10-106(a).
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after settlement, while the limited partners were not notified of the revisions
until after both settlement and recordation.'57 It is possible, although it does not
appear probable, that the creditors relied on the false statement,"5 but the court
held that the limited partners were not liable for the false statement. In so
holding, the court refrained from implying from the statute a duty on the part of
limited partners to inspect the certificate once recorded to ensure its truthful-
ness. 1 9
THE GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT OF SECTION
10-102 OF THE MULPA
Holding that no limited partnership was formed in Klein, the court ruled
that although there had been substantial compliance with the requirements of
section 10-102(a) of the MULPA, the good faith criteria of section 10-102(b)
had not been met.'60 The court found that the revisions of the certificate to
comport with the restructured financial arrangement substantially altered the
limited partners' obligations. The Joint Venture property was to cost $450,000.
It was expected that a $175,000 down payment would be made at settlement,
and a $265,000 mortgage would be taken on the property. The contract of sale,
which was ratified by the limited partners, provided for forfeiture of the $10,000
down payment as liquidated damages in the event that the Limited Partnership
was unable to settle in accordance with the terms of the contract. In addition,
the original documents limited each limited partner's liability to a $9,000 initial
capital contribution per unit and a maximum additional capital contribution of
$15,298. Having sold only seven units when the time for settlement came, the
general partners opted to revise the partnership documents so as to increase
each limited partner's additional capital contribution to four percent of the total
mortgage debt and, instead of forfeiting the $10,000 deposit, mortgaged the
property for $450,000.16 It was this undercapitalization of the property that the
court determined substantially altered the obligations of the limited partners."
Had the general partners adhered to the original plan they would have forfeited
$10,000, and each limited partner would have been liable for one-seventh of that
amount per unit owned.
The court then considered section 10-102(b) of the MULPA, which provides
that "(a] limited partnership is formed if there has been substantial compliance
in good faith"'" with the fourteen particulars enumerated for inclusion in the
certificate in section 10-102(a) of the MULPA.'" Noting that the substantial
157. See notes 28 to 35 and accompanying text supra.
158. See 284 Md. at 45, 395 A.2d at 132.
159. See note 129 and accompanying text infra.
160. 284 Md. at 65, 395 A.2d at 143; see notes 50 & 51 and accompanying text supra.
161. 284 Md. at 63-64, 395 A.2d at 142.
162. See id. at 64, 395 A.2d at 142.
163. MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 10-102(b) (1975).
164. Id. § 10-102(a). The certificate must state the following: the name of the
partnership; the character of the partnership business; the location of the principal place of
business; the name, residence, and status of each general and limited partner; the term of
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compliance requirement, although closely related, is analytically distinguish-
able from the good faith requirement embodied in section 10-102(b),'6 the court
stated, without discussion, that the recorded certificate was in substantial
compliance with the requirements of section 10-102(a).'" Turning to the good
faith requirement, the court cited Rowley on Partnership for the proposition that
"'persons who sign, swear to, and file for record a certificate which in any
important particular is knowingly false, are not acting in good faith . ..[and
therefore] no limited partnership should be deemed formed thereby,"" 67
Concluding that because the general partners filed the certificate with know-
ledge that it contained a false statement they failed to act with good faith.
Although recognizing that section 10-106 of the MULPA contemplates false
statements in the certificate and sets forth a specific remedy for false
statements," in result-oriented fashion the court determined that the altera-
the partnership; the contribution of each limited partner; the additional contributions, and
conditions precedent to the obligation, of each limited partner; any agreed time for the
return of each limited partner's contribution; each limited partner's share of profits or
other compensation; if given, the right (and the terms and conditions) of a limited partner
to substitute an assignee as contributor in his place; if given, the right of the partners to
admit additional limited partners; if given, the right to priority among limited partners in
return of contributions or compensation; if given, the right of the remaining general
partner to continue the business on the death, retirement, or insanity of a general partner;
and, if given, the right of a limited partner to demand and receive property other than
cash in return for his or her contribution. Id.
165. It is noteworthy that the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, drafted in
1976 and yet to be adopted in any state, does not contain the good faith requirement. See
generally Shapiro, The Need for Limited Partnership Reform: A Revised Uniform Act, 37
MD. L. REV. 544 (1978).
166. 284 Md. at 64, 395 A.2d at 142. The recorded certificate in Klein was composed of
14 numbered paragraphs, each corresponding to a provision of § 10-102(a). Record Extract
at 329-33. It is not clear whether the court found that each paragraph in the certificate
was in substantial compliance with its statutory counterpart, or whether it found that the
certificate as a whole was in substantial compliance. Paragraph IV of the recorded
certificate set forth the names and residences of the general partners. The limited partners
were not identified on the certificate itself. Rather, to determine their identity, one was
directed to the "attached" instruments of execution. Id. at 330. The court impliedly found
that this method of identifying the limited partners was in substantial compliance with
§ 10-102(a)(4). The signatures of the limited partners did not appear on the certificate
itself, but were located on the separate instruments of execution. The court impliedly
found that this, too, was in substantial compliance with § 10-102(a)'s signing requirement.
If that section were interpreted as requiring the limited partners' signature on the face of
the certificate, rather than on an attached instrument of execution, unauthorized
alterations of the type in the instant case would be avoided: The limited partners would
have signed the same document that was used at settlement and that was ultimately
recorded. If that were the case, there would be no question that the limited partners would
be charged with knowledge of and assent to the document they signed.
167. 284 Md. at 65, 395 A.2d at 142 (quoting 2 R. ROWLEY & D. SivE, ROWLEY ON
PARTNERS11IP § 53.2, at 562 (2d ed. 1960)).
168. See notes 153 to 157 and accompanying text supra.
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tions to the certificate "were not mere false statements within the contemplation
of § 10-106(a), but were of such a fundamental character as affected the
formation of the limited partnership itself," and that thus no limited partnership
had been formed.'69
The court's reasoning on this point seems erroneous. The good faith
requirement of section 10-102(b) must refer to the fourteen particulars required
by section 10-102(a). The only one of these fourteen elements that appears to
have been stated incorrectly in the certificate at issue in Klein was the
additional capital contribution of each limited partner. However, in explaining
the alterations that resulted in a substantially different undertaking from that
originally contemplated, the court relied most heavily on the fact that the
capital structure of the Limited Partnership had been changed drastically.
Section 10-102(a) of the MULPA does not require that the certificate explain
the capital structure of the limited partnership. Therefore, it appears that in
reaching its conclusion the court relied on a false statement of a fundamental
nature, but one that was not required to be stated in the certificate. ° A better
approach would have been an acknowledgement by the court that section
10-106 contemplated false statements, and that the false statement regarding
each limited partner's additional capital contribution did not amount to a lack of
good faith under section 10-102. Under this analysis, a limited partnership
would have been formed, thus preserving the limited partners' limited liability,
and the consequences of the false statement would have been determined under
section 10-106.
In holding that a limited partnership had not been formed, the court opened
the door to the possibility of the limited partners being held accountable as a
general partners and assuming personal liability for the debts of the partner-
ship. Under pre-ULPA law limited partners were generally conceived of as
partners who secured limited liability by complying with the statutory
requirements for formation of a limited partnership;' 7' failure to comply
precisely rendered them general partners, personally liable for partnership
debts. A major goal of requiring only substantial compliance with section
10-102(a) was avoidance of the harsh results that followed from faulty
compliance with statutory prescriptions under early limited partnership sta-
tutes.'2 Under the ULPA, therefore, the concept of a limited partner was
169. 284 Md. at 65, 395 A.2d at 142.
170. No other cases have been found that address the failure to comply with the good
faith requirement of § 10-102(b). It has been suggested that good faith, as the term is used
in § 10-1021b), "requires ... that the parties honestly attempt to follow the provisions of
the Act to the end that third persons will have notice of the essential features of the limited
partnership." 2 R. RowI.EY & D. SivE, RoWI.EY ON PARTNERHIIII' § 53.2, at 562 (2d ed. 1960)
(emphasis supplied).
171. See notes 60 to 61 and accompanying text supra.
172. See Kittredge v. Langley, 252 N.Y. 405, 418, 169 N.E. 626, 630 (1930); Official
Comment to § 1 of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 6 U.L.A. 562, 564 (master ed.
1969); Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. R:v. 715, 719-24 (1917);
Comment, Partnerships - Limited - Failure to Comply with Statutes as Basis fkr
Unlimited Liability, 48 Miii. L. R:v. 347 (1950).
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changed and he was viewed as more closely analogous to a corporate investor
than a partner.'73 The failure to comply to the letter with every statutory
prescription did not defeat the formation of the limited partnership. Rather a
limited partnership was formed and the limited partners became liable for
mistakes in formation under the terms of section 11 of the ULPA. 7 4
Formation of a limited partnership will be prevented either by the failure to
record the partnership certificate or recordation of a certificate that does not
substantially comply with the requirements of section 10-102. When third party
rights are involved, the implications of failure of formation depend upon
whether the creditors had actual notice of the information that would or should
have appeared in the certificate. In the absence of such notice, failure to record
results in changing the status of limited partners to that of general partners as
respects the third parties.'75 One court has held that when the limited
partnership certificate was not recorded, but prior to dealing with the limited
partnership creditors had the information that would have been provided in the
certificate had it been recorded, the limited partners did not lose their shield of
limited liability merely because of the failure to record.'76 This result was
predicated on the holding that the limited partnership statute was intended as a
notice statute; because the creditors had notice of the limited partners' status,
general partner liability did not result.'" The "notice" interpretation of the
statute also comes into play when the certificate is recorded, but for some other
reason the limited partnership is not formed. In this situation, the general rule
is that limited partners will not become liable as general partners to third
parties who had notice of their alleged limited partner status.' 8
Notice to the Limited Partnership's creditors was not considered by the
Klein court. The court did note, however, that the "principal function of the
certificate is to give third persons notice of the essential features of the limited
partnership."'7 9 Although the creditors did not have notice of the true amount of
each limited partner's additional capital contributions, it is arguable that this
173. See sources cited in note 172 supra.
174. See Kittredge v. Langley, 252 N.Y. 405, 418, 169 N.E. 626, 630 (1930) (comparing
result under former statute with result under ULPA). Section 11 of the ULPA has been
adopted in Maryland as § 10-110 of the MULPA.
175. Ruth v. Crane, 392 F. Supp. 724, 733 (E.D. Pa. 1975), affd, 564 F.2d 90 (3rd Cir.
1977); Arrow Petroleum Co. v. Ames, 128 Ind. App. 10, 17, 142 N.E.2d 479, 483 (1957);
Atlanta Stove Works, Inc. v. Keel, 255 N.C. 421, 422, 121 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1961) (per
curiam). At least when failure to record is involved, one court has identified a duty on the
part of the limited partners to insure proper recordation. When this duty is breached, the
sanction is imposition of liability as a general partner. Tiburon Nat'l Bank v. Wagner, 265
Cal. App. 2d 868, 877, 71 Cal. Rptr. 832, 837 (1968).
176. Garrett v. Koepke, 569 S.W.2d 568, 569-71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978 .
177. Id.
178. See New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Sloan, 391 F. Supp. 530, 532-33 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Widder v. Leeds, 317 A.2d 32, 37 (Del. 1974); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union
Properties, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 400, 406, 562 P.2d 244, 247 (1977).
179. 284 Md. at 53, 395 A.2d at 136.
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information was not an essential feature of the Limited Partnership. Rather,
notice of the limited partners' status as limited rather than general partners
was the relevant feature. Because the creditors had notice of the limited
partners' actual status,'" it would appear that the limited partners should not,
on remand, be held to have forfeited their limited liability as a result of the
failure of formation.
Under the approach taken by the Klein court, if the receiver was asserting
the creditors' rights in this action, it is possible that due to the failure of
formation the limited partners could be held to the terms of the recorded
certificate on remand, despite the egregious acts of the general partners and the
Limited Partnership's attorney.'8 ' If the receiver was asserting the rights of the
Limited Partnership against the limited partners, on the other hand, it is
arguable that the court's holding regarding the formation of the limited
partnership is actually dicta. As between the parties to the limited partnership
agreement, failure of formation is irrelevant; the parties would be bound by the
terms of the agreement they signed.
RATIFICATION OF THE ALTERATION
In a footnote, the court held that appellee Anthony, who had elected not to
rescind after receiving notice of the alterations to the partnership documents,
had not thereby ratified the alterations.'2 The court stated that even though the
Notice "supplied particularized information with respect to the changes made in
the documents, it did not. . . provide information sufficiently full and complete
to justify a conclusion that Anthony ratified the revised partnership agreement
and certificate."'83 The court did not indicate precisely what facts would have
been necessary to constitute "sufficiently full and complete" information, but it
is apparent upon examination of the Notice' that two relevant facts were
missing. First, in preparing the Notice, the attorney did not disclose that the
revised documents, and not the originals, had been used both at settlement and,
180. Id. at 45, 395 A.2d at 132.
181. That is, if, under MULPA § 10-110, it can be proven that any of the limited
partners, upon learning he was not actually a limited partner, failed to renounce his
interest in the profits of the limited partnership that person may be held to be a general
partner. See Mi). CoRP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 10-110 (1975). It is not clear if the creditors
in Klein would have had standing to sue the limited partners directly. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that creditors can sue limited partners
directly to retrieve capital contributions returned to the limited partners, Donroy, Ltd. v.
United States, 301 F.2d 200, 205 (9th Cir. 1962), while a New York court has held that
only the limited partnership, and not the creditors, can maintain suit against the limited
partners to enforce their stated capital contributions, Bell Sound Studios, Inc. v.
Enneagram Prods. Co., 36 Misc. 2d 879, 880, 234 N.Y.S.2d 12, 13 11962).
182. 284 Md. at 66 n.4, 395 A.2d at 143 n.4.
183. Id. (emphasis supplied).
184. See Record Extract at 65-66.
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presumably, in obtaining the Commercial Credit loan.' Second, the Notice did
not inform the limited partners that it was the revised certificate, and not the
original, that had been recorded. The Notice did, on the other hand, inform the
limited partners that their additional capital contribution had been increased
from a flat $15,298 per unit to four percent of the entire mortgage debt.'86
The general rule is that affirmance by a principal of an agent's act is not a
ratification if the principal is unaware of material facts." 7 Material facts are
defined as "those which substantially affect the existence or extent of the
obligations involved in the transaction.""' Examination of the Notice indicates
that the limited partners were informed of all the alterations that had been
made to the certificate. The only facts missing from the Notice were extrinsic to
the certificate. In holding that the failure to supply the limited partners with
these extrinsic facts defeated Anthony's election not to rescind, therefore, the
court has impliedly imposed a duty on the part of those who have committed
unauthorized acts to make a full disclosure of the consequences of those acts, in
addition to disclosing the unauthorized acts themselves.'89
ORIGINAL TENOR AND ESTOPPEL
After analyzing various provisions of the MULPA, Chief Judge Murphy
remarked that "Itihe Uniform [Limited Partnership] Act does not provide an
explicit rule of law which is ultimately dispositive of this controversy."'90 He also
cited section 10-127 of the MULPA, which provides that "Iiln any case not
provided for in this title the rules of law and equity, including the law merchant,
shall govern,""'9 and section 9-101(f) of the MUPA, which makes the MUPA
applicable to limited partnerships insofar as its application is not inconsistent
with the MULPA 92 On the authority of these statutory provisions, the court
held that the estoppel principles of the MUPA are applicable to the MULPA, 93
and stated the general rule that "there may be a partnership by estoppel as to
third persons, even though the parties are not partners inter se . '. . .'  Having
185. It is unclear whether Commercial Credit examined the partnership documents
before making the loan. The documents were revised on March 21 or 22, 1973, and the
loan was obtained sometime between March 15 and March 22. 284 Md. at 44-45, 395 A.2d
at 132-33.
186. See note 35 and accompanying text supra.
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 91(1) (1957). This has long been the rule in
Maryland. See Atlas Realty Co. v. Galt, 153 Md. 586, 595-96, 139 A. 285, 289 (1927).
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 91(2) (1957).
189. It would have been reasonable for the court to reach the opposite conclusion on the
ground that disclosure of the unauthorized acts put the limited partners on notice that
something was wrong. The court could have placed a duty to inquire on the limited
partners.
190. 284 Md. at 66, 395 A.2d at 143.
191. MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 10-127 (1975).
192. Id. § 9-101(f).
193. Section 9-702(b) of the MUPA provides: "The law of estoppel shall apply under
[the MUPA]." Id. § 9-702(b).
194. 284 Md. at 67, 395 A.2d at 143.
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recognized the applicability of estoppel principles to limited partnerships, and in
light of the fact that the receiver did not learn of the revisions to the partnership
documents until trial, the court remanded the case to afford the receiver the
opportunity "to establish responsibility of the [limited partners] for an amount
equal to their capital contributions under any contract, estoppel, or other theory
of liability arising from the [limited partners'] execution of the partnership
documents."'
Section 9-308 of the MUPA addresses the concept of partner by estoppel.
That section provides:
When a person, by words spoken or written or by conduct, represents
himself, or consents to another representing him to anyone, as a partner in
an existing partnership or with one or more persons not actually partners,
he is liable to any such person to whom the representation has been made,
who has, on the faith of the representation, given credit to the actual or
apparent partnership, and if he has made the representation or consented to
its being made in a public manner he is liable to such person, whether the
representation has or has not been made or communicated to the person so
giving credit by or with the knowledge of the apparent partner making the
representation or consenting to its being made.'"
The receiver argued that the limited partners should, at the very least, be
held liable to the original tenor of the agreements they signed. The court
perceived this to be an estoppel question, which, under MUPA section 9-308,
concerns a holding out to third parties. 9 ' Those third parties can theoretically
hold liable as a partner or a limited partner an alleged principal upon whom
they relied when giving credit."9 However, if the receiver is asserting the rights
of the Limited Partnership, instead of the creditors, against the limited
partners, it is arguable that the estoppel theory is inapplicable. As between the
parties themselves, the limited partners are bound by their agreements unless
on remand the unauthorized revision by the general partners is found to be a
material breach of the partnership agreement. In that case, the general partners
would be unable to enforce the contract.' 99
195. Id. at 68, 395 A.2d at 144. It is not clear whether the court was referring to both
the initial and additional capital contributions or solely the initial capital contributions
when it used the term "capital contributions." In either case, however, it appears that the
court believed that the limited partners could not be held liable as general partners under
any theory that the receiver might advance. The case was remanded in accordance with
MD. R.P. 871(a).
196. MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 9-308(a) (1975).
197. The general rule is that estoppel has two distinct elements: The party "asserting
the benefit of an estoppel must [1] have been misled to his injury and 121 have changed his
position for the worse; having believed and relied on the representations of the party
sought to be estopped." Rubinstein v. Jefferson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 268 Md. 388, 393, 302
A.2d 49, 52 11973).
198. MD. CORP. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 9-308(a) (1975).
199. The breach by the general partners of their contract to repurchase the partnership
property would also have to be given consideration.
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The limited partners might be held liable according to the original tenor of
their agreement under the theory of spoliation. It is said that:
[Ain alteration of an instrument by an agent of a party thereto or of one
claiming thereunder is in legal effect the act of his principal if such
alteration is within the express or implied authority of the agent; otherwise,
it is to be regarded as the act of a stranger, constituting a mere spoliation,
unless subsequently ratified."°
Generally, it appears that a spoliation will not affect the rights and liabilities as
provided in the original agreement."'
The court held that neither the general partners nor the partnership
attorney possessed the actual authority to alter the instruments,""2 but did not
address the question of implied authority. Assuming that the court would not
find implied authority to alter for the same reasons it would not find apparent
authority, it is arguable that, in their roles as agents, the general partners and
the attorney were strangers, and that the alteration was therefore merely a
spoliation. Under this theory, the original agreements could be held enforceable.
CONCLUSION
The most significant aspect of the Klein decision is its revelation of the
Court of Appeals' philosophy concerning the role of limited partners in a limited
partnership. The court recognized the importance of a recorded partnership
certificate's serving as notice to third party creditors, but nevertheless confirmed
that a limited partner is an investor and not a partner at all. In the role of
investor, the limited partner has been given a great deal of protection from
misconduct on the part of general partners, even to the detriment of third party
creditors. When a limited partner functions solely as an investor, it appears that
his liability will be restricted to the amount of his investment.
200. 4 AM. JuR. 2D Alteration of Instruments § 15 (1962).
201. Blair v. J.R. Andrews, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 51, 57 (W.D. Pa. 1956); Perry v. Perry,
234 Ark. 1066, 1068, 356 S.W.2d 419, 421 (1962). See Bumb v. Bennett, 51 Cal. 2d 294,
303, 333 P.2d 23, 29 (1958); Vanderford v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Nat'] Bank, 105 Md.
164, 170, 66 A. 47, 49 (1907).
202. 284 Md. at 60-61, 395 A.2d at 140; see notes 46 & 48 and accompanying text
supra.
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VOICE IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY BASED ON SPECTRO-
GRAPHIC ANALYSIS INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE THE TECHNIQUE
HAS NOT GAINED GENERAL ACCEPTANCE IN THE SCIENTIFIC
COMMUNITY - REED v. STATE
As scientific technology has become increasingly sophisticated, litigants,
including prosecutors, have attempted to avail themselves of newly developed
scientific tests and techniques as aids in the factfinding process. As a result, the
courts have been called upon to develop appropriate standards for determining
the relevance and admissibility of proffered evidence based upon these new
scientific techniques. In Reed v. State' the Court of Appeals of Maryland
addressed the issue of the admissibility of voice identification testimony based
on spectrographic analysis. In a four-to-three decision, the court formulated the
standard by which to determine the admissibility of testimony founded on
scientific methods and techniques and held that the result of voice spectro-
graphic analysis was inadmissible based upon that standard.2
After being arrested and indicted for rape, James Reed was twice compelled
to submit voice exemplars 3 to the state's attorney. The exemplars were sent to
the Voice Identification Unit of the Michigan State Police Department for
spectrographic analysis and comparison. The exemplars were accompanied by a
comparison recording of the tape recordings made by the rape victim of seven
telephone calls from a person believed to be her assailant! The spectrographic
1. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
2. Id. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377.
3. On the subsequent appeal of his conviction, the Court of Special Appeals rejected
Reed's contention that the compelled submission of voice exemplars infringed his fourth or
fifth amendment rights. Reed v. State, 35 Md. App. 472, 491-94, 372 A.2d 243, 255-57
(1977), rev'd on other grounds, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978). The Court of Appeals
granted certiorari only to consider the question of the admissibility of the voiceprint
testimony and Reed's contention that the admission into evidence of copies of the tapes of
the telephone calls violated the best evidence rule, 283 Md. at 377 & n.2, 391 A.2d at 366
& n.2, leaving the rulings below on the fourth and fifth amendment claims undisturbed.
4. Shortly after she had been raped, the victim received a telephone call from a
person identifying himself as her assailant. At her request, the police attached a recording
device to her telephone, and she recorded seven subsequent calls believed to have been
made by the original caller. During the course of one of the conversations, the victim and
the telephone caller arranged for the victim to deliver $1,000 in exchange for the
assailant's agreement to stop harrassing her. Pursuant to the caller's instructions, the
victim placed the money in a bus station locker. James Reed took the locker key from the
place where the victim had left it, and police officers arrested him as he approached the
locker. Shortly after his arrest, Reed was placed in a lineup. Although the victim was
unable to identify any of the people in the lineup as her assailant after looking at them,
she identified Reed with 85-90% certainty as the person who raped her and telephoned
her, after hearing the participants in the lineup speak. Joint Record Extract at 2-3.
Reed was subsequently indicted for rape, assault with intent to rape, unnatural
and perverted sexual acts, assault and battery, robbery, larceny, verbal threats, and
unlawful use of the telephone. Brief for Appellee at 1. He was compelled by court order to
submit voice exemplars on two separate occasions. In order to produce exemplars under
(629)
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analysis,5 the product of which is often referred to as a voiceprint, resulted in a
positive identification of Reed as the speaker in four of the seven calls made by
the assailant.
6
The trial court conducted a pre-trial suppression hearing on the general
validity and reliability of spectrographic analysis and concluded that expert
voice identification testimony based upon spectrographic analysis was sufficient-
ly reliable to permit its admission into evidence. Voice identification testimony
identifying Reed as the person who made the telephone calls to the victim was
introduced at trial. Reed was found guilty,7 and his conviction was affirmed by
the Court of Special Appeals.' The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to
consider the trial court's admission of voiceprint evidence.
In an opinion written by Judge Eldridge, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Court of Special Appeals. The court adopted as a legal standard to
govern determinations of the admissibility of expert testimony based upon
scientific techniques and processes the standard known as the Frye test.' Expert
testimony would be inadmissible unless the scientific technique underlying the
testimony has been "generally accepted as reliable within the expert's particular
conditions duplicating those in which the original recordings were made, Reed repeated
the words spoken by the caller in the recorded telephone calls into a telephone connected
to a recorder. Joint Record Extract at 3 n.1.
5. The history of the development and a technical description of the spectrographic
process are outside the scope of this Recent Decision. Simply stated, however, voice
identification by sound spectrography is a procedure by which a tape recording of an
unknown voice is compared with tape recordings of one or more known voices in an
attempt to determine whether the unknown voice is the same as one of the known voices.
A certain number of individual clue words, usually between six and twenty, common to
both sets of tapes are isolated in the tape recording and played into the spectrograph. The
spectrograph converts the acoustical energy of the voice (in its three main components of
time, frequency of vibration, and energy distribution) into electrical energy and then
graphically produces a visual pattern on electrically sensitive paper. The resulting graphic
is called a voiceprint or spectrogram. A trained examiner visually compares the points of
similarity of the spectrograms of the voice exemplars with those of the unknown voice and
determines whether the comparison warrants a finding that the unknown voice matches
one of the known voices, does not match any of the known voices, or cannot be determined
to be either of the above. For more detailed explanations of the principles of spectrographic
analysis, see Kamine, The Voiceprint Technique: Its Structure and Reliability, 6 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 213 (1969); Comment, The Voiceprint Dilemma: Should Voices Be Seen and Not
Heard?, 35 Mo. L. REV. 267 (1975).
6. 283 Md. at 376, 391 A.2d at 365. The results of the spectrographic comparison of
the first set of exemplars were inconclusive, and Reed was required to submit another set
of exemplars. Spectrographic comparisons were made on only four of the calls. Because one
call was too short, one was too distorted, and a voice exemplar had not been obtained for
the third, three of the calls were not compared. Id. at 376 n.1, 391 A.2d at 365 n.1.
7. Id. at 377, 391 A.2d at 365. Reed was found guilty at his second trial on the
charges against him. The first trial, at which voiceprint identification testimony had also
been introduced, resulted in a mistrial after the jury were unable to reach a verdict.
8. 35 Md. App. 472, 372 A.2d 243 (1977), rev'd, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
9. The test was first articulated in Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923).
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scientific field.""° The court held that the trial court had misapplied the standard
in deciding whether the testimony was admissible. Although it had used the test
of general acceptance within the scientific community, its restriction of the
appropriate expert community to those who had actually worked with voice
spectrographs was improper."1 Experts in speech and hearing and related fields,
although they had not performed experiments with voice spectrographs, were
nonetheless competent to judge the reliability of spectrographic evidence, and
their opinions should have been considered." After reviewing other cases
dealing with voiceprint testimony, legal and scientific commentary, and the
evidence introduced at the suppression hearing, the court concluded that
voiceprints had not been generally accepted by the relevant scientific commu-
nity, and testimony based on them was therefore inadmissible. 3
The court began its analysis by noting that it is recognized that the
threshold question with respect to the admissibility of expert opinion testimony
based upon a scientific technique or process is whether the reliability of the
particular scientific technique has been established.'" In some situations, the
validity and reliability of the technique may be so widely accepted in the
scientific community that a trial court may take judicial notice of its
reliability.'- When the reliability of the technique cannot be judicially noticed,
however, it must be demonstrated.'6 Because the reliability of a specific
technique does not vary from case to case, the court concluded, the need for
uniformity and consistency of decisionmaking requires that a legal standard for
determining its reliability be adopted rather than leaving the decision to each
trial court's discretion.17
10. 283 Md. at 381, 391 A.2d at 368.
11. Id. at 398-99, 391 A.2d at 376-77. The court also expressed doubt that voiceprint
analysis met even the trial court's standard. Id. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377.
12. Id. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377.
13. Id. See text accompanying notes 89 to 96 infra.
14. 283 Md. at 380-81, 391 A.2d at 367-68.
15. Id. at 380, 391 A.2d at 367. Judicial notice of the reliability of a particular
scientific technique might be taken according to the theory that judicial notice may be
taken of those facts that are capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to
indisputably accurate sources. MCCoRMICK's HANDBOOK OF TIlE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 330, at
763 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK I; FED. R. EVID. 201(b)(2). See
Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 440, 45 A.2d 85, 86.(1945) (blood tests universally accepted
as scientifically accurate).
16. 283 Md. at 380, 391 A.2d at 367. See text accompanying notes 97 & 98 infra.
17. 283 Md. at 381, 391 A.2d at 367-68. The court clearly distinguished the threshold
question of reliability from the general test used to determine whether expert opinion
testimony is admissible. The general test of admissibility of any testimony, including
expert opinion testimony, is whether the testimony will be of appreciable help to the jury
and will aid its understanding of the issues. See id. at 379-80, 391 A.2d at 367;
MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 13, at 30; 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1923 (Chadbourn rev.
1978). Because the resolution of this question normally depends on the particular facts and
circumstances of each case, the decision is properly committed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. See 283 Md. at 379-80, 391 A.2d at 367. The reliability of a scientific
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According to the Reed court, most other courts that have considered the
admissibility of scientific evidence have adopted the standard established in
Frye v. United States" as the test for the reliability of a scientific method.'9 The
Frye standard states:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which
the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.2"'
In articulating the standard governing the admissibility of scientific evidence to
be followed in Maryland, the Court of Appeals rephrased the Frye standard
slightly to require that "before a scientific opinion will be received as evidence
at trial, the basis of that opinion must be shown to be generally accepted as
reliable within the expert's particular scientific field."'" Expert testimony based
upon a scientific technique cannot be received into evidence either when the
validity of the technique is in controversy in the relevant scientific community
or when the technique is generally regarded as experimental."
The court in Reed then applied the Frye standard to voice spectrographic
evidence. The court first reviewed the history of the spectrograph's development,
procedure, however, does not vary from case to case, although the particular administra-
tion of any procedure is always open to challenge at trial.
As a result, expert opinion testimony based on a scientific technique must satisfy
a two-step test before it will be admissible. The first step questions whether the proponent
of the evidence has established that the technique has been generally accepted as reliable
within the scientific community. If the technique does not satisfy this element of the Frye
standard, the expert testimony based on it will be excluded. If, however, the technique is
found to have gained general acceptance, the second step in the Frye test requires the trial
judge to determine, in his discretion, if the proposed testimony will be helpful to the jury
and the expert is properly qualified. It is only when both of these steps have been satisfied
that expert testimony based on scientific techniques will be admitted into evidence. Id. at
380-81, 391 A.2d at 365-66.
18. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
19. 283 Md. at 381-82, 391 A.2d at 368 (citing cases). As Judge Smith correctly
observed in his dissenting opinion in Reed, id. at 409-15, 391 A.2d at 382-88, many of the
cases cited by the majority to support its assertion that the Frye standard as used by most
courts concerned the admission of evidence based on polygraph tests. See. e.g.. Pulakis v.
State, 476 P.2d 474 (Alaska 1970); Salisbury v. State, 221 Ga. 718. 146 S.E.2d 776 (1966);
State v. Trimble, 68 N.M. 406, 362 P.2d 788 (1961). Some of these cases seem to refer to
Frye more for the proposition that polygraph evidence has generally been held
inadmissible than for an express adoption of Frye as the appropriate standard for
determining the admissibility of scientific evidence. See. e.g.. Kaminski v. State. 63 So. 2d
339 (Fla. 1953), reheard, 63 So. 2d 339, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 832 11954); State v. Woo, 84
Wash. 2d 472, 527 P.2d 271 (1974).
20. 293 F. at 1014 (emphasis added).
21. 283 Md. at 381, 391 A.2d at 368 (emphasis added).
22. Id.
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observing that prior to 1972 it was generally agreed that voiceprint analysis had
not been sufficiently tested to establish its reliability." That opinion shifted in
1972, however, when a series of studies by one expert reported that spectro-
graphic analysis was subject to a low maximum rate of error.24 The studies were
later controverted by the work of other scientists, 5 leading the Court of Appeals
to observe that the "fundamental division" in the scientific community
concerning the validity of spectrographic analysis had continued unabated.1
6
Further, the court observed that a leading proponent of spectrographic analysis
had in his trial testimony acknowledged the division within the scientific
community on the issue of the spectrogram's reliability. 7 An expert witness
offered by the defense at trial testified that spectrographic analysis was neither
reliable nor generally accepted within the scientific community. 8 Finally, the
court noted that all of the courts that had held testimony based on the voiceprint
technique inadmissible as evidence had held that the technique failed to satisfy
the Frye standard" and that most legal commentary had also concluded that
voiceprint identification failed to satisfy that standard. Based upon this review,
the Court of Appeals concluded that voiceprint identification failed to meet the
Frye test of general acceptance within the scientific community.3
23. Id. at 389-90, 391 A.2d at 372.
24. In 1972 a noted scientist in the field, Dr. Oscar Tosi, reported the results of an
experiment that he claimed supported the reliability of spectrograph analysis for speaker
identification. Tosi, Dyer, Lashbrook, Pedrey, Nicol & Nash, Experiment on Voice
Identification, 51 J. Acousw. Soc. AM. 2030 (1972). Tosi's experiments revealed a 6.3%
error rate for false identifications and a 12% error rate for false eliminations. Dr. Tosi also
posited that in real-life situations these error rates would fall to a percentage lower than
that contained in his laboratory study. Id. at 2041.
25. In the wake of Dr. Tosi's comprehensive experimentation, the Bolt group, a panel
of speech scientists, reported that voice identification through spectrogram analysis lacked
an adequate scientific basis for estimating reliability in many practical situations. Bolt,
Cooper, David, Denis, Pickett & Stevens, Speaker Identification by Speech Spectrograms:
Some Further Observations, 54 J. Acousw. Soc. AM. 531, 533-34 (1973). For a more
detailed discussion of the Tosi and Bolt papers, see Comment, supra note 5, at 273-76.
26. 283 Md. at 392, 391 A.2d at 374.
27. Id. at 392-93, 391 A.2d at 374. Dr. Tosi stated that approximately nine experts
having done work in voice identification opposed the process and fifteen were in favor of
the process. Of those experts in the field who had not actually engaged in voiceprint
identification, Dr. Tosi stated that five were opposed and four or five were in favor. Id. at
393, 391 A.2d at 374. "
28. Id. at 394, 391 A.2d at 374.
29. Id. at 396-97, 391 A.2d at 375.
30. Id. at 398, 391 A.2d at 376.
31. Id. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377. The Reed court's conclusion is supported by a 1979
study conducted by a committee of scientists and acoustical experts of the National
Academy of Sciences for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which cautioned against the
use of voice identification testimony based on spectrographic analysis. It warned that
evidence based on the method should be "approached with great caution" because of what
it described as great technical uncertainties and substantial lack of agreement among
speech scientists. The study suggested that when voice identification findings are used in
court, the jury should be informed of the "inherent limitations in the method and in the
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In Reed the Court of Appeals explicitly established the general acceptance
standard for the admissibility of evidence based upon scientific techniques in
Maryland. In dissent, Judge Smith argued that before Reed the Maryland courts
had followed a standard for the admissibility of such evidence that was
significantly different from the Frye approach.32 The prior test, he said, had been
closer to the general test of relevance applicable to the admission of all evidence.
performance of examiners." It concluded that the current practice of spectrographic
analysis is "based on limited knowledge about properties of voice sounds" and that there
are "unanswered questions about statistically valid representations of voice populations."
See N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1979, § C, at 3, cols. 3 & 4.
32. 283 Md. at 452-57, 391 A.2d at 403-06. The cases Judge Smith used to support
his conclusion, however, are inapposite to Reed. Most of them did indeed espouse a
relatively liberal standard for the admissibility of expert opinion evidence, but they did
not involve the admissibility of evidence based upon scientific techniques. In Nizer v.
Phelps, 252 Md. 185, 249 A.2d 112 (1969), for example, the Court of Appeals held that it is
within the discretion of the trial court to determine whether a witness qualified as an
expert, id. at 192, 239 A.2d at 116, and whether the witness' testimony would be of
appreciable help to the jury, id. at 193, 249 A.2d at 117. At issue in Nizer, however, was
the admissibility of an expert's opinion as to the point of impact between a bus and an
elderly woman, when the expert was the investigating police officer who observed the
scene of the accident. His opinion was not founded upon scientific evidence. Id. at 194-96,
249 A.2d at 117-18. See Shivers v. Carnaggio, 223 Md. 585, 588, 165 A.2d 898, 899 (1960)
(expert witnesses were two attending physicians who expressed an opinion that plaintiff
had suffered a "20% disability to the back," but tests performed upon plaintiff not in issue);
Williams v. Dawidowicz, 209 Md. 77, 120 A.2d 399 (1956) (expert witness was a qualified
expert on particular machinery who expressed an opinion that a person with a certain
medical disability was incapable of operating that machinery but no scientific evidence
was involved in the case).
Also cited by the dissenting opinion in Reed for the proposition that earlier
Maryland cases more nearly followed McCormick than Frye was Raithel v. State, 280 Md.
291, 372 A.2d 1069 (1977). In Raithel the qualified expert was a psychiatrist who
expressed his opinion on the defendant's competency to stand trial. The defendant
appealed his conviction because the witness' opinion was not phrased in language
substantially similar to the statutory language of the test for competency to stand trial. Id.
at 302, 372 A.2d at 1075. There was no challenge to the expert's opinion based upon the
validity or acceptance of the scientific techniques which formed the basis of that opinion.
See State v. Gray, 227 Md. 318, 176 A.2d 867 (1962) (investigating officer may express an
opinion about point of impact in accident but no scientific techniques involved); Acme
Poultry Corp. v. Melville, 188 Md. 365, 53 A.2d 1 (1947) (investigating officer may express
an opinion whether tires would leave skid marks but no scientific techniques involved);
Langenfelder v. Thompson, 179 Md. 502, 20 A.2d 491 (1941) (medical expert may express
an opinion as to the cause of a physical condition based upon his personal examination of
the patient but validity of physical examination technique not in issue).
One case cited by the dissent in Reed, Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 45 A.2d 340
(1946), did call into question the admissibility of expert opinion evidence based upon
scientific techniques. At issue in Corens was the admissibility of an expert's testimony
based upon the chemical analysis of blood. The defendant did not object to the expert's
findings based upon that chemical analysis. Id. at 569, 45 A.2d at 346. The court held: "We
accept the rule that facts ascertained by chemical analysis of the blood of a human being
or a part of the human body may be stated by a competent chemist, provided that the thing
analyzed is satisfactorily identifi3d." Id.
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The court, however, citing Shanks v. State,33 noted that it had previously
recognized the standard of general scientific acceptance in the context of blood
test evidence.' A toxicologist, qualified as an expert witness, testified at trial in
Shanks concerning the blood type of a stain found on the defendant's coat, and
the defendant objected to his testimony. The Court of Appeals reviewed the
origin of the blood test and noted its widespread use throughout Europe." The
court then observed: "In the early cases evidence of the tests was not admitted,
because the courts here [in the United States] were not convinced of their
general acceptance and reliability. . . . Blood tests are now accepted every-
where, scientifically, as accurate, and the courts and legislatures have generally
followed the same view."3
Although the Court of Appeals had not expressly established a standard for
the admissibility of evidence based upon scientific techniques before Reed, its
earlier decisions suggested a standard of general scientific acceptance. Address-
ing the issue of the admissibility of fingerprint evidence in Murphy v. State,37
the court took judicial notice of the "infallibility" of that scientific technique. In
Edwards v. State,' ruling on the admissibility of ballistics identification
evidence, the court conceded that that scientific technique had been well
established. The Court of Special Appeals held evidence based upon the results
of polygraph tests inadmissible in Rawlings v, State,39 citing dictum from the
Court of Appeals' decision in Lusby v. State,"0 in which the court observed that
the results of the polygraph test were almost universally excluded from evidence
at trial.4 In Rawlings the court ruled that evidence based on polygraph tests
should be excluded at trial in light of the "stage in the science or the art of lie
detecting.""2 Following Rawlings, the Court of Special Appeals later held that
the results of a "psychological stress evaluation test" were inadmissible as
evidence because the technique had not attained sufficient scientific acceptance
as an accurate and reliable method. ' Although the opinions of the Maryland
appellate courts before Reed thus suggested that the standard to be followed in
admitting testimony based upon scientific evidence was one of general scientific
acceptance, the courts had not clearly established the standard until Reed.
33. 185 Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85 (1945).
34. 283 Md. at 383-84, 391 A.2d at 369.
35. 185 Md. at 439, 45 A.2d at 86.
36. Id. at 440, 45 A.2d at 86.
37. 184 Md. 70, 85-86, 40 A.2d 239, 246 (1944).
38. 198 Md. 132, 81 A.2d 631 (1951).
39. 7 Md. App. 611, 256 A.2d 704 (1969).
40. 217 Md. 191, 141 A.2d 893 (1957).
41. Id. at 194-95, 141 A.2d at 895.
42. 7 Md. App. at 614, 256 A.2d at 706.
43. Smith v. State, 31 Md. App. 106, 120, 355 A.2d 527, 535-36 (1976). The rule
established in Rawlings was also followed in Smith v. State, 20 Md. App. 577, 318 A.2d
568, cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1974), and Wilson v. State, 20 Md. App. 318, 315 A.2d 788
(1974).
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The Frye standard adopted by the Reed court is one of two standards
employed by courts in determining the admissibility of evidence based on
scientific techniques and processes. In a lengthy dissent replete with references
to and quotations from various cases and journals, Judge Smith argued that the
Frye standard had been subjected to great criticism, was an inappropriate
standard, and was out of step with the standard usually applied by courts in
determining whether scientific or other evidence was to be admitted.4 He
argued that the test suggested by Dean McCormick in his treatise on evidence,
ar aftefiiative sLandard employed by some courts, should have been followed.4
Under the McCormick standard, any relevant conclusions supported by a
qualified expert witness are admissible unless other reasons exist for their
exclusion.
6
Proponents of the McCormick standard criticize the Frye test for unduly
restricting the admission of scientific evidence. According to these critics,
general acceptance in the scientific community is appropriate to determine
whether judicial notice should be taken of the scientific technique involved but
not as a general standard of admissibility of all scientific evidence. 7 Critics
maintain that the Frye standard, which according to them requires something
less than unanimous acceptance of the technique in the scientific community but
something more than acceptance by the expert testifying at trial," is too
indefinite,4 9 because it fails to define the relevant segment of the scientific
community to be used to determine the degree of acceptance. Instead, the Frye
test results in a vague polling or nose counting' of members of the scientific
community. Moreover, Frye is said to surrender to scientists the trial court's
traditional discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence5 ' and to
exclude the help that a new technique can afford the factfinding process if a
vague search for acceptance within the scientific community does not prove
44. 283 Md. at 400-504, 391 A.2d at 377-428 (Smith, J., dissenting). Judge Smith
also argued that even if the Frye standard were appropriate, the record in Reed satisfied
that standard. The essence of Judge Smith's argument was that Dr. Baker, the sole expert
introduced by the defense at the pretrial hearing on admissibility, was familiar with the
voice identification process only through his reading of the professional literature on the
subject. According to Judge Smith, Dr. Baker's testimony that voice identification was
neither reliable nor generally accepted was insufficient to outweigh the testimony of
experts, who had been actively engaged in experimentation and use of the voice
identification process, introduced by the prosecution who had testified that the process was
reliable. Id. at 489-91, 391 A.2d at 421-22.
45. Id. at 400-504, 391 A.2d at 377-428.
46. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 203.
47. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978).
48. See 283 Md. at 405, 391 A.2d at 380 (Smith, J., dissenting); Strong, Questions
Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. i.j.. L.F. 1, 10-11 (1970).
49. 283 Md. at 405, 391 A.2d at 380 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting Strong, supra
note 48); MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 203; Strong, supra note 48, at 10-11.
50. See 283 Md. at 406, 391 A.2d at 380 (Smith, J., dissenting).
51. E.g., 283 Md. at 407, 391 A.2d at 380-81 (by implication) (Smith, J., dissenting).
But see Comment, supra note 5, at 282 n.88.
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fruitful." Finally, critics assert that Frye introduces an element of inconsistency
into the law of evidence by evaluating expert testimony based on scientific
processes according to a different standard of admissibility than other expert
testimony.Y
Some critics of the Frye standard advocate McCormick's approach, or a
modified version of that approach.' McCormick's resolution of the issue of the
admissibility of scientific evidence is that there should be no different test for
scientific evidence; "[any relevant conclusions which are supported by a
qualified expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for
exclusion.""s Taken literally, this standard appears to admit any evidence that a
person who can qualify as an expert witness would be willing to offer, without
requiring any inquiry into whether there is an objectively reliable basis to
support the testimony.56
However, the standard itself implies qualifications that limit its apparent
breadth. First, in determining whether the witness qualifies as an expert the
trial court must initially determine that there exists some body of knowledge
about which the witness could become an expert. This would limit testimony to
processes about which there is some body of data to explain the process and
provide data to determine reliability, and would further screen out the very new
and untested processes. Second, McCormick requires that the profferred
testimony be "relevant." To be relevant evidence must in some way advance the
court's inquiry and thus be of probative value.57 Evidence is relevant when it
would make the existence or non-existence of a fact in dispute more probable
than it would be without the evidence.'M It is clear, therefore, that for scientific
evidence to be relevant, there must be some demonstration that it is sufficiently
reliable to make the existence or non-existence of a fact more probable than
without the evidence. 9 If unreliable, the scientific evidence cannot make the fact
in dispute more probable than without it.
Evidence that meets these two qualifications should be admitted unless
other factors require its exclusion60 McCormick turns to the traditional test to
52. See 283 Md. at 407, 391 A.2d at 380-81 (Smith, J., dissenting); Strong, supra note
48.
53. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 203; Strong, supra note 48, at 10-11. See 283 Md. at
403-06, 391 A.2d at 380-81 (Smith, J., dissenting).
54. 283 Md. at 416, 497-500, 391 A.2d at 385, 425-27 (Smith, J., dissenting); Strong,
supra note 48.
55. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 203, at 49. Those other reasons include the tendency
of the evidence to confuse the jury or to lead the jury to decide the case on an improper
basis, and the undue consumption of time. Id.
56. McCormick's standard has been criticized for being too broad and loose. See J.
RICHARDSON, MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 6.18, at 165 (2d ed. 1974).
57. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 185.
58. Id.; J. RICHARDSON, supra note 56, §§ 4.11, 6.14.
59. J. RICHARDSON, supra note 56, § 4.11; see Romero, The Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence Under the New Mexico and Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 N.M.L. REV. 187, 201-05
(1976); Strong, supra note 48, at 4-5.
60. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
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determine whether relevant evidence is admissible - all relevant evidence
should be admitted unless its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial
effect, tendency to waste time, or tendency to mislead the jury.61 This final step
in determining the admissibility of evidence requires the court to balance the
degree to which the evidence tends to make the disputed fact more probable
against the tendency of the evidence to prejudice or mislead the jury or to waste
time. Evidence shown to meet these threshold tests is admitted, and its weight
in the factfinding process is left to the jury.
This approach has been followed by some courts faced with the issue of the
admissibility of spectrographic analysis. For example, in United States v.
Williams" the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that
the main concern, when determining the admissibility of scientific evidence, is
to balance the reliability of the scientific technique against the technique's
tendency to mislead or prejudice the jury."' The Williams court's pivotal inquiry
was whether spectrographic analysis was sufficiently reliable to warrant its use
in the courtroom., Because an expert testified as to the reliability of the
technique, the expert was properly qualified, and the jury was given cautionary
instructions on the limitations of the technique,6 the judge concluded that voice
spectrogram analysis was "sufficiently reliable" for him to allow a qualified
expert to give his opinion based on the technique.
Similarly, Judge Smith, dissenting in Reed, was satisfied that the proffered
evidence was sufficiently reliable to be relevant. This determination was based
on the experts' testimony as to their qualifications, methods, and equipment and
their belief concerning the reliability of the technique." Further, Judge Smith
was satisfied that the trial court had adequately guarded against the dangers
inherent in the use of newly developed scientific devices; the right of the defense
to produce experts to testify concerning their opinions on the reliability of the
process was preserved, and the jury was given cautionary instructions regarding
the shortcomings of the technique. 7
Although both the McCormick and Frye standards require a threshold
determination of reliability, each uses a different method of establishing
reliability. McCormick allows any qualified expert to assert, and provide his or
her supporting reasons for the assertion, that the process is reliable - that is,
that it is reasonably capable of accurately producing the results it purports to
demonstrate. The judge simply seeks to satisfy himself that the technique has
been adequately tested and deemed reliable by researchers who are knowledge-
able through work, utilization of techniques, experimentation and so forth.
Simply stated, the reliability of a technique depends on expert testimony
61. McCoRMICK, supra note 15, § 185.
62. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978).
63. Id. at 1198.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1200.
66. 283 Md. at 469-82, 391 A.2d at 411-18.
67. Id. at 491-92, 391 A.2d at 422.
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regarding the validity and reliability of the underlying scientific principles of
the technique, proper utilization of the scientific technique, and use of the device
by a properly qualified and trained expert.' Once the judge satisfies himself that
the process has been shown to meet the threshold of reasonable reliability and
that evidence based on it is not misleading or prejudicial, he admits the evidence
based on it and leaves to the jury the decision of how much weight should be
accorded the evidence.
Under the Frye standard, on the other hand, the expert does not offer his
own opinion on reliability, but testifies instead as to whether the process is
generally accepted as reliable by the scientific community, based on the number
of scientists opposing and favoring the technique.' The scientific community
"form[s] a kind of technical jury, which must first pass on the scientific status of
a procedure before the lay jury utilizes it in making its findings of fact.""0 As
Judge Eldridge noted in Reed, the court may further substantiate the expert's
testimony concerning the acceptance of the technique by examining scientific
and legal journals." Instead of the judge's deciding if the expert has adequately
demonstrated the reliability of the technique, the court seeks to determine
whether the testimony of the expert, together with the other evidence, has
demonstrated that the scientific community accepts the technique as reliable.
The rationale underlying the Frye standard is that because lay jurors lack the
sophistication necessary to assess accurately the weight to be accorded the
scientific testimony, the judge must predetermine the reliability of the scientific
technique.
The Court of Appeals found compelling several reasons for the adoption of
the Frye standard. Initially, the court observed that essential fairness entitles a
litigant to a scientific judgment on the reliability of a scientific process before
the results of that process can be used against him. 2 The court emphasized that
68. See Romero, supra note 59, at 203.
69. It is interesting to note that in United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.
1975), the Sixth Circuit observed that reliability is virtually synonomous with the Frye
standard of general acceptance in a particular scientific field. Hence, according to the
Franks court's analysis, if an expert testifies that a particular technique is reliable or
sufficiently accurate, the court can interpret the testimony to mean that there is general
acceptance of the technique. Although the Franks court purported to use the Frye standard
of general acceptance in the scientific community, this analysis rendered the Frye
standard meaningless. The Sixth Circuit, in effect, evaluated the scientific evidence by the
McCormick standard, which enables the court to evaluate the scientific technique on the
basis of a single expert's opinion.
70. People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 405, 255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (1977).
71. 283 Md. at 380, 391 A.2d at 367.
72. Id. at 385, 391 A.2d at 369-70. The Reed court agreed with United States Circuit
Judge McGowan's analysis in United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir.
1974), in which the court reasoned that "[tihe requirement of general acceptance in the
scientific community assures that those most qualified to assess the general validity of a
scientific method will have the determinative voice." See People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31,
130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 148, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (1976); People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 405,
255 N.W.2d 171, 194 (1977).
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this is an extremely significant consideration with regard to those scientific
techniques that involve highly subjective interpretations of purportedly objec-
tive criteria. 3 Moreover, the court expressed concern that there would be a
mystical aura of infallibility around scientific techniques, and lay jurors might
assign undue weight to a scientific technique that is not foolproof." Further, the
court noted that although judges and lay jurors have neither the experience nor
the expertise to evaluate the validity of scientific techniques and processes, the
McCormick standard requires them to evaluate the technique's reliability.7 In
addition, the Reed court emphasized that becaus the Fiye standard requires a
pre-trial determination of reliability, there is no possibility of inconsistent
results by different juries confronted with the same issue."6 If the trier of fact
determined the validity and reliability of a scientific technique, the court
reasoned, one judge or jury might determine that the technique is reliable, and
the very next judge or jury might find it unreliable. Such inconsistency
concerning the validity of a given scientific technique would be intolerable."
Finally, the court noted that the introduction of evidence based on a scientific
technique that is not yet generally accepted as reliable becomes a trial of the
technique itself, diverting attention from the actual issues of the litigation."
There are several problems with the application of the Frye test. The
relevant "scientific community" to which the scientific evidence belongs must be
determined. Some courts, including the trial court in Reed, have defined the
relevant scientific community narrowly, to include only those scientists who
would be expected to be familiar with the technique's use.' 9 At present, this
73. 283 Md. at 385, 391 A.2d at 369-70.
74. Id. at 386, 391 A.2d at 370. As aptly stated by the Court of Appeals in Shanks v.
State, 185 Md. 437, 449, 45 A.2d 85, 90 (1945), however, "[j]udges and juries must be
presumed to have average intelligence at least and no assumption to the contrary can be
made for the purpose of excluding otherwise admissible testimony." Further, statistics as
to jury verdicts in cases in which voiceprint evidence has been admitted do not support the
notion that lay jurors will blindly convict defendants on the basis of scientific evidence.
Rather, of the 32 cases tried by juries as of 1975 in which voiceprint identification
testimony had been admitted, just over 61% resulted in guilty verdicts - a percentage
significantly lower than the 72% rate of guilty verdicts returned generally in criminal
cases tried by juries. Greene, Voiceprint Identification: The Case in Favor of Admissibility,
13 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 171, 190-91 (1975). The small number of cases in which voiceprint
identification testimony has been admitted in jury trials, however, makes it difficult to
draw any conclusions as to the effect of the testimony upon the jury. See id.
75. See 283 Md. at 387, 391 A.2d at 371; State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 332, 239
A.2d 680, 684 (1968), affd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970) (court noted that "it is not for
the law to experiment but for science to do so").
76. 283 Md. at 387, 391 A.2d at 371.
77. Id. at 387-88, 391 A.2d at 371.
78. Id. at 388, 391 A.2d at 371. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183,
194, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967), in which the dissent observed that "the trial was virtually
concerned with nothing else but the efficacy and infallibility of the voiceprint process."
79. E.g., Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 203, 327 N.E.2d 671, 677-78 (1975)
(general acceptability requirement of Frye held satisfied if scientific principle at issue is
generally accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar with its use); Hodo v.
Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 790-91, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547, 554 (1975) (general
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small community of experts on voiceprints includes only those who were
pioneers in spectrograph research and development and have actually performed
voiceprint experiments. 8° The Court of Appeals in Reed rejected such a narrow
formulation of the relevant scientific community and articulated a much
broader, all-encompassing definition of the relevant community.8 The relevant
scientific community must include "those scientists in the fields of speech and
hearing, as well as related fields, who by training and education are competent
to make professional judgments concerning experiments undertaken by
others. '82 Clearly there is a lack of consensus among the courts regarding just
what group constitutes the relevant scientific community within the meaning of
the Frye standard.
scientific acceptance requirement held satisfied because voiceprint analysis accepted by
recognized experts in the field who would be expected to be familiar with its use). The
court in People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 862, 331 P.2d 251, 254 (1958), noted
with respect to the nalline test (a chemical test to detect narcotic use): "It has been
generally accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar with its use. In this age
of specialization more should not be required." The results of the test were admitted,
therefore, even though the vast majority of the medical profession was unfamiliar with the
test. The most compelling argument for a narrow definition of the relevant scientific
community was made by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971), where the court emphasized that "[e]very
useful new development must have its first day in court," regardless of conflicting opinions
of expert witnesses.
80. But see People v. Kelley, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 38, 549 P.2d 1240, 1249, 130 Cal. Rptr.
144, 153 (1976) (court rejected expert testimony by one who assisted in the development
and promotion of the spectrograph process); People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 146, 257
N.W.2d 537, 539 (1977) (court rejected expert testimony by those whose reputations and
careers were built on their work with the spectrograph process). The courts in these cases
recognized one of the problems in so restricting the scientific community to be considered.
When a technique is new, the only "experts" may be the developers of the technique, who
can be expected to accept it. In the field of voice spectrography the preeminent expert is
Dr. Tosi, the first to apply scientific methods to voice spectrographs. The trial court noted
that he had testified as an expert in most of the reported cases involving the admission of
voice spectrogram evidence. See 283 Md. at 469-70, 391 A.2d at 412-13 (Smith, J.,
dissenting, quoting trial judge).
81. 283 Md. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377.
82. Id. All of the cases that have excluded scientific evidence based upon spectro-
graphs because the evidence did not comply with Frye's "general acceptance" standard
have defined the scientific field in the same way as the Reed majority did. Such a broad
definition of the relevant scientific community is closely akin to Wigmore's observation
that the particular field need only be in the witness' "branch of learning." 2 J. WiMORE,
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 659, at 771 (3d ed. 1940). Although the vast majority of cases that
have admitted voice spectrograms have implicitly rejected the Frye standard, two cases
that have admitted spectrographic evidence have followed the Frye rule. See note 80 and
accompanying text supra. These are the very courts that have interpreted the relevant
scientific community to be those scientists directly knowledgeable with the process.
Therefore, although these courts purported to use the Frye standard, the result is
analogous to that reached under the McCormick analysis: so long as a competent, qualified
expert testifies as to the reliability of the technique, although he must testify as to
acceptance within the field, the evidence will be admitted.
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The broader the definition of "relevant scientific community" used by the
courts, the more difficult it is to find "general acceptance" within the
community. A second difficulty in applying the Frye standard, then, is
ascertaining how much acceptance constitutes general acceptance in the
scientific community, or, in the alternative, how much opposition precludes a
finding of general acceptance in the community. Taken literally, "general"
acceptance does not denote 95-100 percent acceptance. Rather, such a standard
implies that scientific evidence should be admitted if more than 50 percent of
the members of the relevant scientific community view the technique as
reliable. Because the court in Frye did not offer guidance on how to quantify the
standard of general acceptance, the courts that have faced the question have
resolved it differently. In Commonwealth v. Lykus, for example, the court noted
that "the Frye standard does not require unanimity of view, only general
acceptance; a degree of divergence is inevitable."' In contrast, in United States
v. Addison, ' the same court that established the Frye standard took the
language of Frye a step further and stated that the acceptance of the scientific
community must be "as a whole."" Similarly, although not expressly stated in
its opinion, the court in Reed suggested that a scientific technique will not cross
the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages until virtually the
entire relevant scientific community accepts the technique as reliable. 6 The
majority found persuasive that experts in the field asserted that voiceprints
were not reliable and that the leading proponent of voiceprints acknowledged at
trial the division in the scientific community.17
The difficulties of applying the Frye standard have led the courts to reach
inconsistent decisions regarding expert testimony based on voice spectrograms.
83. 367 Mass. 191, 204 n.6, 327 N.E.2d 671, 678 n.6 (1975). Accord, Commonwealth v.
Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 229, 369 A.2d 1277, 1280 (1977). In Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68
(Fla. App. 1968), appeal dismissed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927
(1970), the court, desiring to admit the results of a generally unknown medical test,
admitted the results of the test into evidence on the basis of the testimony of three experts
that the scientific test was reliable.
84. 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
85. Id. at 745.
86. 283 Md. at 398-99, 391 A.2d at 376-77. Following the Reed standard, the Court
of Special Appeals in Akonom v. State, 40 Md. App. 676, 394 A.2d 1213 (1978), held that
polygraph test results were not admissible into evidence even though they were generally
accepted among polygraphers themselves. Id. at 682, 394 A.2d at 1217. The Reed standard
of admissibility of expert opinion evidence based upon scientific techniques was reaffirmed
by the Court of Appeals in Thompson v. Thompson, 285 Md. 488, 404 A.2d 269 (1979), a
case in which the plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of the two-year statute of
limitations in paternity proceedings established by MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66(e) (1973).
The plaintiff in Thompson argued that blood tests could adequately protect accused
individuals as well as could the law's short statute of limitations. The court held that in
order for a court to admit the sophisticated blood tests that can establish paternity, the
proponent of the evidence must show that the scientific technique is sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in a particular field. 285 Md. at 497, 404
A.2d at 274.
87. 283 Md. at 392-93, 391 A.2d at 373-74.
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Such inconsistencies can be alleviated by admitting evidence based on the
application of new scientific techniques within the ambit of the usual rules of
evidence. Under this approach, any newly developed technique must be
adequately tested by researchers who are competent in the field. If the judge is
satisfied that the research of a qualified expert demonstrates that the process is
reliable, and hence relevant, he should allow the expert to give his opinion on
the technique. However, the testimony should be excluded if it is likely to
prejudice or mislead the jury. An important consideration in making this
determination is the extent of disagreement in the scientific community. If the
conflicting testimony establishes fundamental inaccuracies in the technique, the
evidence must be excluded. If, however, the testimony is found to be reliable and
admitted into evidence, the jury must be apprised that it is the finder of fact,
and thus may assign whatever weight to the expert's opinion that it believes is
warranted. The fact that there is disagreement in the community would, of
course, affect the weight to be given the expert testimony by the jury.
A standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence that follows the
approach of the normal rules of evidence both assures adequate safeguards
against the admission of unreliable evidence by requiring the satisfaction of the
trial court as a precondition for the admission of evidence and leaves room for
the admission of innovative scientific techniques as aids in the factfinding
process by freeing the question of admissibility from the requirement of
acceptance within the scientific community. It allows the law to keep step with
the advancement of science. Further, it places the responsibility for resolving
the problem of the credence to be given scientific evidence precisely where that
responsibility belongs - with the court and the jury, not with the scientists. The
traditional rules of expert opinion evidence permit the introduction of expert
evidence attacking the validity and reliability of the scientific evidence. Based
on the positions of the experts, the court and jury will determine, respectively,
whether the proffered scientific evidence will be admitted, and how much weight
it will be given in the trial. The evidence enters the factfinding process without
the imprimatur of "general scientific acceptance."
A court's choice of a standard to govern the admissibility of expert opinion
based on scientific techniques depends on whether the court views the evidence
as a special form of expert opinion, or as a separate branch of evidence called
"scientific evidence." The difference is more than semantic, for if the court views
the evidence at issue as merely a special class of expert opinion evidence, it can
apply the usual rules of evidence governing the admissibility of expert opinion.
If, however, the court views the evidence at issue as "scientific evidence," it will
formulate a special standard to govern the admissibility of such evidence.
Although expert opinion based on scientific techniques is indeed a special
category of expert opinion evidence, it is, in the final analysis, no more than
expert opinion evidence and can be governed efficiently and well by the
traditional rules governing the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. If courts
are to have the benefit of new scientific techniques, judges must be permitted -
as they are not under Frye - to hold admissible evidence involving newly
ascertained, or applied, scientific theories that have not yet achieved general
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acceptance in the applicable scientific community, if they are satisfied that the
evidence is sufficiently reliable to be found relevant."
In reaching its decision that evidence based upon voice spectrograms was
inadmissible because voice spectrograph analysis had not gained sufficient
acceptance within the scientific community, the Reed court looked, in addition to
other material, to the general scientific literature on the subject. The court's
consideration in its inquiry into whether voiceprints were generally accepted by
the scientific community of data not before the trial court raises several
interesting questions relating to judicial notice and the scope of appellate
review. The court did not merely decide that the evidence before the trial court
was insufficient to establish the reliability of the voice spectrograph. Rather, it
made its own determination of acceptance in the scientific community, based on
an "examination of the record ... , the judicial opinions which have considered
this question, and the available legal and scientific commentaries."" The court's
opinion may perhaps be read as only deciding whether if the trial court had
looked to the proper body of experts, the evidence before it would have
demonstrated that voiceprints were not sufficiently accepted to be admissible;
the opinion indicates that considerable evidence of non-acceptance was pre-
sented to the lower court." The court's reference to its own examination of
commentary and its holding that voice identification testimony based on
spectrographs is not admissible "in Maryland courts,"'" however, indicate that
the court will decide independently whether scientific tests are generally
acceptable.2
The legitimacy of the court's expanding its inquiry beyond the record that
was before the trial court may be questioned. Was the court merely taking
judicial notice of the material it considered that was not before the trial court,
following a liberal view of that doctrine," or was it expanding improperly the
scope of appellate review?" Perhaps an appellate court could make an
independent determination of general acceptance in the scientific community in
a case in which the evidence before the trial court was clearly incomplete; the
basis for such a determination would be that the lower court erred in neglecting
to consider the appropriate material."' The Reed court, however, acknowledged
that substantial evidence on the acceptance issue was presented to the trial
88. See State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978).
89. 283 Md. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377.
90. See id. at 392-95, 391 A.2d at 372-75.
91. Id. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377.
92. Judge Smith in his dissent, urging that the Frye test had been satisfied, properly
focused on the evidence before the lower court. Id. at 469, 391 A.2d at 411-12.
93. See MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 332.
94. Generally, an appellate court may not consider evidence that was not offered or
introduced in the lower court. Nicholas v. Owrutsky. 230 Md. 60, 185 A.2d 498 (1962);
McKenrick v. Savings Bank, 174 Md. 118, 197 A. 580 (1938).
95. See 283 Md. at 380, 391 A.2d at 367.
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court,9 and made no mention of there being an insufficient amount of such
evidence. The Court of Appeals could well have reached the same conclusion
based solely on the evidence before the trial court.
Other questions are raised by the court's statement that although the
demonstration of the reliability of a scientific technique would normally include
witnesses' testimony, a trial court "can and should" take judicial notice of
articles in legal and scientific publications that bear on the degree of acceptance
of the process. 7 If the court's admonition about what a trial court "should" do is
read as stating what it must do, this language in the Reed opinion is of
questionable soundness. It is not realistic as a practical matter for a trial court
always to examine articles and studies pertaining to a question of the reliability
of a new scientific technique - particularly if the parties have not brought the
material to the trial court's attention. Moreover, the extent to which a trial
court goes outside the record to take judicial notice is a matter in that court's
discretion. If this language in Reed is read literally, a degree of the trial court's
discretion in cases involving new scientific techniques will be lost.
96. Id. at 392-95, 391 A.2d at 372-75.
97. Id. at 380, 391 A.2d at 367 (emphasis added).
98. See McCoRMICK, supra note 15, § 333.
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TABLE I: Source Of Cases
TABLE II: Action Of Judges
TABLE III: The Court Of Special Appeals In The Court Of Appeals
A. Reported Opinions Of The Court Of Special Appeals
B. Unreported Opinions Of The Court Of Special Appeals
TABLE IV: Frequency Of Separate Opinions
TABLE V: Judicial Persuasiveness
TABLE VI: Voting Alignment
TABLE VII: Primary Subject Matter Of Opinions
* Tables prepared by Jeffrey S. Amling and William C. Rogers, III, Assistant Editors
of the Maryland Law Review. These Tables follow the format of the Tables used by Prof.
William L. Reynolds in his Article, The Court of Appeals of Maryland: Roles, Work and
Performance - Part I, 37 MD. L. REV. 1, 40-60 (1977).
TABLE I
SOURCE OF CASES
a
A. CERTIORARI Number Percentage
To the Court of Special Appeals
Decided in the Court of Special Appeals 48 34.5
Expedited to Court of Appeals 67 48.2
To Circuit Courts 4 2.9
B. DIRECT APPEALS
Circuit Court 0 0
C. CERTIFIED QUESTIONS 5 3.6
D. PROFESSIONAL SUPERVISION 15 10.8
139 100.0
a. Throughout these Tables, the data include all signed published opinions of the
Court of Appeals decided during the September 1978 Term. Not included are the following:
1. All unsigned orders of the court.
2. All unreported opinions.
The Court of Appeals' decision in In re Oldtowne, 285 Md. 132, 400 A.2d 1111
(1979), has been designated in this Table as a "Professional Supervision" opinion. In
Oldtowne the court denied a petition to obtain a certificate of authorization to use
"Oldtowne Legal Clinic, P.A." as a corporate name for a proposed legal clinic to a
professional service corporation licensed to practice law in Maryland. Id. at 138, 400 A.2d
at 1115.
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TABLE II
ACTION OP' JUDGES
JUDGE AUTHORED JOINED
Opinion Opinion
of of
Court Concurrence Dissent' Court Concurrence Dissent
COLE 18 0 4 96 0 4
DAVIDSON 9 0 2 42 0 0
DIGGES 20 0 0 100 0 2
ELDRIDGE 19 0 4 94 0 2
MURPHY 16 0 4 89 0 3
ORTHb 18 0 3 72 0 3
SMITH 24 0 2 96 0 1
SPECIALLY
ASSIGNED 0 1 0 8 0 0
TOTAL 124C
a. Opinions designated by their author as "Concurring in Part and Dissenting in
Part" are treated in this Table as dissenting opinions. Similarly, opinions in which the
author joined a decision "Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part" are treated as
opinions joining a dissenting opinion.
b. In one case, Judge Orth heard argument but retired prior to the adoption of the
court's opinion.
c. The discrepancy between the total number of decisions listed in this Table and the
total number of decisions listed in Table I occurs because Per Curiam opinions are not
included in this Table, but were included in Table I, and cases consolidated by the court
into a case decided in a single decision are treated as a single decision in this Table, but
were treated as separate cases in Table I.
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TABLE III
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS IN
THE COURT OF APPEALS
a
A. REPORTED OPINIONS OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
MAJORITY CONCURRENCE DISSENT
Authoredb Joined Authored Authored
A-ffirme r vcx u Af -liiied Reversed Affirmed Reversed Afflrmed Reversed
COUCH 2 6 1
GILBERT 2 2
Liss 4 1 1
LOWE 1 3 3 2
MACDANIEL 3
MASON 3 2 3
MELVIN 3 3 3
MOORE 1 2
MORTON 2 2 4
MOYLAN 1 1 2 1
THOMPSON 2 1 5 1
WILNER 1 3 4
DAVIDSONC 1 1 1 4
B. UNREPORTED OPINIONS OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALSd
Number Percentage
Affirmed 8 44.4
Reversed 10 55.6
18 100
a. Although every panel of judges in the Court of Special Appeals consisted of three
judges, Judge Menchine participated in the hearing and the conference in Pope v. State, 38
Md. App. 520, 382 A.2d 880 (1978), rev'd, 284 Md. 309, 396 A.2d 1054 (1979), but retired
prior to the adoption of the opinion by the Court of Special Appeals. In addition, Judge
Powers participated in the hearing and conference in State v. Jones, 38 Md. App. 432, 381
A.2d 317 (1978), affd, 284 Md. 232, 395 A.2d 1182 (1979), but retired prior to the court's
adoption of its opinion.
b. A decision has been designated as "affirmed" or "reversed" if that is the label
placed upon it by the Court of Appeals. The "affirmed" column includes one decision that
was "affirmed in part and vacated in part." The "reversed" column includes decisions that
were "affirmed in part and reversed in part" and decisions that were "vacated and
remanded" and "remanded without affirmance or reversal."
"Affirmed" and "reversed" are fairly crude labels. A decision may be affirmed, for
example, even if the reviewing court thought the grounds given by the lower court to
support the decision below were completely erroneous. Nevertheless, the terms can serve
as rough indicators of possible trends or problems.
c. Judge Davidson served part of the September 1978 Term of the Court of Special
Appeals before she was elevated to the Court of Appeals.
d. Cases that were dismissed by the Court of Special Appeals in unreported opinions
are included in this Table.
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TABLE IV
FREQUENCY OF SEPARATE OPINIONS'
The Court
UNANIMOUS OPINIONS
DECISIONS WITH CONCURRING OPINIONS
DECISIONS WITH DISSENTING OPINIONS
DECISIONS WITH BOTH CONCURRING
OPINIONS AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
Number Percentage
113 85.6
0 0
12 9.1
7 5.3
132 100.0
a. Cases consolidated on appeal, in which the court issued a single opinion disposing
of more than one case, are treated as a single opinion in this Table. Per Curiam opinions
are also included in this Table.
TABLE V
JUDICIAL PERSUASIVENESS
a
(Figures are Percentages)
Author of the
Opinion of
the Court
Opinions
Unanimous with
Opinions Concurrences
Opinions
with
Dissents
Opinions
with
Both
COLE 88.9 0 11.1 0
DAVIDSON 77.8 0 22.2 0
DIGGES 95.0 0 5.0 0
ELDRIDGE 100.0 0 0 0
MURPHY 68.7 0 25.0 6.3
ORTH 83.3 0 0 16.7
SMITH 79.2 0 8.3 12.5
a. Per Curiam opinions are not included in this Table.
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COLE
SPECIALLY J 87.5
ASSIGNED C 12.5
JUDGES D 0.0
J 92.6
SMITH C 0.0
D 7.4
J 87.4
ORTH C 0.0
D 12.6
J 88.1
MURPHY C 0.0
D 11.9
J 95.0
ELDRIDGE C 0.0
D 5.0
J 95.0
DIGGES C 0.0
D 5.0
J 94.2
DAVIDSON C 0.0
D 5.8
DAVIDSON DIGGEs ELDRIDGE MURPHY ORTH SMITH
100.0 85.8 87.5 100.0 66.7 88.9
0.0 14.2 12.5 0.0 0.0 11.1
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0
92.3 95.9 95.8 92.8 91.6
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
7.7 4.1 4.2 7.2 8.4
90.0 91.6 87.0 98.8
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
10.0 8.4 13.0 1.2
88.9 91.9 87.9
0.0 0.0 0.0
1.1 8.1 12.1
92.2 94.9
0.0 0.0
7.8 5.1
96.2
0.0
3.8
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a. Key: J - The two judges joined in the same opinion. One may have authored it.
C - The two judges agreed in the result, but in different opinions.
D - The two judges disagreed in the result.
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TABLE VI
VOTING ALIGNMENT'
(Figures are Percentages)
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TABLE VII
PRIMARY SUBJECT MATTrER OF OPINIONS
Number of Opinions
Criminal
Constitutional Issues (federal and/or state) 12
Evidentiary 6
Procedural (non-constitutional) 14
Substantive 7
Quasi-Criminal
Juvenile 3
Civil
Administrative 12
Constitutional
Federal 6
Maryland 1
Contracts 9
Domestic Relations 1
Domicile 1
Elections 1
Garnishment 1
Guardianship 1
Insurance 6
Procedural
Appellant 6
Pre-Trial and Trial 11
Real Property
Eminent Domain 2
General 2
Zoning 2
Sovereign Immunity 5
Taxation 2
Tort
Defamation/Privacy 2
Negligence 1
Uniform Commercial Code 1
Wills/Estates/Trusts 4
Workers' Compensation 5
Professional Questions
Discipline 14
Supervision 1
139a
a. One case was not included in this Table because the Court of Appeals remanded the
case without affirming or reversing the opinion below. See Molnar v. Childress, 285 Md.
121, 400 A.2d 1106 (1979). Per Curiam opinions are included in this Table.
19801
